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This report presents a feasibility study for weaponizing small Unmanned Air 
Vehicles (UAVs) for campaigns against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
Counter-IED (C-IED) solutions depend not only on advanced technology, but also on a 
combination of superior tactics and timely intelligence.  The primary goal of the C-IED 
mission is to assist in force protection through the implementation of persistent 
surveillance, dependable detection, and the ability to make swift and decisive responses in 
any engagement situation.   
The project was loosely based on an Army Request for Information (RFI), which 
requested arming of the Shadow 200 class of Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV). The project 
scope was limited to the UAV classes with local (squad/battalion) control to provide an 
organic increase in capabilities, specifically Tier I (man-portable) and Tier II (tactical) 
families of UAVs. To further scope the project, integration of weapons was to require no 
major changes to the UAV itself or its current Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) mission.  
A systems engineering approach was developed and utilized to determine the 
feasibility of weaponizing the smaller UAV. The Systems Engineering process used is 
detailed further in the report and consists of the following major phases: problem 
definition, identification of existing capabilities, alternative design research, modeling and 
simulation of alternatives, analysis of alternatives, and recommendation of a solution. 
Current military interest in the UAV and C-IED missions lead the team to find stakeholders 
to help shape the requirements of the project. Three primary stakeholders were identified. 
They include the C-IED Technical Program Office (TPO), the Precision Attack Weapon 
System (PAWS) TPO, and the Irregular Warfare (IW) TPO. Discussions with the 
stakeholders shaped the problem statement and provided feedback to questionnaires 
designed to rank the importance of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of 
Performance (MOP).  
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Several research topics are discussed in the paper as they pertain to the detectability 
of both the UAV by IED emplacement teams and detectability of the IED teams by the 
UAV optics.  The team then researched currently available weapons, both lethal and 
non-lethal, for possible use in the solution. Before transitioning into modeling and 
simulation, the possible weapons were down-selected based on requirements and the 
outcome was eight alternatives.  
Modeling and Simulation was used to explore the performance of the proposed 
alternatives. Both the weapons effects, as dispensed by the UAV and at impact, were 
modeled. From this effort, two clear candidate weapons were selected. From the data 
collected during simulation, only the SAL/GPS guided bomb (GB-1) or a small guided 
missile (M-4) should be the primary weapons systems considered. A warhead kill analysis 
was done and it was found that all weapons dispensed from the Tier II surrogate UAS 
caused minimal damage to collateral targets on the outer targeting zone. 
An aerodynamics analysis of a Tier II UAV with the candidate weapons was 
conducted. It was found that adding a weapon system to a Tier I and Tier II UAV has a 
significant impact on the aerodynamic performance of the baseline system.  Due to 
physical limitations of the Tier I UAV, it was not considered a feasible platform and the 
analysis moved forward with Tier II UAV only.  The RUINS team recommends that any 
weapon system selected for use on a small UAV should emphasize minimizing drag for 
both the weapon and the mounting hardware.  
The cost analysis suggests that the small missile (M-4) weapons option offers the 
best “bang for the buck” in a cost benefits analysis.  The M-4 weapon had the second 
highest Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE) and second lowest Net Present Value 
(NPV).  Although the micro UAV (M-5) weapon option had the highest OMOE, it was 
ruled out because of its high cost. The basic Bomb weapon had the lowest NPV, but it was 
ruled out due to its low OMOE score.   
The recommended weapon for arming the Tier II UAV was the small guided 
missile (M-4), demonstrating high accuracy, maximizing UAV stand-off range, and 
demonstrating cost effectiveness while minimizing the impacts on the baseline UAV.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) have developed into one of the most deadly threats to both Coalition forces 
and civilians across Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although the technologies and materials 
utilized in IEDs are often quite simple, Counter-IED (C-IED) solutions have proven to be 
extremely difficult to identify and implement.  Successful C-IED depends not only on 
advanced technology, but also on a combination of superior tactics and timely intelligence.  
The primary goal of the C-IED mission is to assist in force protection through the 
implementation of persistent surveillance, dependable detection, and the ability to make 
swift and decisive responses in any engagement situation.   
In an effort to adequately address the rapidly evolving IED threat, C-IED 
technologies and tactics are in constant development.  Multiple theaters of operation 
present diverse battlefield conditions, demanding a diligent effort to improve current 
C-IED technology.  In the words of the Counter Explosive Hazards Center Director, 
Lieutenant Colonel Eric Goser, "It's kind of an unrelenting game of catch-up."  Given the 
challenges of the C-IED mission, Goser said, "The frustration is ...  how do I get out in 
front of him [the enemy]? The reward is when you do get ahead of them for that minimal 
amount of time (O'Connor 2010)."  Ensuring the best tools and technologies are available 
to Coalition forces allows development of the most effective C-IED solutions.  The future 
of C-IED lies with Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
to offer capabilities that aid in the battle against the IED threat. 
Unmanned aircraft are currently being used to aid in the C-IED mission.  A UAV 
can be used to monitor suspected bomb-makers to predict their activities through increased 
surveillance.  Once an IED emplacement team has been located by a UAV, Coalition 
forces can avoid or persecute the insurgents.  This research document intends to show that 
providing an armed UAV down at the squad level may give Coalition forces the extra tool 
needed to prevent or neutralize an IED attack. 
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A. Background 
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been largely asymmetric.  The 
overwhelming military force employed by Coalition forces has caused the adversaries to 
employ guerilla tactics instead of traditional military confrontations.  The most effective 
weapon, particularly in Iraq, has been the IED.  The IED is a form of anti-personnel or 
anti-vehicular mine built from scavenged parts and explosive devices (Wilson 2006).  
Based on recent disturbing news reports, the IED has rapidly become the weapon of choice 
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).   
1. The IED Threat 
The IED’s low cost and ease of construction have made it the preferred weapon of 
entities with no conventional military.  Although IEDs have been used for hundreds of 
years, there has been a significant expansion in the use and effectiveness of IEDs in the 
twentieth century due to increased availability of both military and dual-use explosives.   
Variations of the physical architecture are nearly endless due to the ad-hoc nature 
of an IED.  IEDs include the following common components: a main charge, an initiating 
system, and a casing.  Examples of these components are presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Example IED Common Components after (U.S. Army 2008) 
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In Iraq, the most commonly used explosive charges were salvaged artillery shells 
due to their availability, ease of use, and inherent fragmentation capabilities (USMC 2005).  
Conversely, 80 percent of IEDs in Afghanistan are constructed using homemade 
explosives developed from ammonium nitrate, a typical farm fertilizer (JIEDDO 2010).  
Propane tanks and fuel cans have been added to some IEDs to further increase the blast.  
Chemicals, such as battery acid, have been found surrounding the charge, and in some 
instances, nails, ball bearings, and other similar hardware have been used to increase the 
potential for damage and injury to the forces. 
The uses of IED fall into five general categories: Static, Disguised Static, Disguised 
Moveable, Thrown/Projected, and Hoax.  The Static category contains IEDs that have no 
concealment measures: once the IED is placed it is not intended to be moved.  The 
Disguised Static category contains IEDs that can be buried or camouflaged using 
appropriate materials and placed at or near a target.  Disguised moveable are camouflaged 
IEDs, which are designed to be moved.  Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIED) and suicide 
bomber vests are some common means of moving the device once it has been constructed 
and armed.  Thrown or Projected IEDs are used in a manner similar to grenades and are 
typically thrown off overpasses or bridges.  Hoax IEDs are non-operational IEDs used for 
gathering intelligence.  The enemy observes force reactions to the hoax to better develop 
future tactics (USMC 2005). 
Data illustrating the trend of IED incidents associated with recent conflicts in 
Afghanistan are shown in Table 1.  IED incidents, IEDs found, IED attacks, and Coalition 
forces killed or wounded in action by IEDs have all increased each year since 2007.  The 
data in the table suggests IED threats have evolved to become a significant threat to United 
States (U.S.) and Coalition Forces.  Lieutenant General Michael Oates stated “In future 
wars, IEDs will be more sophisticated and the technologies of these devices will become 




Table 1 - Afghanistan Trend Chart June 2010 (JIEDDO 2010) 
Incident 
Totals 
CY07 CY08 CY09 CY10 (As Of June) 
IED Incidents 2,677 3,867 8,206 5,921 
IEDs Turned In 177 118 237 150 
Found/Cleared 1,158 1,892 4,226 3,200 
Ineffective IED Attacks 1,136 1,470 2,923 1,923 
Effective Attacks 206 387 820 648 
Coalition Forces Killed in Action 77 183 322 182 
Coalition Forces Wounded in Action 415 790 1,813 1,303 
 
Continuing development of technology and tactics must continue to protect both 
the troops and innocent civilian population from this insidious threat.  UAVs may provide 
a fast, flexible platform for extending C-IED capabilities. 
2. Unmanned Air System Capabilities 
The Coalition’s primary UAS operational capabilities focus is intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance.  In recent years, the missions of some of the larger 
systems have expanded to include carriage of armaments.  Capabilities and missions 
continue to evolve and develop as new needs arise.  The C-IED mission presents one of 
the emerging areas for improved and expanded UAS capabilities.   
In adapting UAS to be better suited for the C-IED mission, each of the elements 
contained in the UAS must be considered.  As shown in Figure 2, the UAV is but a portion 
of the integrated UAS system.  The UAV must provide the range, loiter time, airspeed, 
and altitude required by the mission.  The mission packages must provide sensors and 
weapons with sufficient capabilities to detect, locate, and defeat IED threats.  The human 
element must be adequately trained to respond with the appropriate tactics and force upon 
IED detection.  The control element must enable commands to be processed quickly 
enough to meet response timelines for IED threats.  The displays must provide operators 
with sufficient detail and accuracy to unambiguously determine the appropriate course of 
action against a detected IED threat.  The communications architecture must allow data to 
be transmitted and received in real-time and not conflict with in-theatre air space 
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operations.  Operational availability, reliability and supportability are critical to ensuring 
the overall effectiveness of UAS in C-IED applications.   
 
 
Figure 2 - UAS Element Integration from (U.S. Army UAS Center of Excellence 2010) 
 
  There are many different sizes of fixed-wing UAVs currently in service.  The 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has divided UAS into categories based on several 
factors as follows (DoD 2009): 
UAS (Cat I).  Analogous to RC models as covered in AC 91-57.  
Operators must provide evidence of airworthiness and operator qualification.  
Small UAS are generally limited to visual line of sight (LOS) operations.  
Examples: Raven, Dragon Eye. 
UAS (Cat II).  Nonstandard aircraft that perform special purpose 
operations.  Operators must provide evidence of airworthiness and operator 
qualification.  Cat II UAS may perform routine operations within a specific set 
of restrictions.  Example: Shadow. 
UAS (Cat III).  Capable of flying throughout all categories of airspace 
and conforms to Part 91 (i.e., all the things a regulated manned aircraft must do 
including the ability to see and avoid (S&A)).  Airworthiness certification and 
operator qualification are required.  UAS are generally built for beyond LOS 
operations.  Examples: Global Hawk, Predator. 
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The FAA made determinations concerning the airspace each type of UAS could 
use.  These operational parameters were divided into the three categories as presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - FAA Restrictions on UAS Categories from (DoD 2009) 
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The Joint Unmanned Air System (JUAS) Certificate of Authorization (COA) 
established a five-level categorization for UAS as presented in Table 3.  These categories 
were accepted by all services on 25 November 2008.  The Marines have defined the term 
“tiers” to refer to the various categories, while the Air Force, Army, and DoD use the term 
“groups.”   The tiers were determined by takeoff weight, operating altitude and speed. 
Tiers I, II and III were targeted for consideration in the C-IED solution presented in 
this Capstone Project.  Each tier has specific support requirements and operational 
restrictions.  Tier I, containing the smallest of the UAV, may be transported by two men or 
less with specialized backpacks.  UAVs in this tier are termed “man-portable.”  Tiers II 
and III are referred to as “tactical” UAS.  The tactical UAS require more support 
equipment and personnel for their operations than man-portable.  Tiers IV and V are 
“theater” UAS and were beyond the scope of this investigation.  Both man-portable and 
tactical UAS may be controlled at the local level and offer an organic capability to local 
troops.  In contrast, control of theater UAS shift from local operations to theater level, 
allowing better management of airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.   
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Current/Future   
Representative UAS 
Tier I 0-20 <1,200 AGL 100 kts 





RQ16A, Pointer, Aqua 
Tern, Puma 





Silver Fox, Aerosonde 






>1,320 Any Airspeed 
MQ-5B, MQ-8B, 
MQ-1A/B/C, A-160 





Representative UAVs are presented in Table 4.  Tactical UAVs are identified by 
the shading of the table.  Lighter-than-air (LTA) and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 
UAS are not included this study.  The primary tasks of the listed UAS are to perform 
reconnaissance and surveillance.  To accomplish this type of mission, all the above UAS 
have UAVs minimally equipped with some form of visual surveillance equipment.  The 
majority of the man-portable UAVs are equipped with either visual or infrared (IR) 
cameras due to their limited payload capacity.  Most of the tactical group carry cameras 
for both spectral bands at all times and include gimbaled mountings for better image 





Table 4 - Representative Tier I - III UAS Systems (DoD 2009) 
Name 
 








TACMAV 0.1 11 1.5 0.5 
Wasp III 0.25 0.5 3 0.75 
RQ-11 Pathfinder (Raven) 0.7 15 5 1.5 
RQ-11 Swift/Dragon Eye 1.0 10 2.5 1.0 
Aqua/Terra Puma 2-4 10 6 2.5 
Buster 3.0 10 6 4 
Silver Fox 5.0 16 20 8 
Aerosonde 12 20 1,000 30 
Scan Eagle 13 16 60 15 
XPV-1 Tern 25 10 40 2 
XPV-2 Mako 30 10 40 8.5 
RQ-7 Shadow 60 14 60 6 
 
It is believed that none of the UAVs in the table currently carry offensive weapons. 
The uses and missions of UAS are only expected to expand in the coming years.  Delivery 
of a warfighting capability is the focus of future developmental efforts and of this capstone. 
B. Systems Engineering Process 
The systems engineering (SE) process used for this project was a modification of a 
process model proposed by John M. Green, formerly of Raytheon, now with the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), for modeling a ship as a weapon system (Green March 27-29, 
2001).  As shown in Figure 3, some stages of the SE process contained multiple tasks and 
parallel efforts to develop multiple prototypes (models) for use in evaluation of 
alternatives.  The output of the process was a design recommendation based on analysis 
and tradeoff studies, rather than a completed physical system.  The following sections 
detail each phase of the process. 
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Figure 3 - Systems Engineering Process Model 
 
1. Mission Requirements Determination Methodology 
The project was proposed in response to a definite mission need: IED interdiction 
and prosecution.  Additional refinement and fidelity of the mission requirements were 
developed after consultation with subject matter experts (SME) and stakeholders.  
Stakeholders were identified as representatives from the C-IED, Weapons, Irregular 
Warfare, and UAV communities.  The required missions were thoroughly understood 
before a proper identification of the depth and scope of the true problem was ascertained.  
Design reference missions that closely represent operational missions were developed 
using information gathered from stakeholders.  Using the developed reference missions, 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) metrics were identified for use in the analysis of 
alternatives and in validation of warfighter needs of the proposed solutions. 
2. Problem Definition Phase 
Following determination of accurate mission requirements, investigation and 
analysis were performed to aid in properly identifying and scoping the problem.  Outputs 
Evaluation of 
Alternatives
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from the Problem Definition phase included a detailed problem statement, requirements to 
guide the later design and evaluation phases, and engagement scenarios for use in the 
evaluation phase.   
a) Identification of Existing Capabilities 
Research of existing capabilities was necessary to ensure that any proposed 
solution was not a duplicate of what is already available.  Additionally, knowledge of 
existing capabilities allowed proposed solutions to augment the current solutions and 
ensure they do not detract from current solutions. 
b) Stakeholder Identification and Analysis  
Identification of parties that may have an input to the mission or solution 
was identified early in the SE process to ensure the problem was fully addressed from a 
variety of viewpoints.  Each of the stakeholders had their own priorities including 
approach, boundaries, needs, and viewpoint.  Performing a stakeholder analysis promotes 
an understanding of the different stakeholders, their relationship to the project, and their 
priorities.  The stakeholders aided in the development of mission scenarios and 
identification of additional mission requirements.  In addition, careful performance of 
stakeholder analysis aided in clearly delineating needs and wants.  The stakeholders also 
acted as a verification authority for the selected MOEs and proposed additional metrics. 
c) Identification of Constraints, Limitations, and Boundaries  
The C-IED problem and proposed problem solution have a clearly 
identified boundary.  Every possible nuance of the mission cannot be addressed within the 
constraints of the project.  Other constraints or limitations preclude certain solutions for 
various political and logistical reasons.  Identification of any limiting factors was done 
early in the problem identification process to help scope the tasks to be accomplished in the 
follow-on processes. 
3. Design of Alternatives Phase 
Information developed during the Problem Definition phase was used in 
combination with research, model development, and development of concept of operations 
to define possible means of satisfying the mission requirements.  Models developed 
during this phase were verified against the requirements and expectations provided by the 
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Problem Definition phase.  Measures of Performance (MOP) and Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) were developed and verified during this phase.  The developed 
requirements and metrics were utilized in the following Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
phase. 
a) Alternative Design Research  
Investigation of currently available technologies, implementations, and 
tactics was performed to identify possible components and approaches to a system 
solution.  Research was conducted using academic and workplace library resources, 
internet resources, and interviews in an effort to determine the limits of what is 
technologically and logistically feasible within the timeframe of the project. 
b) Model Development of Alternative Design Components 
Design of system solutions for this project was accomplished by 
development of models as no physical system was delivered.  The models developed were 
verified against input parameters as well as information developed and gathered during the 
Research phase to adequately model the components necessary for final system evaluation.   
c) Model Verification 
The models developed during this stage were analyzed against 
requirements and capabilities developed during problem definition to ensure that they 
accurately reflected the anticipated performance parameters.  This iterative process was 
repeated until the models achieved an adequate level of accuracy required for the study.    
4. Operations Development of Alternative Designs 
A critical component to the system design was how to operate the system and its 
planned implementation.  Development of operational methods and tactics were 
accomplished to provide a complete system solution for the AoA phase. 
5. Analysis of Alternatives Phase 
The mission scenarios developed during the Program Definition phase were used in 
concert with the verified models developed during the Design of Alternatives phase to 
evaluate the performance of the proposed solution systems, in a simulation environment, to 
determine the optimum weapon solution.  The approach was iterative, as multiple 
solutions were expected to be developed.  Results of modeling were used to evaluate 
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combined system performance against the metrics and other factors determined during 
Problem Definition and Design of Alternatives.  The evaluation was performed in an 
effort to determine the solution that best meets cost and performance requirements and to 
develop data for validation of proposed system performance.  Information developed 
during this phase was used for the generation of a final recommendation report.  
Simulating and scoring the alternatives for performance are the two major activities that 
were accomplished during this phase. 
a) Simulate and Analyze Engagements of Proposed Alternatives 
Mission simulations using the models developed during the previous phase 
and the scenarios developed during the Problem Definition phase were used to develop 
parameters and evaluation methods for comparison of proposed solutions.  Many 
iterations of mission simulations included the full range of operational and system 
possibilities.  Each mission simulation was analyzed to ensure accuracy remained 
comparable to others, allowing direct comparison of results. 
b) Scoring and Analysis of Proposed Alternatives Performance 
Selected metrics and methods were used to compare, contrast, and evaluate 
the performance of the various alternatives against each other in an effort to determine the 
optimum solution.  The analysis included measures of cost as well as performance in the 
evaluations. 
c) Solution Validation 
Each possible UAV-weapon pairing simulated was evaluated against the 
requirements and documented stakeholder preferences to insure that the solutions would 
meet the operational needs.  The observed solutions performances were compared with 
the measures of effectiveness to further aid the selection of the optimum solution. 
6. Recommended Solution Development and Documentation 
The successful completion of the previous phases provided information included in 
a final compiled evaluation and recommendation.  This document contains a thorough 
discussion of the compete process coupled with a detailed analysis and reasoning behind 
the final recommended solution. 
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C. Scope 
Several assumptions, limitations, and constraints were identified and in place for 
the duration of the project.  Additional limitations on scope were expected to develop as a 
result of stakeholder interactions during the development process.  The next sections 
detail the assumptions and the limitations and constraints identified for this project. 
1. Assumptions 
The team made several assumptions to limit the scope of the task and provide a 
reasonable basis for comparison of alternate solutions. These include degradation of 
current UAV operational capabilities, modifications to the air vehicle, the effect on normal 
UAV flight parameters and operations, and representations of the UAV systems used in 
this study. 
a) No Degradation of Current UAV Operational Capabilities 
Proposed modifications to the UAVs do not significantly adversely impact 
current operational modes, parameters, capabilities, or readiness. The stakeholders were 
willing to accept a 25 percent reduction in performance to accommodate weapon 
integration. 
b) No Modification to Air Vehicle 
Any proposed solution would require no major modifications to the UAV 
airframe itself.  For the purposes of this study, the airframe was assumed to be physically 
and mechanically capable of transporting the entire payload (sensors and weapons) within 
normal operational boundaries.  Minor mounting holes were considered acceptable and 
necessary electrical connections possible without major modification.  
c) Normal UAV Flight Parameters and Operations 
The UAV will maintain its normal operating procedures, flight parameters, 
and limits.  The operator was asked to perform additional tasking; however, the UAV was 
operated within the same flight envelope.  
d) Surrogate Representation Adequate for Study 
The proposed surrogate representations of the two UAVs addressed in the 
study were considered adequate.  The study was intended to incorporate broad weapons 
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concepts for all in the man-portable and tactical UAV variations within a tier, without 
make or model specifics. 
2. Limitations and Constraints 
Several limitations and constraints were identified and in place for the duration of 
the project.  These included keeping the classification of the document to Unclassified, 
limiting the UAS surrogate models to two generic variants, time restrictions of the study, 
and legal implications of arming a UAV. The following sections discuss these in further 
detail. 
a) Classification 
The Team realized that incorporation of exact specifications could result in 
the release of sensitive information.  As a result, no exact specifications are included in 
this report.  Instead, generic representative values obtained from open source literature 
were used.  Any resulting solution remains unclassified.  To ensure no accidental 
information disclosures, classification guidelines for included technologies were obtained 
and reviewed.  All documentation generated was reviewed frequently by SME to ensure 
no inadvertent disclosures. 
b) Limited UAS Models 
Twelve representative UAVs were identified in Table 4.  Rather than 
attempt to address every possible variant of these UAV with their subtle differences, 
generic representations of a man-portable and tactical UAV were created.  Only these two 
representations were used in the study. 
c) Time 
The time available for completion of the study is fixed: approximately eight 
months.  Team schedules need to be adjusted to allow adequate time to participate in the 
various facets of the project. 
d) Legal Issues 
There has been some concern by the Team that certain arming aspects of 
UAV may be prevented by International Law or treaties.  The Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty Article II between the U.S. and the Soviet Union addresses 
"ground-launched cruise missiles" with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers 
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(Gormley and Speier 2003).  The team is aware of this issue.  As the project is a study 
only with no actual deployment planned, this possible constraint did not affect the study. 
D. Path Forward 
By some estimates, there are currently several thousand UAS in theater in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The majority of these devices are capable of being operated at the local 
company/platoon/squad level rather than under theater control.  Many of these devices are 
not being fully utilized due to limitations in the performance of the currently fielded 
equipment (DoD 2009).  Advancements in technology realized since their initial 
development may provide means for extending the operational utility of these UAS, 
increasing their usefulness to the warfighter in the C-IED mission by providing a more 
efficient and effective capability.  Given a better equipped, more robust, and more flexible 
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II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The Problem Definition phase defined the scope and boundaries of the analysis to 
be performed and resulted in the generation of system level requirements and a system 
architecture.  Needs analysis was the first major event and consisted of performing 
stakeholder and existing capability identification and analysis, development of 
representative mission scenarios, and defining the constraints and limitations applicable to 
the project.  These activities resulted in a refinement of the problem statement, a set of 
system requirements, a hierarchy of objectives, determination of the system boundary, 
functional analysis, and development of measures of performance and related key 
performance parameters.  Finally, an architecture to be used in the accomplishment of the 
project was developed. 
A. Needs Analysis 
Stakeholders and their inputs served as the starting point for the Needs Analysis, 
but additional investigations and analyses were required to begin developing solutions that 
meet the true needs of the stakeholders.  A capabilities assessment was performed to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of current systems in a C-IED role.  
Additionally, Concept of Operation (CONOPS) and engagement scenarios were developed 
to define an operational context and limit the scope to a manageable level for analysis.  
Finally, it was necessary to understand the mission requirements, identify the constraints 
and outline the assumptions that were used to establish boundaries for the problem.  
Through these processes, it became apparent that the primitive need of the C-IED with 
UAS problem might be addressed by developing enhancements for UAS that improve the 
capabilities to defeat IEDs and/or the IED placement teams.   
1. Stakeholders 
The Roving UAV IED Interdiction System (RUINS) team researched various 
organizations that had interest in UAS and C-IED to locate potential stakeholders for the 
project.  Contact was established through telephone calls, emails, and meetings.  These 
initial discussions helped shape the initial problem statement and eventually led to contacts 
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within the stakeholder organizations. The contacts also provided feedback to 
questionnaires designed to rank the importance of potential MOEs and MOPs. 
a) Stakeholder Identification 
The RUINS project has seven stakeholders.  They have been divided into 
different levels according to their influence on a program.  The primary stakeholders have 
the authority to make a program-changing decision if needed.  Secondary stakeholders 
lack this authority, but are very important to the successful completion of the project due to 
their expertise in certain aspects of the project.  The tertiary level stakeholders are not 
directly involved in the project, but do bring valuable insights to the approach to the 
project. 
Three primary stakeholders have been identified.  They include the C-IED 
Technical Program Office (TPO), the Precision Attack Weapon System (PAWS) TPO, and 
the Irregular Warfare (IW) TPO. 
Three secondary stakeholders were asked to provide inputs to the project.  
All three are certified UAV pilots who train others in proper UAV operation.  Two are 
associated with tactical UAVs, and one is associated with man-portable UAVs. 
The single tertiary stakeholder on the project is a systems engineer with 
many years of experience.  His role was a subject matter expert (SME) for the Team.  His 
long experience in accomplishing tasks such as the RUINS project is critical to the best 
results from the Team. 
b) Stakeholder Analysis 
Each of the stakeholders was sent a questionnaire containing a pair-wise 
ranking matrix including proposed MOEs and MOPs.  At the same time, the relative 
importance of each of the primary stakeholders, and their relation to the project, was 
determined by the Team to best score the responses.  The questionnaire responses were 
reviewed to develop a stakeholder ranking according to each stakeholder’s preferences.  
Stakeholder weighting derived by the Team was then applied to develop a final ranking of 




Table 5 - MOE from Stakeholder Responses 
Stakeholder Ranked Measures of Effectiveness 
Stakeholder Counter IED 
Irregular 
Warfare PAWS Final 
Ranking Stakeholder Weight 0.37 0.30 0.33 
Target Identification 0.2470 0.1830 0.1270 0.1882 
Maneuvering Target Strike 0.2113 0.0560 0.2100 0.1643 
Reconnaissance 0.1757 0.1970 0.1200 0.1637 
Surveillance 0.1400 0.1970 0.1050 0.1456 
Stationary Target Strike 0.1043 0.0610 0.1810 0.1166 
Flexible Capabilities 0.0687 0.2470 0.0330 0.1104 
Covert Target Tracking 0.0033 0.0590 0.2230 0.1035 
 
Table 6 - MOP from Stakeholder Responses 
Stakeholder Ranked Measures of Performance 
Stakeholder Counter IED 
Irregular 
Warfare PAWS Final 
Ranking 
Stakeholder Weight 0.37 0.30 0.33 
Data Link Performance 0.2450 0.1280 0.1960 0.1937 
Target Tracking 0.1614 0.1030 0.2440 0.1711 
Sensor Spectral Bands 0.2171 0.1480 0.1110 0.1614 
Control Range 0.1057 0.2300 0.1080 0.1437 
Sensor Resolution 0.0779 0.1870 0.1550 0.1361 
RF Detection Threshold 0.1893 0.0640 0.0740 0.1137 
Target Localization Error 0.1336 0.0910 0.0680 0.0992 
RF Directional Resolution 0.0500 0.0500 0.0450 0.0484 
 
To determine the effects of variations in the relative stakeholder rankings 
and their effects on the final MOE and MOP, a simple sensitivity analysis was performed. 
In a typical sensitivity analysis, each stakeholder response and stakeholder weight is 
varied, one at a time (Haskins 2007).  The effect on the resulting ranking is noted for each 
change.  In this analysis, the relative stakeholder ranking was applied to a different 
stakeholder’s response preferences.  Six possible ranking variations were investigated.  It 
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was found that these variations had no effect on the final MOP ranking results.  In the 
MOE results, an occasional ranking swap of two of the upper level measures, “Conduct 
Maneuvering Target Strike” and “Conduct Reconnaissance,” did occur.  This swap was 
not surprising given the relatively equal ranking of those two measures. 
2. Current C-IED Capabilities 
"Tackling the IED threat is vital for us to make military progress.  C-IED is not 
just about the bomb disposal expert defusing a bomb, as vital and dangerous that role is.  It 
is about making sure our soldiers have a range of tools, tactics and techniques available to 
them." – United Kingdom Minister for Defense Equipment, Support and Technology, 
Peter Luff.  
Current tactics for countering the IED threat are constantly evolving.  Friendly 
forces develop countermeasures for particular types of IEDs.  Meanwhile, the bomb 
makers are also developing and evolving their techniques as well.  The following IED 
Defeat Framework from the U.S. Army Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Field Manual 
summarizes the best practices when dealing with IEDs. 
From IED Defeat Framework (Department of the Army 2005): 
Predict activities.  These activities are used to identify and understand 
enemy personnel, equipment, infrastructure, [tactics, techniques, and 
procedures] TTP, support mechanisms, or other actions to forecast specific 
enemy IED operations directed against U.S. interests.  This is driven largely by 
success in analysis in the requirements management.  Predict activities assists 
in― 
• Identifying patterns of enemy behavior. 
• Identifying emerging threats. 
• Predicting future enemy actions. 
• Prioritizing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
missions. 
• Exploiting IED threat vulnerabilities. 
• Targeting enemy IED attack nodes (such as funding and supplies). 
• Disseminating alert information rapidly to specific users. 
• Analyzing forensics and enabling better on-scene technical analysis. 
Detect activities.  These activities contribute to the identification and 
location of enemy personnel, explosive devices, and their component parts, 
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equipment, logistics operations, and infrastructure in order to provide accurate 
and timely information.  These actions assist in the efforts to interdict and 
destroy these activities.  Detect activities aid in─ 
• Detecting and identifying explosive material and other IED components. 
• Detecting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
material. 
• Recognizing suicide bombers. 
• Conducting forensic operations to track bomb makers and/or handlers. 
• Conducting persistent surveillance. 
• Training to improve detection of IED indicators by digital means. 
• Developing priority information requirements (PIR) tied to IED 
operations decisive points.  Linking and synchronizing detection assets 
to PIR-related named areas of interest (NAIs).  Using detection means 
across the full range available (from imagery, mechanical-clearance 
operations, search techniques, dogs, and so forth). 
• Recognizing individual soldier actions and awareness in all activities. 
Prevent activities.  These activities disrupt and defeat the IED 
operational chain of events.  The actions focus on the target to interdict or 
destroy key enemy personnel (bomb makers, leaders, and financiers), the 
infrastructure/logistics capabilities (suppliers and bomb factories), and 
surveillance/targeting efforts (reconnaissance and overmatch operations) before 
emplacement of the device.  They also include actions to deter public support for 
the use of IEDs by the enemy.  Prevent activities aid in― 
• Disrupting enemy operations and their support structure. 
• Denying critical IED-related supplies to the enemy. 
• Increasing awareness of enemy TTP and their effectiveness. 
• Denying the enemy the opportunity to emplace IEDs (through presence 
patrols, observation posts, checkpoints, aggressive surveillance 
operations, and so forth). 
• Rewarding local nationals’ cooperation in determining the locations of 
caches, bomb making, or emplacing activities. 
• Denying easily concealed locations (such as trash piles and debris along 
sides of primary routes) and removing abandoned vehicles along routes. 
Avoid activities.  These activities keep friendly forces from IEDs when 
prevention activities are not possible or have failed.  Avoid activities include― 
• Increasing situational understanding (SU) of the area of operations 
(AOs) and continually refining the common operational picture (COP) 
and the timely and accurate dissemination of related information. 
• Ensuring timely and accurate status reporting and tracking. 
• Altering routes and routines. 
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• Marking and bypassing suspected IEDs. 
Neutralize activities.  These activities contribute to the destruction or 
reduction of enemy personnel, explosive devices, or supplies.  They can be 
proactive or reactive in nature. 
• Proactive activities include conducting operations to eliminate or 
interrupt the enemy’s leaders, suppliers, trainers, enablers, and 
executors responsible for the employment of IEDs against coalition 
forces. 
• Reactive activities include conducting controlled detonations or render 
safe procedures (RSPs) against identified IEDs, caches, captured enemy 
ammunition (CEA), and so forth.  Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
forces are the only personnel authorized to render safe IEDs. 
Protect activities.  These activities improve the survivability of IED 
targets through hardening, awareness training, or other techniques.  Protect 
activities include― 
• Disrupting, channeling, blocking, or redirecting energy and 
fragmentation. 
• Creating greater standoff distances to reduce the effect that IEDs have on 
their intended targets. 
• Incorporating unmanned platforms. 
• Using jamming devices. 
• Reducing time and distance in which intended targets are within IED 
range. 
• Accelerating processes and increasing the effectiveness by which 
reaction and evacuation operations are conducted. 
• Providing blast and fragmentation mitigation for platforms, structures, 
and personnel. 
• Avoiding establishing patterns and predictable forms of behavior. 
• Conducting proper pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and rehearsals for all 
operations. 
• Treating every operation as a combat mission (from a simple convoy to 
daily forward operating base (FOB) security). 
 
Unmanned aircraft can be used in all areas of the framework.  A UAV can be used 
to monitor suspected bomb-makers to predict their activities.  UAV can be used to detect 
IEDs once they have been emplaced.  Prevention can be accomplished through increased 
surveillance.  Once the IED has been located by a UAV, friendly forces can avoid it or act 
to disarm it.  IEDs can be neutralized by a UAV either by targeting the bomb-makers 
23 
before they have a chance to act or by rendering the emplaced IED safe.  UAV can carry 
jamming devices ahead of a supply convoy to protect it.  Providing an armed UAV at the 
squad level may give them the extra tool needed to prevent or neutralize the IED. 
3. IED Defeat Capabilities 
There are several methods of IED defeat in the field today.  Devices currently in 
the field serve to either detect IEDs to allow neutralization prior to detonation or help 
minimize the effects due to detonation.  The methods currently employed are jamming, 
route clearing, neutralization, detecting explosives, EOD, and protection for vehicles and 
personnel. 
Commonly used C-IED devices are the Joint Counter Radio-Controlled Electronic 
Warfare (JCREW) Systems.  These systems are commonly employed on the ground, 
either mounted on vehicles or as part of a man-portable system.  These systems prevent 
radio-frequency (RF) controlled IEDs from detonating by jamming communications.  
They cover a wide spectrum of threat frequencies but may also disrupt friendly 
communications and datalinks.  These Electronic Warfare (EW)-based systems provide 
localized protection and do not depend on actually detecting IEDs.  This means there are 
still significant dangers to friendly forces and civilians.  A UAV system could augment 
the JCREW systems by providing alerts to potential IED locations through alternative 
methods, such as laser designation or paint marking that could easily be seen by ground 
forces. 
The Vehicle Operated Sensor System (VOSS) supports the C-IED mission by 
providing increased situational awareness.  VOSS is a ground vehicle-based system with a 
stabilized camera, which is mounted upon a 25-foot mast.  While the mast-mounted 
camera provides some localized detection capability for the vehicles within the convoy, the 
mast mounted system is very visible and acts as a beacon to the enemy. 
 A UAV-mounted camera could provide wide-area detection coverage prior to 
entry by a vehicle convoy.  An added benefit of the UAV over the mast mounted system is 
that the UAV system is more covert.   
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4. Existing UAS Capabilities 
The idea of using a UAV to support the C-IED mission is not new.  There are 
several C-IED UAS such as the Sky Warrior Alpha, Sentinel Hawk, MQ-5B Hunter, 
Copperhead, and Yellow Jacket.  These UAS employ infrared sensors used for 
route-directed cooperative UAV surveillance, radar systems to detect specialized threat 
returns, and full-motion video to directly control vehicles (Simpson 2009).  However, the 
main focus of these systems is surveillance.  Therefore RUINS focused specifically on 
possible weapon technologies for use with the Tier I (man-portable) and Tier II (tactical) 
UAV without removing existing UAV capabilities.  The investigation utilized surrogate 
representations of the two UAV tier groups with representative sensor performance, flight 
characteristics, and physical parameters. 
a) Man-Portable UAS Capabilities 
Tier I UAS, or Man-Portable UAS, are already being used in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Many of the small UAV have optical systems, but little else, as they are largely 
used in an ISR type function.  Table 7 lists the physical properties of these Tier I UAVs in 
theater.  The most commonly used Tier I systems are: 
• Raven – Generally used for aerial intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, 
and reconnaissance.  The Raven uses a Charge-Coupled Device (CCD) color 
video camera or an infrared night vision camera for Day/Night capability. 
• Cutlass – Developed to provide ISR, the Cutlass uses a steerable low-light 
camera that interfaces to a real-time video tracker to provide target tracking. 
• Wasp – Designed for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition 
(RSTA) and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), the Wasp uses several 
miniature Electro-Optic (EO) video-cameras. 
• Puma – An upgrade to the Pointer UAV, the Puma employs two EO/IR cameras 




















Cutlass1 55.2 32.6 85, 65 unavailable 1 3 
Raven2 54 36 44, 17 500 1 to 1.5 unavailable 
Wasp2 28.5 15 31, 22 1,000 0.75 unavailable 
Puma2 110.4 55.2 40, 20 500 2 unavailable 
1. Refers to all Cutlass data (L3 Communications 2009) 
2. Refers to all Raven, Wasp, and Puma data(AeroVironment, Inc. 2010) 
 
The Tier I surrogate was defined by averaging the physical parameters of 
the UAVs in Table 7.  Although the AeroVironment manufactured UAVs (Raven, Wasp, 
and Puma) do not advertise any payload capability, the Tier I operators that Team Bravo 
contacted claimed small payload integration efforts up to 1.5 to 2.5 lbs.  The Tier I 
surrogate UAV is defined in Table 8. 
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62 34.7 50, 31 500 1.3 2.5 
 
b) Tactical UAS Capabilities 
Tier II UAS, also known as Tactical UAS, "fill the capability gap between 
the short range mini-UAVs and the long range, extended endurance [Medium Altitude 
Long Endurance] MALE and [High Altitude Long Endurance] HALE UAVs, combining 
the flexibility of the smaller platforms with the longer endurance of the higher-end 
platforms" (Thales n.d.). 
Most Tactical UAS are still only used for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) purposes.  Common payloads include optical 
payloads such as an infrared camera, and a daytime television (TV) camera with a 
selectable near-infrared filter, and often employ a laser pointer to aid in targeting. 
26 
Team Bravo utilized the same approach to identify the Tier II surrogate 
UAV as implemented for the Tier I UAV.  The team researched the physical properties of 
the most commonly operated UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The properties are listed in 
Table 9. The Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) POP-300D sensor was considered to be the 
sensor package for this Tier.  This sensor package provides an inertially-stabilized 
platform for the multiple field of view (FOV) 3–5 μm IR and visible optical sensors.  In 
addition, the sensor package includes an optically bore-sighted laser target designator 
system, compatible with many U.S. weapon systems, as well as an eye-safe laser range 
finder (Israel Aerospace Industries 2009). 
 
Table 9 - Most Common Tier II UAVs 



















RQ-7 2001 244.8 141.6 90, 65 15,000 8 to 9 45-80 327 
RQ-7 4001 201.6 150 85, 65 11,000 5 75 448 
RQ-7 6001 268.8 188.4 80, 65 16,000 12 to 14 91 584 
Tarzan2 216 129 unavbl, 43 14,000 unavbl 105 unavbl 
TigerShark 
LR33 204.7 187 unavbl, 65 unavbl 9.5 150 unavbl 
Sentry HP4 153.6 101.04 75, unavbl 16,000 8 75 325 
Pioneer5 201.6 168 99, unavbl 15,000 4.5 99 448 
1. Refers to all RQ-7 200, 400, and 600 data (AAI Corporation 2010) 
2. Refers to all Tarzan data (Theiss Aviation 2010) 
3. Refers to TigerShark LR3 data except payload (Flightglobal 2010) 
4. Refers to all Sentry HP data (Wikipedia 2010) 
5. Refers to Pioneer data except payload (Parsch 2007) 
 
The surrogate Tier II UAV was defined by averaging the physical 
parameters of the UAVs in Table 9.  Although the TigerShark LR3 and Pioneer UAVs did 
not have defined payloads in their respective references, the SMEs and UAV operators 
contacted by Team Bravo had estimated 150 lbs and 99 lbs respectively.  Team Bravo 
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213 152.1 85.8, 63 14,500 7.83 92.96 426.4 
 
5. UAS-Based C-IED CONOPS 
Tactical and man-portable UAS platforms are already being used to provide ISR 
capabilities to U.S. ground forces.  Weaponizing these types of UAS would provide a 
quick strike capability to eliminate IEDs and the personnel responsible for placing and 
detonating IEDs while maintaining their current ISR capabilities.  The envisioned 
CONOPS for UAS-based C-IED would be a modification to current ISR CONOPS.   
Launch and recovery would maintain commonality with traditional ISR operations.  
Expected differences would include loading the weapon onto the UAS prior to launch and 
performing any additional preflight checks.  The UAS would be brought to an ordnance 
loading location where the weapons would be attached after having their mission 
parameters programmed.  It would then be transported to the launch area and loaded onto 
the launcher (for Tactical UAS).  The weapon would be armed just prior to launching the 
UAS.  Recovery after a mission where the weapon was not fired could require 
modifications to the recovery system.  These would depend on the size of the weapon 
relative to the UAS. 
Weapon handling procedures would maintain commonality to manned platform 
operations.  In cases where the weapon was not traditionally used in an air-to-ground 
fashion, new procedures will be developed.  These procedures would be drawn from the 
best practices of similar airborne weapons handling.  
For a weaponized system, the UAS would be loaded with a pre-planned route to 
patrol and provide real-time situational awareness back to the ground station.  The UAS 
sensor package would then search along the pre-planned route to detect and track potential 
28 
targets.  The tracked targets would be identified and confirmed by the ground station 
operator.  This portion of the mission would be identical to a traditional ISR mission.   
If a potential target is found, the operator would designate the target using the 
ground control station.  Movement to the target could be accomplished by placing an 
additional waypoint into the flight plan.  The location of this waypoint may need to move 
dynamically for rapidly moving targets.  The UAS would then autonomously navigate to 
an appropriate launch area for the weapon to be employed.  Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
procedures follow with consent to fire under human control culminating in the desired 
outcome: employing a lethal or non-lethal weapon to neutralize the IED threat. 
Should a weapons deployment using the weaponized UAS not be approved by the 
firing authority, the UAS would continue to maintain track on the target and provide target 
location data to Command and Control (C2).  C2 would then command EOD or another 
response team to address the IED threat.  After engagement of the IED threat by friendly 
forces, the UAS would provide imagery data for BDA by the ground station crew.  After 




Figure 4 - RUINS OV-1 
 
To evaluate the operations and effectiveness of proposed UAS-weapon solutions 
developed during the project, representative targets and scenarios were developed by 
incorporating suggestions and preferences provided by stakeholders.  The developed 
scenarios were also used in identifying important modeling parameters and additional 
considerations necessary for the use of RUINS that may have been overlooked in earlier 
analysis.  While primary emphasis was placed on the successful engagement of the 
targets, collateral damage, timing, and cost were also considered during the evaluations.   
Figure 5 outlines the notional operations and interactions that take place during the 
mission scenarios where the ground control station commands a UAV to engage a target 
with a weapon.  It is assumed the imagery being fed to the ground control station is of 
sufficient quality for the human operator to detect and identify the target.  It is also 
assumed that the weapon provides sufficient effectiveness to kill the target.  
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Figure 5 - System Operations and Interactions for RUINS Target Engagement 
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B. Scenario Development 
Two types of targets were used in the analysis.  The different vulnerabilities of the 
targets provide for the broad examination of weapon capabilities needed for this initial 
investigation.  Both targets, while related to the C-IED mission, are also representative of 
the types of targets an armed UAV may engage in other mission types. 
1. Targets 
a) IED Emplacement Team.   
Three persons were used in the representation of an IED emplacement team.  
These persons were unprotected by any armor or protective gear.  Two were considered 
actively engaged in actual IED emplacement: kneeling, facing each other, and separated by 
approximately three feet.  A non-active IED was being assembled on the ground between 
them.  While not yet activated, the explosive of the IED could be detonated by the effects 
of an offensive weapon.  The third person was serving as a lookout, and was standing 
approximately eight feet from the center of the other two persons.  Weapons utilized 
against this type of target were lethal. 
b) (2) Light Vehicle.   
A separate target was required for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
UAV-weapon system against a lightly armored vehicle.  The target was considered to be a 
transport vehicle utilized by those engaged in the implantation of IEDs.  The vehicle did 
not need to be destroyed for success, but must lose its mobility.  The target was 
represented by a small standard half-ton pickup. 
2. Scenarios 
a) Fixed Threat Scenario 
Scenario 1 considered a fixed target. A fixed IED threat, represented by the 
IED emplacement team target, was assumed to be positioned at the red triangle.  The 
RUINS operator was assumed to be at least five kilometers away.  UAV flight altitude 
was assumed at elevations of 100 and 500 feet above ground level (AGL) for the Tier I 
UAV, and 500 and 2000 feet AGL for the Tier II UAV.  The UAV was dispatched to the 
target location from random locations in its ISR path, allowing differing targeting times.  
Different airspeeds were used for each Tier: 30 knots for the Tier I UAV, 65 knots for the 
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Tier II UAV.  A single time of day, noon, was simulated.  Other particulars concerning 
the engagement are included in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 - Stationary Target Scenario 
Scenario 1: STATIONARY TARGET SCENARIO 
Purpose: Simulate armed UAS interdiction against a stationary target with 
elevated risk of collateral damage. 
Domain: Medium-sized city in arid environment (3 story buildings or less, 
populated areas, narrow dirt streets)  




Assumptions: 1.0. Locally controlled UAS dispatched to scene. 
2.0. Local UAS flown under primary computer control with internal 
algorithms to handle control dropouts.  
3.0. Friendly forces are a minimum 15 minutes away from target 
location by ground vehicle. 
4.0. Local UAS control a minimum 5 km from the suspected IED site. 
5.0. Medium-sized city, buildings three stories or less, primarily two 
lane or less dirt streets. 
6.0. Low wind (< 10 kts) 
7.0. Temperature 90° F. 
8.0. Noon local time. 
9.0. UAS has been launched, traveling at 30 kts for Tier I and 65 kts for 
Tier II. 
Scenario: 1.0. Urban UAS IED Placement Interdiction. 
Vignettes: 1.0. Engage targets using lethal weapons.  
 
 Figure 6 illustrates the first scenario in an urban environment.  A RUINS 
performing an ISR mission over a relatively large city under local control spotted a group 
of persons, represented by the IED emplacement team target, acting in a suspicious 
manner.  Upon further examination, it appeared the suspects were engaged in the 
implantation of an IED in a street.  The RUINS maintained an observation of the suspects 
while further directions and engagement authority were obtained. As the potential IED was 




Figure 6 - Fixed Target Scenario 
 
This scenario offered several challenges to the UAV-weapon and target 
engagement, including: 
• Targeting accuracy 
• Engagement timelines 
• Weapon lethality footprint 
• Collateral damage 
• Possible loss of UAV control and/or operator feedback 
b) Moving Threat Scenario 
Scenario 2 considered a moving target.  In this scenario, intelligence had 
identified a moving target that must be stopped.  It need only experience a mobility kill, as 
it is desirable to capture those inside alive.  A RUINS performing an ISR mission was 
dispatched to halt the target, represented in this scenario by the light vehicle target.  The 
assumed vehicle speed is 40 knots.  The vehicle is traveling down curving roads in 
relatively flat desert terrain.  The target vehicle is in a rural environment, resulting in 










This scenario offers its own set of problems for the UAV-weapon and target 
engagement, including: 
• Targeting accuracy. 
• Engagement timelines. 
• Weapon lethality footprint. 
• Weapon guidance capability (if any). 
• UAV autonomous target tracking capability (if any). 
• UAV flight capabilities. 
 
Table 12 - Moving Target Scenario 
Scenario 2: MOVING TARGET SCENARIO 
Purpose: Simulate armed UAS engagement against a moving target with lower 
risk of collateral damage. 
Domain: Rural arid environment (little population, few buildings, winding dirt 
roads)  




Assumptions: 1.0. Locally controlled UAS will be dispatched to scene. 
2.0. Local UAS is under primary man control with internal algorithms 
to handle control dropouts. Algorithms are TBD. 
3.0. Friendly forces are minimum 15 minutes away. 
4.0. Local UAS control is five kilometers from current target position. 
5.0. Rural arid environment, few buildings, narrow winding dirt roads. 
6.0. Low wind (< 10 kts) 
7.0. Temperature 90°F. 
8.0. Midnight or noon local time. 
9.0. UAS has been launched and is airborne, traveling at 30 kts Tier I, 
65 kts Tier II. 
10.0. Suspect vehicle velocity of 40 knots. 
Scenario: 1.0. Rural UAS Moving Target Interdiction. 
Vignettes: 1.0. Engage target using lethal weapons. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the second scenario.  The target was again represented 
by the red triangle and was moving in the direction indicated.  The RUINS operator was 
assumed to be at least five kilometers away.  The UAV flight altitude was assumed at 
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elevations of 100 and 500 feet above ground level (AGL) for the Tier I UAV, and 500 and 
2000 feet AGL for the Tier II UAV.  The UAV was dispatched to the target location from 
random locations in its ISR path, allowing differing targeting times.  Different airspeeds 
were used for each Tier: 30 knots for the Tier I UAV and 65 knots for the Tier II UAV.  
The simulation used noon as the time of day.   
 
 
Figure 7 - Moving Target Scenario 
 
C. System Requirements 
Current events in Iraq and Afghanistan dictate a need for Coalition forces to adapt 
to the increasingly dangerous, changing, adversary.  The adversary seeks to endanger the 
Coalition forces by placing and triggering camouflaged IEDs to inflict harm.  The 
capabilities to prevent emplacement of or destroy IEDs are required for the C-IED effort.  
One solution to gain these capabilities is equipping the UAV with an offensive weapon.  
Requirements must be developed to bring these capabilities to fruition.  
In developing system requirements, input was sought from the stakeholders on 
what was needed to aid the C-IED effort.  Information was also gathered from the IED 
Defeat Framework (Department of the Army 2005) on what was needed to detect IED, 










Target Velocity: 40 knots
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Additionally, the Fed Biz Ops RFI Solicitation Number: W31P4Q-10-R-0142 (Fed Biz 
Ops 2010) provided an additional example of the aspects that should be considered when 
weaponizing a tactical UAV.  The information captured the key aspects of UAS 
weaponization that RUINS project must address in the Design and Analysis phase.  Top 
level requirements were developed based on the needs analysis and the information 
acquired from the above sources.  Both functional and non-functional requirements were 
addressed for the UAS weapon system.  The following list defines the common 
terminology used throughout the requirements: 
• UAS Air Vehicle – The air vehicle component of the existing UAS. 
• UAS Operator Squad – The ground team that is in charge of programming, 
launching, controlling, and recovering the UAS Air Vehicle. 
• UAS Weapon System – The weapon and any necessary mounting adaptors, 
launchers/ejectors, wiring/cables, or other hardware. 
• Weaponized UAS – The existing UAS with the inclusion of the integrated UAS 
Weapon System. 
1. Functional Requirements 
UAS Weapon System Ground Operations plays a pivotal role prior to launching the 
aircraft.  There are certain pre-flight procedures that need to be followed in order to verify 
that the weapon system is operational, armed safely and mission ready.  There is always 
risk, but implementing proper protocol helps increase safety and lower risk.  Weapon 
system ground operations include loading the weapon, running pre-flight operations, and 
arming the weapon prior to launch.  The below requirements are based on the UAS 
weapon system ground operations.  
1.0 UAS Weapon System Ground Operations 
1.1 The UAS Weapon System shall be installed by the UAS Operator 
Squad during the standard pre-launch procedures. 
1.2 The UAS Operator Squad shall provide necessary data to the UAS 
Weapon System during the pre-flight programming procedures. 
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1.3 The UAS Operator Squad shall perform all necessary system tests 
and safe and arm procedures for the UAS Weapon System prior to 
launch. 
At the conclusion of pre-flight operations, and assuming everything checks out, the 
aircraft is ready to be launched.  Currently the Tier II UAS may utilize a catapult launch 
system to take flight.  To avoid altering the existing launch system, the weaponized UAS 
should not exceed its weight launch limits.  Exceeding the launch limits may result in the 
UAS not taking flight and possibly crashing as a result.  After the UAS has completed its 
mission, it needs to be able to be recovered safely.  “Recovered safely” means aircraft 
intact along with any unused weapons.  Currently the UAV can be recovered safely 
without the added weapon system. Therefore, it is imperative that it can do the same with 
the weapon system.  Taking into account what the system needed to achieve and using the 
"RUINS Top Level Functional Hierarchy" Figure 18, the following requirements were 
derived. 
2.0 UAS Weapon System Launch and Recovery 
2.1 The Weaponized UAS shall be capable of being launched from the 
existing UAS launching system. 
2.2 The Weaponized UAS shall be capable of landing and being 
recovered with unused weapons. 
Prior to pre-ops, launch, and recovery, the weapon needs to be integrated onto the 
UAV.  Integration is not just attaching a weapon to the side of an aircraft with nuts and 
bolts; there needs to be system-level integration with any data link systems, payloads, 
under-wing stores, Ground Control System, and weapon/store management system.  
System integration is needed to link together the subsystems and ensure that all the 
subsystems function together correctly in order to successfully complete its mission.  The 
following requirements were derived in order to verify the proper integration of the 




3.0 UAS Weapon System Integration and Carriage 
3.1 The UAS Weapon System shall not exceed the payload limits of the 
UAS Air Vehicle.  
3.2 The UAS Air Vehicle shall be certified for safe carriage and 
employment of the UAS Weapon System and shall maintain 
performance within its fully loaded flight envelope requirements. 
3.3 The UAS Air Vehicle shall comply with the integration 
requirements defined in the Interface Control Document of the UAS 
weapon system. 
3.4 The Tier 2 UAS shall be capable of carrying a single munition off 
axis without significantly affecting flight performance. 
3.5 The UAS flight performance shall not be significantly degraded. 
{The term “significantly” means changes of parameter values over more than 
an objective of 5 percent and threshold of 25 percent due to carriage of the 
weapon system.} 
2. Non-Functional Requirements 
Usability must be taken into account when selecting, designing, and integrating a 
system.  The system must be designed for ease of use by making the human-to-machine 
interface simple.  This is accomplished by minimizing training requirements while 
maintaining productivity, efficiency and safety.  The Usability requirement is based on 
the constraints and boundaries that were established in the beginning of the project.  
1.0 Usability 
1.1 The Weaponized UAS shall not adversely impact existing 
functional capabilities of the UAS. 
1.2 The UAS Weapon System shall require minimal additional 
training to be completed by the UAS Operator Squad. 
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D. Objectives Hierarchy 
The key objective for the RUINS project was to decrease the IED threat using 
enhanced UAS capabilities.  Figure 8 shows the breakdown of this main objective into 
two sub objectives: 1) Support C-IED Effort and 2) Maintain Operational Effectiveness. 
The "Support C-IED Effort" objective was further decomposed to "Clear Supply 
Routes" and "Engage IED."  "Clear Supply Routes" gauges the system’s ability to fulfill 
the role of an organic and persistent airborne capability.  "Engage IED Targets" describes 
the impact that the RUINS system has on the C-IED mission by measuring weapon 
delivery effectiveness. 
The "Maintain Operational Effectiveness" objective was decomposed to "Minimize 
Susceptibility" and "Measure Endurance and Performance Impacts on Aerial Vehicle."  
"Minimize Susceptibility" describes the engagement envelope of the RUINS system prior 
to enemy weapon range, and visual detection.  "Measure Endurance Impacts" reflects the 




Figure 8 - Objectives Hierarchy 
 
1. Measures of Effectiveness 
The primary Critical Operational Issue (COI) that is impacted by the integration of 
weapons on a UAS platform is related to the system's need to be able to be lethal and 
disrupt the IED network.  Therefore MOEs have been identified that are focused on this 
need.  The Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) cycle, graphically 
illustrated by Figure 9, was used as the basis to derive the MOEs and MOPs that were used 
to assess the alternative designs.  Find, Fix, Track, Target, and Engage were considered 
the Objectives.   
Decrease the IED 













Figure 9 - F2T2EA Targeting Cycle 
 
The Find, Fix, and Assess piece of the kill-chain were considered existing 
capabilities of the baseline UAS and its normal ISR mission.  These functions were not 
assigned MOEs and MOPs under the assumption that integrating weapons will not 
interfere with the baseline capability of the platform, except for decreases in endurance, 
which are accounted for under a separate MOE/MOP.  After consulting with the 
stakeholders and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) mission, the following set 
of MOEs and MOPs was developed.  The JIEDDO’s mission is to: Detect the IED, 
Disrupt the IED Network, and Train Personnel.  Training personnel is omitted from the 
RUINS objectives because it is a subset of the C-IED mission, whereas the focus for 
RUINS is to Detect and Disrupt IED.  Following is a decomposition of the RUINS 
objective hierarchy into MOEs and MOPs that will be used to define Key Performance 
Parameters. 
The first level is considered the mission: Decrease the IED Threat Using Enhanced 
UAS Capabilities.  Objectives are the second level and represent the functions necessary 
to facilitate the mission.  MOEs reside in the third level and correspond to 
accomplishment of mission objectives and the achievement of desired results (DAU 2010).  
The MOEs are further broken down into MOPs in the fourth level to specifically 
quantifiable features.  The MOPs will be used to further define the Key Performance 
Parameters. 
 








OBJ 1.1 Support C-IED Effort 
MOE 1.1.1 Clear Supply Routes 
MOP 1.1.1.1 Maximum Speed 
MOE 1.1.2 Engage IED Targets 
MOP 1.1.2.1 Minimum Range of Engagement 
MOP 1.1.2.2 Maximum Effective Range of Engagement 
MOP 1.1.2.3 Weapon Time of Flight 
MOP 1.1.2.4 Weapon Miss Distance  
MOP 1.1.2.5 Lethality Radius 
MOP 1.1.2.6 Number of Stowed Weapons at Take-off 
MOP 1.1.2.7 Weapon Minimum Acquisition/Track Range 
OBJ 1.2 Maintain Operational Effectiveness 
MOE 1.2.1 Minimize Susceptibility 
 MOP 1.2.1.1 Amount of Engagement Time Prior to Enemy Weapon 
Range 
MOE 1.2.2 Minimize Endurance & Performance Impacts on Aerial Vehicle 
 MOP 1.2.2.1 Impact to Mission Time on Station  
 MOP 1.2.2.2 Impact to maximum UAV range 
 MOP 1.2.2.3 Impacts to maximum speed 
 
E. System Boundary 
Knowledge of all the system components that are involved and their interactions is 
crucial for early identification of issues and determination of system boundaries.  The 
primary system of interest is the weapon system and its interactions with the target.  The 
weapon system acts on the Target, indicating the Target is within the external system 
boundary. 
The weapon representation shown in Figure 10 includes the actual weapon itself, 
any necessary fire control system, and any carriage/dispenser/mounting needed for the 
particular weapon chosen.  The weapon system depends on the UAS for the initial 
physical transportation to the dispense location.  The UAS uses inputs from GPS satellites 
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and its surrounding environment to successfully fly its ISR mission and locate possible 
targets.  Course planning and UAS control will be supplied by the pilot through the 
Ground Control Segment, and UAS navigation and sensor systems will provide feedback 
to the Pilot on UAS and target position.  Sensor systems contained in the UAS may also 
provide initial target positioning information to the weapon system, and the weapon system 
will provide status information to the UAS for operator feedback.  The UAS may also 
interact with the target in an undesirable way, providing warning of its approach to the 
target in certain conditions though visible and audible cues.  
   
 
Figure 10 - System Physical Boundary Diagram 
 
Depending on the type of weapon system, target positioning information may be 
derived directly from the target itself by the weapon system.  Firing Command Authority 
will be provided through the Pilot, UAS Ground Segment, and finally UAV for issuance to 
















further assistance from the UAS depending on the type of weapon used.  It may continue 
to use GPS positioning as well as internally generated target positioning updates.  While 
the Pilot and Ground Segment are outside of the RUINS boundary, the addition of weapons 
will place new requirements on them.  The Pilot will require additional training to 
properly employ the weapons.  The Ground Segment will require the ability to receive and 
display information from the weapon and to command the UAS to fire the weapon.   
The RUINS complements and interfaces with several other activities in the 
battlespace.  To depict how the RUINS makes use of other activities, an Integration 
Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0) activity diagram was constructed.  The A0 
drawing depicts the boundary of the system under consideration in the study (Figure 11).  
The A-1 level drawing (Figure 12) depicts the interactions between the external activities 
and the RUINS and provides indications on required resources, both material and 
informational, required for successful RUINS operation.   
 
 






















































































F. Quality Function Deployment (QFD) 
QFD was chosen as a method to ensure that the stakeholders’ concerns and priorities would 
be reflected in the Team’s analysis.  This QFD effort was a team approach to transfer 
requirements into a technical solution.  Customer requirements and preferences were defined and 
categorized as attributes, which were then weighted based on relative degrees of importance 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006). 
As used, the QFD focused on the specific characteristic needs and activities that would be 
used to evaluate weapons systems in the Analysis of Alternatives phase.  With the Objectives and 
MOEs identified, four levels of QFD House of Quality (HOQ) matrices were developed to 
determine the weighting and relative importance of each objective.  Then MOE were decomposed 
into Key Performance Parameters.   
The first level HOQ emphasizes the system-level requirements.  This matrix takes the 
primary needs and maps them to the “Hows.”  The “Hows” represent at least one technical 
solution for each identified customer need.  The top five customer needs for RUINS were 
identified through a pair-wise assessment of 19 Counter-IED needs taken from a 2005 Army Field 
Manual (Department of the Army 2005) describing overall IED Defeat tactics.  The team used 




Figure 13 - HOQ 1 
 
Results from HOQ 1 reveal that the Objectives ranking is: Engage IED Targets, Clear 
Supply Routes, Minimize Susceptibility and UAV Performance Impacts.  These are the most 
important objectives for fulfilling the mission. 
The second level HOQ identifies the functions necessary to accomplish the RUINS 
mission.  This HOQ, shown in Figure 14, is comprised of a pair-wise comparison between the 
Objectives identified in HOQ 1 and functions indirectly necessary to accomplish the mission.  








































































Organic Airborne Capability 0.158 0.258 6 9
Persistent Airborne Intelligence Gathering 0.101 0.164 6 9 9
Route Clearance/Overwatch 0.085 0.138 6 6 6 6
Neutralize IEDs 0.169 0.276 9 9 9 9
Project Targeted Force Beyond Visual Range 0.101 0.164 6 6 6 6
Check Sum 0.613 1.000
Goal Value
Threshold Value
Weighted Performance 6.8 6.6 5.8 5.8 25.0
Percent Performance 0.273 0.265 0.231 0.231 1.000 Check
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Figure 14 - HOQ 2 
 
The highest weighted functions that support the RUINS mission are those that support IED 
threat neutralization followed by the original UAV functions that support the original mission of 
ISR. 
The third level HOQ, shown in Figure 15, weighs the design characteristics that are 
necessary to perform the functions weighed in the previous HOQ.  This HOQ is comprised of a 
pair-wise comparison between the design characteristics and functions necessary to support the 





























































































Clear Supply Route 0.273 0.273 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Engage IED Targets 0.265 0.265 6 9 9 9 6 6 6
Minimize Susceptibility 0.231 0.231 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Minimize Performance Impacts on Vehicle 0.231 0.231 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Check Sum 1 1.00
Goal Value
Threshold Value
Weighted Performance 6.7 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 49.2




Figure 15 - HOQ 3 
 
The results of the third-level HOQ show that design characteristics that impact target 
engagement functionality are the highest weighed items.  Minimization of UAV performance 
impacts follows target engagement characteristics.  These results are brought forward to HOQ 4, 






































































































Detection of IED Activities 0.136 0.136 9
Effective Engagement 0.152 0.152 9 9 9 9
Timely Engagement 0.152 0.152 9 9 9 9
Accurate Weapons 0.152 0.152 9 9
Fix Target Location 0.136 0.136 9 9 9
Minimize Impact to ISR Mission 0.136 0.136 9 9
Minimize Availability Impact 0.136 0.136 9
Check Sum 1.000 1.000
Goal Value
Threshold Value
Weighted Performance 2.6 4.0 4.0 4.1 1.4 2.4 3.8 22.3
Percent Performance 0.116 0.178 0.178 0.185 0.062 0.110 0.171 1.000 Check
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Figure 16 - HOQ 4 
 
HOQ 4 results indicate weapon effectiveness characteristics are the highest weighted items 
and essential to RUINS success.  The QFD method is responsible for establishing the appropriate 
levels of design focus and the levels of risk if the RUINS requirements are not met.  With HOQ 4, 
the team has identified that weapon speed, range, average miss distance, and warhead 
effectiveness are the top performance parameters that will impact RUINS the most.  These 
weighted results will be used to calculate an overall-MOE (OMOE) of the RUINS. 
1. Key Performance Parameters 
The RUINS will support the deployment of the Coalition Forces throughout their military 
operations.  These operations include the C-IED mission.  To improve operations, certain 
capabilities need to be addressed: ability to accurately locate a target, ability to neutralize a target, 
while not detrimentally impacting the inherent UAV ISR capabilities.  To verify these capabilities 
have been met, Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and attributes translate capabilities into 
quantifiable characteristics that are testable. 
KPPs are those characteristics that are considered essential to accomplishing the mission. 














































































































































































































Minimize Aerodynamic Impact 0.1165 0.1165 9 9 9 9 6
Engage Fixed Targets 0.17801 0.17801 9 3 3 3 9 9 3 9 6 6
Engage Moving Targets 0.17801 0.17801 9 3 3 3 9 9 6 9 9 9
Effectively Kill Targets 0.18453 0.18453 9 3 9 9 9 9 6 6
Minimize Collateral Damage 0.06151 0.06151 9 9 9
Minimize Weapon Complexity 0.10997 0.10997 6 6 6 6 9 6 6
Find and Fix Targets 0.17148 0.17148 9 9 3 9 9
Check Sum 1 1.00
Goal Value
Threshold Value
Weighted Performance 1.0 6.6 3.7 3.7 2.8 7.1 7.1 3.9 6.4 5.0 5.0 52.2
Percent Performance 0.020 0.126 0.070 0.070 0.054 0.135 0.135 0.075 0.123 0.096 0.096 1.000 Check
0.340 Category Total = 0.468 Category Total = 0.191Category Total = 
UAV Performance & Susceptibility Weapon Delivery Performance
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needs, research was conducted to help determine which parameters would result in mission failure 
or loss of target if not met.  Two values for each parameter, threshold and objective, were 
identified.  The threshold is the minimum acceptable value for the system.  The objective is the 
desired value and is better than the threshold.  The following are the key performance parameters 
or characteristics that are needed to satisfy the operational capability requirement that were 
decomposed from the customer desires and the Objectives Hierarchy via the QFD method. 
a) UAV Performance & Susceptibility: 
Weapon Weight was selected as a KPP because the UAV must be able to physically 
lift at least one weapon and associated launch/release equipment.  The weight of the supporting 
launcher equipment is assumed to be equal to that of the weapon itself.  The available Tier II 
payload dedicated to weapons is the maximum available payload.  A single weapon and its 
associated launcher need to be 48 pounds or less.  For scoring, the following formula was used: 
 
 




Equation 2 - Weapon Weight Calculation 
 
Number of Stowed Weapons at Take-off (number of rounds) was selected as a KPP 
because the UAV must be able to engage a target.  The threshold value was set to one weapon.  
The objective would be to carry more weapons to allow engagement of other targets within the 
same sortie or reengaging the first target if the first weapon missed.  For scoring, the following 









Equation 4 - Stowed Weapons at Take-off Calculation 
 
Maximum Weaponized UAV Range was selected as a KPP because the UAV must 
be able to fly a certain round-trip distance in order to satisfy ISR and C-IED efforts.  The team 
used the Shadow RQ-7 200’s range as a representative performance estimate.  This UAV has an 
estimated range of 109 km round-trip.  The weaponized Tier II UAV must be able to fly with a 25 




Equation 5 - Scored Maximum Weaponized Range 
 
RUINS UAV Endurance was selected as a KPP because it is the amount of time in 
hours that the RUINS system will be able to operate.  The threshold values were based upon a 
percentage of the surrogate UAVs’ endurance times listed in Table 10.  The addition of an adjunct 
weapon system to any aircraft is not without its detrimental effects.  For this, the team has 
proposed that a 25 percent reduction in endurance time is acceptable.  The resulting threshold is 6 
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The AK-47 assault rifle represents an enemy stand-off capability of a maximum of 
400 meters.  This value was used to set the threshold for the Tier II weaponized UAV.  The 
objective will be based upon visual detection by the unaided enemy eye at 500’ AGL.  For 
scoring, the following formula was used: 
 
 





b) Weapon Delivery: 
Minimum Weapon Range was selected as a RUINS KPP due to the Tier II 
engagement envelopes defined in Figure 25.  The AK-47 assault rifle represents an enemy 
stand-off capability of a maximum of 400 meters.  This value was used to set the threshold for the 
Tier I and Tier II weaponized UAVs.  This weapon delivery parameter fits hand in glove with the 
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UAV performance impact/susceptibility parameter of Stand-Off Range.  For scoring, the 
following formula was used: 
 
 





Weapon Maximum Effective Range was selected as a KPP as it takes into account 
1m target and 3.5m target ID.  The 1m target ID represents the objective of at least being able to 
launch at the 1m ID with EO sensors at 500’ AGL.  This KPP also takes into account the ability to 
effectively ID a 3.5m target via the onboard IR sensors.  A threshold of 900 meters and an 
objective of 6500 meters were chosen.  For scoring, the following formula was used: 
 
 





Weapon speed was selected as a KPP as it affects the amount of time the UAV may 
be susceptible to enemy defenses prior to weapon impact and the time the enemy has to react if 
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attacked.  To allow consideration of all weapon types, a wide range of speeds was considered.  A 
disposable armed UAV might have flight velocities as low as 20 knots.  The threshold value for 
this KPP was selected as 10 m/sec, which approximately corresponds to 20 knots.  An objective 








Equation 11 - Weapon Speed Calculation 
 
Weapon Accuracy was selected as a KPP because of the concern over collateral 
damage when engaging targets in urban environments.  The threshold and objective values were 
based on the target sizes that were used in the optical performance analysis.  The threshold is to 
hit a 3.5 m x 3.5 m vehicular target and the objective is to hit a 1.0 m x 1.0 m target that is 
representative of a human.  For scoring, the following formula will be used: 
 
 




Equation 13 - Miss Distance Calculation 
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c) Weapon Warhead Effectiveness: 
A common metric of weapon effectiveness is the “probability of kill” (PK).  Better 
termed the “probability of damage,” it is a statistical measure of the probability of an entity 
suffering damage sufficient to cause its contribution to the battle force to be removed.  PK in its 
strictest sense is a combination of several probabilities depending on the type of weapon, delivery, 
and target.  For the purposes of the warhead effectiveness metrics in this study, PK will be 
considered to be the probability of causing severe damage to a human target or damaging — 
causing mobility damage — to a vehicle target.  The metric of interest selected is the 50 percent 
warhead lethality range.  The range is defined as the range at which a target has a 50 percent 
probability of suffering a specific level of damage.  The range is dependent upon the 
characteristics of both the warhead and the target and will be determined for each candidate 
weapon as part of the analysis.  The measure was selected as a KPP for two reasons.  First, the 
warhead must demonstrate adequate damage potential to cause the target to be removed from the 
battle at demonstrated miss distances for a particular weapon.  If it does not contain this potential, 
the weapon must be considered ineffective.  Second, the warhead should not cause excessive 
collateral damage.  In any battle, some collateral damage is to be expected and cannot be avoided.  
However, these types of losses can have profound effects on the morale and support of the local 
populations.  While the possibility of collateral damage is not a KPP, and so not considered in 




Equation 14 - Warhead 50% PK Range (Human) 
 
Where: 





Equation 15 - Warhead 50% PK Range (Vehicle) 
 
Where: 
  PK|HIT(VEHICLE) is defined as 0.5 
 
The resulting RUINS KPPs and their associated threshold and objective are 
represented in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 - RUINS KPP Threshold and Objective Values 
System Impact TPM Threshold Objective 
UAV Performance & Susceptibility 
 Weapon Weight (single weapon + launcher), lbs. 48 < 48  
Weapon Rounds at Takeoff, count 1 6 
Maximum Weaponized UAV Range, km 80 109 
UAV Endurance, hours 6 8 
Stand-off Range, m 400 4,000 
Weapon Delivery 
 Minimum Weapon Range, m 400 4,000 
Maximum Effective Weapon Range, m 900 6,500 
Weapon Speed, m/s 10 150 
Weapon Warhead Effectiveness 
 Weapon Accuracy, m 3 2 
Warhead 50% PK for Human Target 4 3 
Warhead 50% PK for Truck Target 4 3 
 
2. Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE) 
The KPPs were used to determine an Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE) for each 
candidate weapon integrated onto the surrogate UAV.  Each KPP belongs to an OMOE impact 
category.  The impact categories describe the effects that the KPP has on the entire RUINS 
system.  The results of HOQ 4 translate to OMOE weights for the following: 
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Table 14 - OMOE Weights 
OMOE Impact Category Weight 
UAV Performance & Susceptibility 0.340 
Weapon Delivery 0.468 
Weapon Warhead Effectiveness 0.192 
OMOE Total 1.000 
  
The team evaluated each candidate weapon integrated on the surrogate UAV via this 
weighting method.  Total OMOE cannot exceed 1.00 and the higher the weight, the better.  
Scoring for each KPP was accomplished as follows: 
• KPPs where higher values are better were assigned a calculated score of 0 to the lowest 
value (threshold) and a calculated score of 1 to the highest (objective) value.  Values 
between the threshold and objective were scaled to form the calculated score.  This 
calculated score was multiplied by the KPP computed weight to achieve an overall 
score for that KPP.  If the attained value was less than the threshold, a calculated score 
of 0 was assigned.  If the attained value was higher than the objective, a calculated 
score of 1 was assigned. 
• KPPs where lower values are better were assigned a calculated score of 0 to the highest 
value (threshold) and a calculated score of 1 to the lowest (objective) value.  Values  
between the threshold and objective were scaled to represent the calculated score.  
This calculated score was to be multiplied by the KPP computed weight to achieve an 
overall score for that KPP.  If the attained value was more than the threshold, a 
calculated value of 0 was assigned.  If the attained value was less than the objective, a 
calculated score of 1 was assigned. 
The OMOE Impact Category weight results were considered in system analysis and final 
recommendation.  Figure 17 is representative of the OMOE scoring chart.  The final OMOE 





Figure 17 - OMOE Weighting 
 
G. Functional Analysis 
The functional analysis started by incorporating responses from stakeholders and research 
into UAS and weapon operations.  Typical UAS operations were broken down into the following 
top level functions.   
• Perform External Control 
• Prepare and Launch 
• Fly Mission 
KPP Key
Computed weight
Weight obtained from QFD 3
KPP KPP Attribute Name KPP Threshold KPP Goal Attained Units
0.020 Weapon Weight Single Weapon + Launcher 48 < 48 lbs
0.020 Calculated Score
0.126 Maximum Weapon Rounds at Takeoff 1 6 count
0.126 Calculated Score
0.070 Maximum Weaponized UAV Range 180 250 km
0.070 Calculated Score
0.070 UAV On-Station Time 6 8 hours
0.070 Calculated Score
0.054 Stand-off Range 400 4000 m @ 2000 ft. AGL
0.054 Calculated Score
KPP KPP Attribute Name KPP Threshold KPP Goal Attained Units
0.135 Minimum Weapon Range 400 4000 m @ 500 ft. AGL
0.135 Calculated Score
0.135 Maximum Effective Weapon Range 900 6500 m @ 2000 ft. AGL
0.135 Calculated Score
0.075 Weapon Speed 10 150
m/s (avg of min & 
max flights)
0.075 Calculated Score
0.123 Weapon Accuracy 3 2
avg. miss distance 
(m)
0.123 Calculated Score
KPP KPP Attribute Name KPP Threshold KPP Goal Attained Units
0.096 Warhead 50% Pk Range Human (Radius) 4 3 m
0.096 Calculated Score
0.096 Warhead 50% Pk Range Truck (Radius) 4 3 m
0.096 Calculated Score




• Recover  
The addition of weapons to the system required modifications to all of the top level 
functions.  Modifications included adding functions for maintenance, pre-flight checks, and 
recovery of the weapon.  Functions that described the targeting and launching of the weapon were 
also included. 
1. Functional Hierarchy 
The top level functions were decomposed to create the functional hierarchy.  Further 
decomposition can be found in Appendix A.  
 
Figure 18 - RUINS Top Level Functional Hierarchy 
 
a) Perform External RUINS Control 
Control from the ground station was broken down into several sub-functions.  
Communication and control of the UAV would be largely similar to traditional ISR operations.  
The addition of weapons would require the data links and control hardware and/or software to be 
modified.  At a minimum, the ground station would need to display weapon readiness to the 
operator, and have a method of remotely firing the weapon.  The firing mechanism should be 
designed to avoid similarity with other controls to avoid accidental firing or confusion.  The 
amount of training operators would require would depend on the automation of the software and 
















Figure 19 - Perform External RUINS Control Functional Hierarchy 
 
b) Prepare and Launch RUINS 
In addition to the standard UAS launch preparation functions, loading the 
appropriate payload onto the UAV was added.  The other standard functions include 
programming and fueling the UAV, performing preflight checks, and loading the UAV onto the 
launcher.  Loading weapons onto the UAV should be done at a neutral height to minimize strain 
on the loaders.  Although the weapons are relatively light, loading onto the underside of a small 
UAV could be cumbersome.  Raising the UAV on a working platform or stand would allow for 
easier access to the weapon attachment points.  The launch system should be keyed so that the 
weapons can only be loaded in the correct orientation.  Once the weapon is loaded, it is advised 
that the launcher/weapon produce a tactile indication that the weapon is fully and correctly 
engaged.  Prior to UAV launch, any weapons domes, fiber optics, and electrical connector covers 
should be removed.  Connections between the weapon and launch/release assemblies should be 






















Figure 20 - Prepare and Launch RUINS Hierarchy 
 
c) Fly RUINS Mission 
The major functions of RUINS in flight would not change much from an ISR 
mission.  The addition of weapons would add the Deliver Weapons function and require changes 
to the Communicate with Controller in Flight function.  Delivering weapons would involve 
detecting and tracking targets.  If a potential target was found, the UAV would need to maintain 
the target track.  Ideally this would be automated and performed either by the UAV itself or by 
automated commands from the Ground Control Station.  One possible method of accomplishing 
this would be to have a dynamically updated waypoint that the UAV would either orbit or make 
repeated passes over.  The target tracking algorithms would update the waypoint to compensate 
for target movement.  The weapon would be activated and queued to the target if the target was 
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Figure 21 - Fly RUINS Mission Hierarchy 
 
d) Recover RUINS 
Recovering the UAV after a mission will require additional functions to safely deal 
with weapons.  Some UAS incorporate a recovery device while others simply land in a cleared 
area.  A recovery device would possibly need modifications to handle the increased weight and 
approach speed of a UAV returning with a weapon.  Additionally, it would have to recover the 
UAV without damaging the weapon.  If there was a hang fire during the mission, where the 
weapon was commanded to fire but did not leave the UAV, an attempt to jettison it prior to landing 
would need to be made.  The ground control system would need to be altered either in hardware or 
software to add the jettison functionality.  A recovered UAV with weapon aboard will need to be 
transported to an appropriate weapons removal site.  It is possible that the recovery device would 
be collocated there to save time.  The ordnance crew would need training similar to that of 
manned aircraft on proper handling procedures.  Cross-training on manned systems could provide 



















Figure 22 - Recover RUINS Hierarchy 
 
2. Functional Flow Block Diagrams (FFBD) 
Once the functions had been developed, the functional flow of the system was created.  
FFBDs depict how information travels between the various functions and sub-functions, as well as 
showing the temporal relationship between the functions.  The order that functions are performed 
is not captured in the functional hierarchy.  Detailed investigation can be found in Appendix B. 
 
 
a) Perform External RUINS Control 
Controlling RUINS occurs in parallel with the other top level functions as shown in 
Figure 23.  The communication and control sub-functions also function in parallel with each other 


















Figure 23 - RUINS Top Level FFBD 
 
 
































b) Prepare and Launch RUINS 
Prior to launch, RUINS must be prepared for launch as shown in Figure 25.  First 
communication with the controller must be established and mission information transmitted to the 
UAV.  This would include either manually inputting weapon parameters or selecting a preset 
option.  The UAV would then be prepared for flight by loading fuel and weapons.  It would then 
be moved to the launch area, positioned for launch, and the weapons prepared or armed by 
ordnance crews.  Prior to launch, the flight controls would be verified and the system energized.  
If all checks were successful, the UAV would be launched and climb to cruise altitude.   
 
 
Figure 25 - Prepare and Launch RUINS FFBD 
 
c) Fly RUINS Mission 
Once the UAS had been launched, it would begin performing the mission.  Several 
functions would be performed in parallel as shown in Figure 26.  It would communicate with the 
ground controller.  Commands would be uplinked while system status and sensor information 
would be downlinked.  Once a target is found, the operator would designate it and manually 
release the weapon.   
To properly employ the weapon, the ground control system should communicate 
relevant information to the operator such as weapon information and target location.  The 
preloaded weapon information would allow the system to display the maximum effective range of 



















indicator would be dynamically overlaid on the two-dimensional navigation map or possibly as a 
three-dimensional object overlaid on the sensor's video image.  The three-dimensional object 
would require much more processing capability on the ground control system.  Ideally, the range 
indicator would change shape to represent the actual capability of the weapon.  If the UAV 
pitched down or decreased altitude, this could decrease the range of the weapon and the indicator 
would shorten.  Once in range and properly oriented with respect to the target, the display would 
notify the operator to release the weapon.  This could be accomplished by changing the color of 
the range cone, displaying a text message, making a distinctive noise, or some combination of 
those alerts.  Additionally, the display should indicate the number of weapons available, weapon 
status, and safe-arm condition.   
To ease the workload on the operator, the target should be automatically tracked as 
much as possible, once designated.  Keeping the sensor centered on the target, or the correct 
position of the target on the navigation display, would free the operator to verify the identity of the 
target and obtain proper authorization to engage with a weapon.  Having to manually keep the 
target in sight while maneuvering the UAV into position, and then firing the weapon precisely on 
target, could be very difficult to accomplish.  This difficulty is increased by the quality of the 
video being sent from the sensor or weapon.  The display should also keep a box or icon over the 
target to aid in distinguishing it from the background. 
Passing the target location to the weapon should also be automatic.  The UAV 
would be calculating the target's position and converting it to location coordinates.  These 
coordinates should be passed to the weapon through a machine-to-machine interface to avoid 
human error.  The display should show the coordinates given to the weapon so the operator can 
verify them.  If a weapon is guided optically, the image of the target should be transferred to the 
weapon similarly, or the weapon's sensor imagery should be viewable on the ground control 
system.  With the weapon properly queued from the UAV sensor, the operator should only have 




Figure 26 - Fly RUINS FFBD 
 
d) Recover RUINS 
After completing the RUINS mission, the weapon would need to be recovered.  
Communication with the controller would be performed in parallel with the landing and disarming 
functions as shown in Figure 27.  Landing would involve commanding any returning weapons to 
be safe.  In the case of a hung weapon, it would be jettisoned if possible.  Jettisoning the weapon 
would require the addition of a jettison command in the ground control system.  The UAV would 
then be landed or recovered and de-energized.  Ordnance personnel would remove the weapons 
and then transport the UAV to a safe location.  Once removed, the weapons would be placed in an 
appropriate storage location.  The UAV would then be moved to the maintenance area to be 
























Figure 27 - Recover RUINS FFBD 
 
H. Architecture 
Weaponizing Tier II UAVs is becoming a desirable concept for the future warfighter.  
UAV weaponization examples and endeavors are few and far between.  The best weaponization 
examples would have to be taken from manned aircraft.  The RUINS system architecture was 
mapped to the IDEF0 system context and is shown in Figure 28. The architecture is defined by the 





















functional flow block diagrams. Further breakdown can be found in Appendix C.  Although UAV 
weaponization impacts the entire system, consideration should focus highly on the weapon 
integration effort. 
The RUINS Weapons Management Controller and RUINS Payload Ground Controller is a 
hardware/software combination that specifically addresses the various platform/weapon 
combinations in a flexible concept.  This will make platform/weapon combinations possible 
without costly integration for each variant.  The RUINS UAVs will have limited payload 
capability and thus the corresponding weapons will require development of the launchers, pylons, 
and data links to integrate the entire package.  The Weapons Management Controller and Payload 
Ground Controller will be at the top of this integration effort. 
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Figure 28 - RUINS Architecture
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The RUINS architecture is designed to control weapons from the UAV platform.  
This is accomplished through “basic” commands from the ground control station to the 
UAV’s avionics, managed through the Weapons Management System (WMS), and 
submitted to the specific weapon mounted to the vehicle.  Each weapon has a specific 
sequence of events it must go through before launching the weapon to target.  These 
weapon specific data requirements are expected to be different for each weapon and would 
be configured into the weapons management controller.  The weapon must be within the 
vehicle operational limitations in order to take-off and deliver the weapon to a specific 
target.  
For the small UAVs whose traditional role was as an ISR platform, ground control 
station operations had both a vehicle controller and a payload operator.  The UAV 
generally consisted of a sensor package that included multiple sensors integrated into the 
UAV airframe.  The UAV’s mission was to gather data and send it back to the payload 
operator for further analysis and dissemination to appropriate command levels.  The 
operational system consisted of a UAV/sensor and a ground control station split into a 
payload operator and vehicle operator displays.  The system had no software to provide 
human interaction with a weapon on the UAV.  Integration efforts within the system 
software should include the opening a “new screen” on either vehicle or payload displays.   
I. Summary 
The Problem Definition phase of the project focused on further definition and 
refinement of the directions to be taken as the project proceeds.  Stakeholders were 
engaged to obtain their inputs into possible uses and limitations of the system, resulting in 
a set of representative mission scenarios for use in later modeling efforts.  From these 
interactions, initial requirements were developed, and an objectives hierarchy with related 
measures of effectiveness created.  This allowed the allocation of objectives, using 
Quality Functional Deployment methods, from objectives to physical instantiations.  
Measures of performance, key performance parameters, and an overall measure of 
effectiveness were developed for later use in the evaluation of alternatives.  Using the 
identified functional allocation, an architecture for the project was defined.  The project 
then proceeded to the identification of possible options in the Design and Analysis phase.    
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III. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The examination of sponsor needs and requirements documented in the previous 
chapter narrowed the scope of the problem.  Representative scenarios were developed that 
detail the anticipated use of the system, allowing a determination of tasks to be 
accomplished, and helped define the system boundary.  Operational objectives and key 
performance parameters were developed, which will allow future evaluation of the 
feasibility of proposed alternatives as they are developed. 
Prior to developing alternative solutions to the identified problem, further analysis 
was performed.  During this phase, the proposed use of the system was closely examined 
to understand the sequence of operations that must be performed during a weapon 
engagement.  As the RUINS concept was intended to make use of minimally modified 
UAVs if possible, understanding of the existing capabilities installed was necessary.  The 
anticipated enemy defenses were examined to identify possible areas of RUINS 
susceptibilities during a weapon engagement to assist in developing desired engagement 
ranges.  At the same time, open source research was performed to identify possible 
candidate weapons that might be of use with the RUINS.  Finally, an initial screening of 
the identified candidates was performed and a subset selected for further examination in 
modeling.  Concurrently, a risk analysis was performed to identify risks associated with 
both the proposed alternatives and the processes used during the project.  The output of 
the phase was a reduced set of candidate weapons and associated risks intended for further 
investigation in the following modeling stage.  
A. Mission Cycle 
For the scenarios explored in this research paper to provide useful insight, there 
were several factors that had to be understood. The following sections detail determining 
mission success, targeting accuracy, identification by a target, and weapon delivery 
accuracy. 
1. Probability of Mission Success 
Many metrics were proposed for the evaluation of the weapons’ selected solutions.  
Many of the proposed metrics relied on knowledge of weapon specifics, which were not 
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initially known as weapons and had not been selected at the time.  Instead, some concepts 
from weaponeering were used for early evaluations and to further define the problem.  
Weaponeering is defined as, “…the process of determining the quantity of a specific type 
of weapon required to achieve a specific level of target damage, considering target 
vulnerability, weapon effects, munition delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of kill, 
weapon reliability, etc.” (Driels 2004).  A rough evaluation of Probability of Mission 
Success (PS) provided rapid insight into major issues with possible weapon systems and 
allowed rapid reduction to the most likely candidates.   PS has been defined by Morris 
Driels, a weaponeering instructor at NPS, as a combination of other probabilities that result 
from various aspects of the performance of the weapon, performance of the dispensing, 
vehicle vulnerabilities of the target, and effects of the environment.  The general formula 
for PS is given as 
 
 
Equation 16 - Probability of Mission Success from (Driels 2004) 
 
Where  PL is the probability of weapon launch 
SSPD is the single sortie probability of damage. 
  
A full assessment of PS would provide the most complete evaluation of 
UAV-weapon-target performance. SSPD is defined as, “the probability that a single 
weapon will inflict on the target the amount of damage represented by the damage 
function.  A sortie is a single pass by one aircraft over the target where one or more 
weapons can be released.  For unguided weapons only one weapon was released…For 
guided weapons however, more than one weapon can be released [with an appropriate time 
delay] against a single desired mean point of impact” (Driels 2004).  However, 
determination of SSPD would prove difficult at this time as little definite was known 
concerning the possible weapons.  A full calculation of SSPD would require in-depth 
knowledge of the weapon warhead characteristics, target vulnerabilities, and weapon 
delivery geometries.  Instead, some measures of relative system performances were 
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derived from the piecewise evaluation of the systems and probabilities that contribute to PS 
determination (Driels 2004). 
2. Target Engagement Sequence 
PS is an overall measurement of the results of the targeting cycle.  Targeting is 
where mission objectives are turned into plans for actions against targets.  The targeting 
cycle may be either deliberate or dynamic.  In both, the focus is on achieving the 
commander’s objectives.  Targeting is performed for both kinetic and non-kinetic actions.  
Deliberate targeting is “…the procedure for prosecuting targets that are detected, 
identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions against them in tasking 
cycle products.”  In comparison, dynamic targeting is all targeting that occurs outside of 
deliberate targeting (AFDD 2.19 2006). 
Entry into the targeting cycle is at the “Find” stage.  During this stage, a search is 
performed for possible targets that have been identified and evaluated prior to the mission.  
Once a possible target is identified, it is further classified into probable time-sensitive 
target, time-insensitive target, unknown classification, or not a target.   
If classified a target and deemed “worthy of engagement,” the “Fix” stage 
determines the target position and other information with sufficient definition to allow 
engagement.  Once the target is fixed, the track stage “takes a confirmed target and its 
location, maintains a track on it, and confirms the desired effect against it.”  If target track 
is lost during this stage it may be necessary to repeat both the “find” and “fix” stages.  This 
stage, by constantly tracking the target, maintains target identification. 
The “target” stage verifies the identified target engagement and obtains necessary 
approvals to perform the engagement.  During this stage, possible engagement options are 
considered.  Approvals for engagement depend on several factors, including location of 
weapon assets, ROE, target range, accuracy of targeting information, and weather.  This 
stage is often the most time consuming of all the stages, but may be accomplished in 
parallel with earlier stages. 
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In the “engage” stage, the weapon operator is ordered to engage the target by the 
engagement authority.  The desired outcome of the stage is a “successful action against 
the target.” 
Following the “engage” stage, the “assess” stage evaluates desired results against 
the target with the results observed.  In the case of a time-sensitive target, rapid 
assessment is often desired.  Depending on the results of the assess stage, the cycle may 
return to the “target” stage and again engage the target if the weapon system has 
capabilities remaining (AFDD 2.19 2006). 
3. Onboard Sensors and the Probability of Launch 
The probability of launch (PL) is defined as “the probability that the weapon was 
launched based on the target being detected.” (Driels 2004).  For an air-delivered weapon, 
it is the probability that the weapon was successfully dispensed, ejected, or deployed by the 
carrying aircraft. 
PL reflects the success that the aircraft has in detecting, classifying, and tracking a 
target to the level of certainty required by the engagement authority as well as other 
external conditions, such as weather.  Further analysis of the onboard optical sensor 
system was performed to understand its impact to the targeting cycle and engagement. 
The man-in-the-loop in a UAV system is located external to the air vehicle itself.  
As a result, no human eyes are directly observing the target scene from the location of the 
UAV.  Instead, imaging systems in both visible and infrared (IR) spectral bands are used 
to provide situational awareness to the UAV operator on the ground.  The imaging 
systems may have varying levels of resolution and tracking capabilities that make timely, 
positive target classification and verification difficult.  The spectral bands available may 
not be optimum for the imaging task at hand. 
Typically UAVs are equipped with optical systems that operate in one or multiple 
spectral bands defined as follows: visible (0.4 – 0.8µm), mid-IR (3 – 5µm), and long-IR (8 
– 12µm).  In all of these cases, the optical systems are passive.  Though some of the 
man-portable UAVs offer an IR laser pointer, they are not intended for onboard imager 
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illumination and typically operate near the 0.85µm band, and so are outside of the peak 
response area of the IR imagers.   
Two types of radiation are available for use by the passive optic sensors: emitted 
and reflected.  Radiation frequency emissions can be modeled by a blackbody radiator.  It 
is found from these devices that as temperature increases, emitted wavelength decreases. 
Figure 29 illustrates the emitted frequencies of a blackbody at 6000 Kelvin, which is 
approximately the temperature of the surface of the sun.  This figure, while representing 
what frequencies the sun emits, does not represent the frequencies that actually reach the 
Earth’s surface, as there is attenuation and filtering due to the atmosphere.  The natural 
visible light observed on Earth is due primarily to the emissions of the sun and stars.  
Other natural sources of light are also of high temperature, such as fire.  When an object is 
observed under natural illumination, it is generally due to the reflection of the light 
produced by the sun.  At night, a reduced amount of visible light is available from either 
the moon’s reflection of the sun or starlight.  Standard visual cameras make use of the 
radiation wavelengths in this band. 
 
Figure 29 - 6000 Kelvin Blackbody Curve 
 
In contrast, IR imagers receive and translate energy of wavelengths beyond the 
visual bands.  Sources of IR energy can again be reflected from other sources.  However, 
there are many systems that emit directly in the IR bands.  Consider a human body with its 

























Visible Band 0.4 - 0.8um
Peak Response 0.48um
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mean operating temperature of 98.6°, or 310 Kelvin.  As shown in Figure 30, peak 
frequency is approximately 9.4µm, near the middle of the long-wave IR band.  This 
radiation is available for detection both day and night.  As the blackbody temperature 
increases, the peak wavelength of the emitted radiation shifts to shorter wavelengths.   
Both types of UAV have provisions to take advantage of the passive IR emissions.  
The man-portable UAV IR imaging system operates in the 8–12µm.  The imaging micro 
bolometer technology used operates at ambient temperatures and requires no detector 
cooling, reducing power requirements and weight.  However, the technology is not as 
sensitive to temperature differences and the payload limitations restrict the optics that may 
be carried.  In comparison, the tactical UAV has the option of a 3–5µm imager system.  
Its Indium Antimonide (InSb) detector array is cooled to approximately 77 Kelvin using 
either liquid nitrogen or closed-cycle cooling to reduce detector noise and increase 
sensitivity, allowing detection of slight temperature differences.  The increased payload of 
the tactical UAV allows for much improved optics to be used, greatly increasing the 
capabilities of both the visible and IR imagers.   
 
Figure 30 - 310 Kelvin and 400 Kelvin Blackbody Curves 
 
Table 15 shows the specifications used to simulate the surrogate optical systems.  
The parameters used in these specifications are estimates based on available information 
and engineering judgment.  

































Table 15 - Surrogate UAV Optical Specifications 
Surrogate UAV Optical System Specifications 
UAV Type Spectral Band 
(µm) 
Array Size Pixel 
Dimensions 
(µm) 
Field of View 
Man-Portable 8–12 320x240 51 5° 
0.4–0.8 768x494 10 5° 








The optical information transmitted from the UAV will ultimately be used to make 
the final engagement decision by operators on the ground.  However, the information 
received is of varying quality depending on the range to the possible target.  The 
information necessary for determination of a possible target does not necessarily rise to the 
same level as that needed to make a lethal weapon engagement decision.  Visual target 





Table 16 - Visual Target Acquisition Tasks (Driels 2004) 
Task Definition Example Operator Action 
Detection Observer decides that an object in his 
field of view should be inspected 
further (e.g., a man-made object).  It 
may have been visible before but was 
not distinguishable from other nearby 
objects. 
Observer inspects the object, and 
takes actions to investigate 
further (e.g., turns the aircraft). 
Recognition Observer decides that the object 
belongs to a certain class of objects 
(e.g., vehicles).  The level of detail 
required for recognitions depends on 
the operational situation and pre-brief. 
Observer begins attack mode.  
The attack mode can include 
designation of the target to the 
fire control system, flying 
aircraft as required, etc. 
Identification Observer decides the object is in a 
particular subclass within the class 
(e.g., tank). 
Observer continues attack and 
proceeds with weapon launch or 
release. 
 
Determination of the information necessary to transition from one task to the next 
has been of interest to the military for years.  John Johnson performed a study concerning 
these criteria for the Army in 1958, the results of which are still widely accepted.  Johnson 
defined five levels of detection activity that are similar to those above: no detection, 
detection, shape orientation, shape recognition, and detail recognition (Johnson 1958).  
Johnson found that complex military targets could be represented by a transformation into 
lines of alternating high and low contrast as shown in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31 - Method of Optical Transformation from (Johnson 1958) 
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The “transformations were found to be independent of contrast and scene 
signal-to-noise ratio as long as the contrast in the resolution chart was the same as the 
contrast in the complex target” (Johnson 1958).  Since then, a measure of spatial 
frequencies in cycles per angle subtended has been used as one measure in the evaluation 
of imager performance.  Johnson compiled a table indicating the number of line pairs 
needed to accomplish various levels of detection.  A portion of this table is presented in 
Table 17. 
 
Table 17 - Optical Image Transformations after (Johnson 1958) 
Target Resolution per Minimum Dimension 
Broadside View Detection Orientation Recognition Identification 
Truck 0.90 1.25 4.5 8.0 
M-48 Tank 0.75 1.2 3.5 7.0 
Jeep 1.2 1.5 4.5 5.5 
Command Car 1.2 1.5 4.3 5.5 
Soldier 
(standing) 
1.5 1.8 3.8 8.0 
Howitzer 1.0 1.5 4.8 6.0 
Study Average 1.0 ± 0.25 1.4 ± 0.35 4.0 ± 0.8 6.4 ± 1.5 
 
Johnson’s study went into much more detail concerning the contrast of the target in 
relation to the background.  For the purposes of this study, his work with spatial 
frequencies was utilized to evaluate the identification threshold necessary to obtain 
authority to engage a target with a lethal weapon.  In this study, the threshold of seven 
lines per angle subtended must be met to obtain engagement authority.  By Nyquist 
discrete sampling criteria, greater than two samples per signal cycle period must be 
obtained to be able to accurately reproduce the frequency of the sampled signal.  For the 
spacing of target-representative resolution lines, viewed at the detector, to be equal to the 
detector element spacing, the necessary target-to-sensor range that was calculated.  At this 
range, the information present on the detector was just enough to properly classify the 
target per the seven lines per angle criteria.  This calculated range formed the estimated 
“engage authority” range. 
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Spacing of the detector elements is critical in making these calculations. Consider 
the optically transformed gun target from Figure 31.  If the transformation lines were 
horizontally aligned, as shown in the left drawing of Figure 32, the required spacing 
between detectors is of one measurement.  However, if the transformation lines are 
oriented as shown in the right drawing, the effective necessary spacing is different.  The 
worst case scenario would be when the target was oriented 45° to the detector array.  In 
this situation, the minimum required detector spacing necessary for correct sampling 
criteria would be √2 x Detector Pitch. 
 
Figure 32 - Target Orientation and Pixel Spacing from (Johnson 1958) 
 
A simple technique may be used to generate rough engagement range estimates.  
The effects of atmosphere were ignored in the calculations as the purpose is to determine 
the maximum range the surrogate UAV system might be able to satisfy engagement 
authority criteria.  It is also assumed that the optics axis is orthogonal to the target.  
Estimated Field of View (FOV) and maximum number of detector cells across the FOV are 
known from Equation 17.  It is assumed that the width of the FOV exactly fill the entire 
number of detector cells across the width of the detector array.  Determination of the 
included angle, or angular subtense, captured by each detector cell in the FOV, may then be 
calculated by dividing the angular FOV by the number of detector cells across the FOV.  
To accommodate the possible orientation issue presented above, the angular subtense of 
each detector cell will then be multiplied by √2.  The angle required to satisfy the Johnson 
criteria may then be calculated by simply multiplying the calculated angular subtense by 
two times the number of required cycles.  Once this angle is known, the range may be 
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approximated by dividing the target height (or width) by the total Johnson criteria angle (in 
radians).   
 
 
Equation 17 - Johnson Criteria Angle 
 
Three resolution criteria were examined: detection (1 cycle), recognition (4 cycles), 
and identification (7 cycles).  The estimated detector resolution limited criteria ranges 
were developed for two types of targets: a 3.5 meter square target, suggested as being 
similar to a vehicle, and a 1 meter wide target, representative of the width of a standing 
human with a weapon.  The calculations assume perfect optics, and ignore the attenuation 
of target signature due to range or atmospheric diffusion.  The results of these calculations 
are presented in Table 18 and Table 19. 
 
Table 18 - Surrogate UAV Optical Performance (3.5m Target) 
Surrogate UAV Optical Performance, 3.5m Wide Target 








Man-Portable 8 - 12 0.7712 4,536 1,134 648 
0.4 - 0.8 0.3213 10,890 2,723 1,556 
Tactical 3 - 5 0.0771 45,412 11,353 6,487 
0.4 - 0.8 0.1478 23,683 5,920 3,383 
 
Table 19 - Surrogate UAV Optical Performance (1.0m Target) 
Surrogate UAV Optical Performance, 1.0m Wide Target 








Man-Portable  8 - 12 0.7712 1,296 324 185 
0.4 - 0.8 0.3213 3,111 778 444 
Tactical 3 - 5 0.0771 12,970 3,243 1,853 
0.4 - 0.8 0.1478 6,767 1,692 967 
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In order to obtain weapon firing authority using the current surrogate UAV optical 
sensor systems, the analysis indicated the UAVs were required to be reasonably close in 
range to optically detect a target at the necessary resolution.  The derived identification 
ranges were later used in developing an overall model of a possible target engagement.  
An analysis was needed to determine the detectability of the surrogate UAV.  This 
allowed a better understanding of the feasibility of using a smaller, weaponized UAV in the 
C-IED mission. 
B. Enemy Defenses and UAV Susceptibility Ranges 
It was assumed that if the enemy were aware of impending attack it would react by 
either defending itself or fleeing.  Consideration was made for both possibilities.  The 
UAVs currently have many duties in addition to the attack/defense roles being proposed.  
The Tier I and II UAVs are constructed to maximize the available on-station time while 
performing their current ISR functions.  As a result, the UAVs in these Tiers are equipped 
with little or no redundant capabilities and are constructed of light-weight materials.  A 
single small caliber bullet has the capability of permanently disabling the aircraft.  
However, if the enemy does not realize an attack is imminent, the risk of damage to the 
UAV decreases and likelihood of weapon success increases.  An examination of 
anticipated enemy defenses and ranges of UAV detection by the enemy was performed.  
Results of the examinations were used for further analysis of a possible target engagement. 
1. Anticipated Enemy Defenses 
The enemy, anticipated to be insurgents, was expected to have limited defense 
weaponry.  What weapons they possess would be older and limited in capabilities.  The 
weapons likely would have come from government magazines and armories.  For 
example, the sudden defeat of the Iraqi armed forces resulted in weapon magazines 
unprotected and open to pilferage.  Insurgents, while dedicated and competent, were not 
expected to be properly trained on the weapons they possessed.  As a result, though 
optimum engagement conditions were considered, the results presented would likely be 
“worst case.” 
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a) Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) 
MANPADS surface-to-air IR missiles were a significant threat to Coalition 
aircraft during the operations in Iraq.  Many Coalition aircraft, primarily rotary wing, 
were lost to these types of weapons.  Representative systems of this type include the 
NATO designators SA-7b “GRAIL” and SA-16 “GIMLET,” both originally designed by 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
 
Figure 33 - Example IR MANPADS (Pakistan Defence 2008) 
 
These types of weapons are capable of engaging targets at ranges of up to 
several nautical miles and altitudes of over 10,000’ AGL.  These rockets, once 
successfully launched, guide to intercept at ranges of up to several nautical miles and 
altitudes of over 10,000’ AGL, reaching speeds approaching Mach 2.  No operator 
intervention is required once launched, hence the term “fire and forget.”  Impact is 
required to trigger the warhead.  Times required for missile launch are typically under 10 
seconds once a target is detected (SA-7 GRAIL 1999). 
While these types of weapons are definitely a threat to larger aircraft, the 
threat to the Tier I and II UAVs was considered to be minimal.  These types of weapons 
rely on the IR self-emissions of a target to acquire and track to intercept.  While a target’s 
IR signature includes components related to reflected energy from either the sun or earth, 
the primary contributors are hot engine parts, engine exhaust, and heat resulting from air 
friction.  These components are minimal for the Tier I and II UAVs.  The airspeeds of the 
vehicles are low enough to cause little aerodynamic heating.  The Tier I UAV has 
electrically powered propulsion, minimizing motor heating and eliminating exhaust, 
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though there are emissions due to the chemical actions of the battery.  The Tier II UAV is 
powered by a small, well shielded internal combustion engine that provides for minimal 
exhaust and hot parts exposure.  The SA-7b, originally fielded in the 1960s, was designed 
to engage unsuppressed jet engines.  The IR signature from such a source is many orders 
of magnitude higher than that of the Tier I and II UAVs.  The SA-16, while an 
improvement on the SA-7b due to better maneuverability and detection capabilities, would 
also likely encounter difficulty engaging the smaller UAVs due to the small IR signature.   
b) RPG-7 Grenade Launcher 
The RPG-7 is a front-loading, reloadable, recoilless, shoulder-fired antitank 
grenade launcher.  Several different types of grenades are available for use with the 
weapon.  The propulsion of the grenades consists of two portions.  An eject motor 
propels the grenade from the launcher to a safe distance in front of the gunner.  
Stabilization fins that cause grenade rotation in flight deploy as the grenade exits the 
launcher.  At a range of approximately 11 meters, the main rocket motor fires rapidly, 
accelerating the grenade to a maximum speed of 300 m/sec.  If the grenade fails to impact 
a target after five seconds at an approximate range of 900 meters, the grenade will 




Figure 34 - RPG-7 40mm Launcher with Round (Pakistan Defence 2009) 
 
Though the RPG-7 was originally developed as an anti-tank weapon, more 
recently it has been heavily used by insurgents.  Several rotary-wing aircraft have been 
disabled due to grenades.  While it may be relatively easy to employ the RPG-7 system, its 
effective use requires training and practice.  Though the weapon is reasonably accurate, 
even well-trained gunners often incorrectly estimate ranges leading to a first round miss.  
Probability of a first round hit of a stationary M60 tank target at a range of 300 meters is 
less than 30 percent.  If there is any wind present, the probability decreases, due to the 
large cross-sectional area of the projectile.  Adding movement to the target also decreases 
probability of hit as the rounds are non-guided.  However, due to the wide proliferation of 
the weapon and its ammunition, possible use against UAV targets cannot be discounted 
(U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 1976). 
c) AK-47 Assault Rifle 
The AK-47 is probably one of the best known rifles in the world.  
Originally entering service in 1947, the FSU design has demonstrated itself to be both 
rugged and reliable.  These characteristics have contributed to its enduring popularity.  
Though production ceased in the FSU in the late 1960s, manufacture continues in a variety 
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of different countries.  Well in excess of 50 million of these weapons or their copies have 
been made through the years (Jane's Defense Equipment and Technology 2010). 
 
 
Figure 35 - AK-47 Assault Rifle (Jane's Defense Equipment and Technology 2010) 
 
The AK-47 fires a standard 7.62x39 M1943 cartridge.  Muzzle velocity for 
the standard 10 gram bullet is approximately 715 m/sec, though higher velocity rounds are 
available.  The standard rifle is capable of firing up to 600 rounds per minute (Jane's 
Defense Equipment and Technology 2010).  Effective range of the AK-47 is estimated to 
be 400 meters (Enemy Forces 2010). 
The sheer number of produced weapons leads to wider availability.  Many 
have found their way into the hands of insurgents.  The ongoing demand for the weapons 
has kept its ammunition widely available.  Its ease of use, rugged construction, and 
effectiveness has made it a weapon of choice for many nations. 
2. UAV Detection by the Enemy 
Maintaining surprise is critical in enhancing the effectiveness of a target 
engagement.  In surveillance missions, stealth is necessary to prevent an adversary from 
deliberately modifying his actions, thereby reducing the validity of the surveillance data.  
When engaging with weapons, the element of surprise may prevent a target from taking 
evasive actions.  For the purposes of this study, the targets are considered to be 
represented by males in their early twenties, with normal hearing and vision capabilities for 
this age group.  As the targets are considered to be involved in IED activities, they are not 
equipped with any detection enhancement equipment, such as radar detection, IR imaging 
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systems, or binoculars.  To determine maximum possible detection range, only the worst, 
or least stealthy, case is considered. 
a) Target Optical Detection of UAV 
Many studies have been performed through the years in an effort to 
determine a generic formula for determining the probability of aircraft detection by 
unaided human observers.  None have proven completely accurate in all situations.  The 
studies reviewed included various types of aircraft, sizes, and colorings, in a certain region 
of search.  For the purposes of this investigation, the observer was assumed to know the 
general direction of aircraft approach, the aircraft was in the unobstructed sky, and the sky 
conditions were clear.  Additionally, the aircraft was painted a dull gray, with purely 
diffusive reflective properties.  Rather than attempting to determine a probability of 
observation, an estimation of worst case detection range was made.   
The human eye may be thought of as a specialized detector.  Its spectral 
response is between approximately 400 and 800μm.  As discussed earlier, the primary 
source of natural light required for human vision is the sun.  An illustration of an eye is 
presented in Figure 36.  Light enters through the cornea and is focused by the lens onto the 
retinal surface at the rear of the eye.  Two types of detectors are present on the retina: rods 
and cones.  Cone detectors are used for photopic (daytime) vision and have the ability to 
sense colors.  Rod detectors are used primarily for scotopic (low light) and peripheral 
vision.  The center of cone detector spectral response is approximately 0.6μm, while the 
center of rod spectral response is approximately 0.5μm.   
A specialized region at the rear of the eye is called the fovea.  In this small 
area there are only densely packed cone detectors that provide the most detailed 
information of the image.  The fovea includes a FOV of less than two degrees.  In this 
high-resolution area, the normal visual acuity assumed for the design of optical instruments 
of 20/20 corresponds to a resolution of 0.291mrad (Kopeika 1998).  The visual axis of the 
eye is aligned with this area, and the eye is in constant motion to pass the image across this 
sensitive area.  The eye moves in jumps while searching and can only provide vision 
during periods of little or no motion.  These stationary periods, termed fixations, are 




Figure 36 - Diagram of Human Eye (Savio D Silva Network 2010) 
 
Outside of the fovea, visual acuity drops off rapidly with the number of 
cone detectors.  Instead, rod detectors provide less sensitive, but still important, peripheral 
vision.  At less than three degrees from fovea axis, visual acuity has decreased by fifty 
percent; at ten degrees, by eighty percent.  This situation is illustrated in Figure 37.  In 
this illustration, the angle from the fovea axis is noted by degrees, and the relative visual 
acuity for each angle is normalized to be a value between zero and one (Operations 
Evaluation Group 1952). 
Acuity also depends on the available illumination.  For maximum acuity, 
uniform illumination is needed to maintain fixed pupil dilation.  In varying illumination, 
the iris opens wider as the brightness of the scene decreases.  Vision results more from 
low-light rod detectors than normal-light cone detectors.  As the rod detectors are spaced 
further apart, resolution abilities decrease (Kopeika 1998).  
Color can also have an effect on visual acuity.  Normally testing for acuity 
is done using white light.  However, there are some effects of chromatic aberrations and 
acuity is improved for yellow and yellow-green lighting.  In contrast, acuity decreases for 
reds, and may decrease by up to thirty percent for blues or violets.  This is due to a lack of 













problems of visual search, the effects due to color could be ignored without contributing to 
appreciable errors (Koopman 1946).  Color will not be considered in this investigation. 
Studies by the Operations Evaluation Group indicated that the important factors in 
determining whether or not a target will be seen by the human eye in daylight reduced to: 
• Target contrast against its background, 
• Target distance from the eye, 
• Size of the target (Operations Evaluation Group 1952). 
 
Figure 37 - Human Eye Detection Lobe from (Operations Evaluation Group 1952) 
 
The target distance and size determine the solid angle subtended by the 
target image and thus the target image size on the retina.  Studies performed to determine 
threshold contrast (the contrast at which fifty percent of all targets would be detected) used 
a simple circular shape that subtended the representative target angle rather than detailed 
target shapes.  This data may be modified by “field factors” to determine a threshold 
contrast for a given angular subtense as experienced by the observer’s eye (Taylor 1964).  
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Note that the term “contrast” as used here refers to a ratio of two luminance values and is 
dimensionless.  The target size was given in milliradians, and was determined from the 
surrogate UAV wingspans divided by slant range as the UAVs traveled a straight and level 
flight path directly at the observer at a typical operational altitude of one thousand feet.  
The flight path was assumed to be in clear atmospheric conditions, with no structure 
background.  A plot of the resulting target threshold contrast is presented as Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38 - Angular Subtense versus Threshold Contrast 
 
The apparent contrast of the UAV against the sky background was derived 
using available study data and assumptions.  There are three possible sources of 
luminance for the UAVs: direct sunlight, sunlight reflected from the terrain, and path (sky) 
luminance.  As the slant range between the target and observer increases, the apparent 
contrast decreases as there is additional light scattering due to the increased path length.  
Some of the background light is scattered into the line of sight, while some of the light from 
the target is scattered from the line of sight.  At longer slant ranges, the result is that the 
target and background begin to appear similar in luminance.  In addition, there are 





































Background = 75 footlamberts








 τ is the atmospheric transmission, 
Bh is the luminance of the sky from altitude h at a given angle of sight, 
Bt is the inherent luminance of the target before attenuation 
Bo is the luminance of the sky as it appears at zero altitude along the same 
angle of sight (Dugas 1965). 
 
Transmission of the atmosphere and brightness of the daylight sky were 
derived from field test information (Boileau 1964).  During this testing, the sun was at 
approximately 41 degrees from the zenith.  The tabular data contained in the report were 
used as input tables to a Matlab® script that performed necessary interpolations and 
calculations.  
The modeling script first determined target angular subtense as seen by an 
observer as a function of range and UAV altitude.  The area of a circular disk of UAV 
wingspan diameter was calculated.  The disk was positioned horizontally with the ground.  
As an observer on the ground would only be able to see the underside of the disk, the only 
source of illumination for the underside considered was the sunlight reflected off the 
terrain.  The terrain was considered to be sand, and a reflectivity of 0.3 was used over all 
path angles.  The disk was considered painted with a dull gray paint with a reflectivity of 
0.26.  In both cases, the reflective surfaces were considered to be perfectly diffusing.  
The total illuminance of the terrain by the sun and sky was considered to be 7,000 foot 
candles.  Using the preceding data, the luminance of the UAV was estimated as the 
product of the illumination on the scene and the reflectivity of both the terrain and target 
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for each of the observation angles.  From this, apparent contrast values for the UAVs at 
points throughout the flight path were determined. 
The apparent contrast values derived above were used as an index into the 
data array used for developing the angular subtense versus threshold contrast chart 
presented earlier.  From this mapping, a determination of the angular subtense required 
was determined.  This value was then mapped to a range using the angular subtense versus 
slant range data developed during the first step.  The resulting graphs have two lines, one 
indicating the angular target size as a function of slant range, and the other, the threshold 
size as a function of slant range derived from manipulation of threshold contrast values.  
The intersection of the two lines indicates that the expected maximum range UAV 
detection will occur with a probability of 99 percent (Dugas 1965).   
 
Figure 39 - Tier I Maximum Detection Range Determination 
 
































Threshold Size for Target
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Figure 40 - Tier II Maximum Detection Range Determination 
 
From Figure 39, the unaided visual detection of the Tier I surrogate UAV 
by a person with 20/20 vision should occur at approximately 1,800 meter slant range 
(~5,900ft), with the target subtending an approximate 0.9 mrad.  Similarly, the detection 
of the Tier II surrogate UAV should occur by a slant range of approximately 4,000 meters 
(~13,000ft), with an angular subtense of 1.2 mrad as shown in Figure 40. 
b) Target Audible Detection of UAV 
A sound is generated when an object vibrates.  This vibration causes the 
molecules next to the object to vibrate, those molecules then pass the vibration to the 
molecules next to them and this process continues until the vibration loses all of its energy. 
The human ear is an entirely mechanical device that converts pressure 
disturbances propagated through the atmosphere into electrical signals that the brain can 
process.  A sound is generated when an object vibrates.  This vibration causes the 
molecules next to the object to vibrate, those molecules then pass the vibration to the 
molecules next to them and this process continues until the vibration loses all of its energy.  
The human ear is made up of three parts, the outer ear, the middle ear and the inner ear.  
The outer ear consists of the pinna and ear canal.  When a pressure wave hits the outer ear, 
it is funneled through the ear canal and focused onto the ear drum.  The middle ear 
consists of the ear drum and ossicles.  The ear drum picks up the vibrations and passes the 
vibrations to the inner ear by vibrating the ossicles or ear bones.  The ear drum and 
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ossicles act as an amplifier for the inner ear.  The inner ear consists of the cochlea and 
auditory nerve.  When the vibrations make it to the inner ear they cause tiny hairs in the 
cochlea to displace, resulting in an electrical signal that is passed to the auditory nerve.  
The auditory nerve delivers the electrical signal to the brain were it is processed into a 
sound (Harris 2011).  Figure 41 shows a cross-section of the human ear.   
 
 
Figure 41 - The Human Ear (Chan 2008) 
 
The noise generated by a UAV was investigated to determine the range it 
would be susceptible to audible detection by a representative twenty-year-old male with no 
hearing loss.  For UAVs there are two sources of noise, the first being the propeller and 
the second, the engine.  When a propeller moves through the air, it generates vibration and 
displacement of the surrounding air.  For non-electric motors, the sound of gasoline 
combustion and piston movement will also generate noise.  
Propellers generate noise in a spherical pattern similar to the shock waves 
of an explosion.  The noise generated from a propeller is a function of its top speed, power 
input and diameter. Equation 19 is used to calculate propeller noise for commercial aircraft 





Equation 19 - Propeller Noise Calculation from (Marte and Kurtz 1970) 
 
where: 
  = rms sound pressure level in dynes/cm2 
 m = order of the harmonic 
 S = distance from propeller hub to observer, ft 
 R = propeller radius, ft 
 A = propeller disc area, ft² 
 Ph = absorbed power, horsepower 
 T = thrust, lb 
 B = number of blades 
 Mt = tip Mach number 
 Jmb = Bessel function of order mB 
 x = argument of Bessel function 0.8 Mt mB sin Ø  
 Ø = angle from forward propeller axis to observer 
 
Current UAV propellers have a noise level of roughly 65–70 decibels 
(dBA) at 100 ft (Miller 2001).  The current propeller is a nylon propeller with two blades 
and a typical wing airfoil.  Recent studies have determined that by increasing the number 
of blades, changing the airfoil, and changing the blade material, a UAV propeller noise 
profile can be reduced by 12 dBA.  
The blade material of a propeller can be changed to a softer but stronger 
plastic.  The increased strength will result in less vibration during vortices shedding.  The 
softer material will absorb some of the sound and result in a softer sound.  The new 
materials are expensive, but the increased strength will result in longer life spans and fewer 
breaks during arrested landings.  
The number of blades used for a propeller requires a number of tradeoffs.   
For smaller electric engines there is a large drop in efficiency due to the higher speeds and 
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reduced torque.  For four-stroke and two-stroke engines, the loss in efficiency is not as 
severe because of lower rotational speeds and higher torque.  As the number of blades 
increases, the noise produced drops, making this a good option for larger Tier II UAVs but 
not for the smaller Tier I UAVs.  
Propeller noise is driven by tip shape; rounded tips result in less noise than 
sharp tips. The proposed airfoil (Miller 2001) takes advantage of this concept over the 
length of the blade resulting in significant noise reductions.  The propeller must be chosen 
based on the engine, performance requirements and noise requirements of the UAV.   
Figure 42 shows the sound profile for a typical UAV propeller.  Note that the top axis is 
decibels with the X and Y axis in feet.  
 
Figure 42 - UAV Noise Profile from (Miller 2001) 
 
The noise made by a UAV must remain below the background noise level 
or 0 dB to remain unheard.  Assuming the worst case scenario, being heard in a remote 
location standing on a hard surface with little to no background noise or wind, the sound 
level would have to be 0 dB.  To calculate the drop in noise per unit length, the Stokes 
equation was used.  Equation 20 shows the Stokes equation for sound attenuation.  
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From SBIR N02-096 (DTIC 2001), the noise level for a Tier 2 UAV is 
assumed to be 68 dB at 33 meters at 2,000 Hz.  From measurements of two-stroke motors, 
the engine is assumed to produce 85 dB at 50 ft (Jackson Hole Scientific Investigations 
2002).  The Tier 1 UAV is assumed to produce 40 dB at 2,000 Hz.  The air density, sound 
speed and dynamic viscosity were assumed for Kabul, Afghanistan.  Figure 43 was 
derived by the RUINS team to depict the results of the study.  
 
 
Equation 20 - Stokes Equation from (Silex Innovations 2002)  
Where 
 α = Sound attenuation in air (neper/m) 
 η = Dynamic viscosity of air (Pascal-s) 
  = Volume viscosity of air (Pascal-s) 
 ω = Frequency (cycles/second) 
 ρ = density (kg/m^3) 
 V = Speed of sound through air (m/s) 
 
 



















There are many considerations for the audible detection of UAVs.  In a 
moving target scenario, the engine noise in the cabin of the vehicle would make audible 
detection of the UAV before it enters striking range very unlikely.  In the fixed target 
scenario, urban background noise levels will increase the detection threshold significantly.  
In either case, audible detection is not anticipated until the UAV is well inside the AK-47 
range. 
C. Target Engagement Envelopes 
Using data developed during the preceding analyses, graphical models were 
generated of UAV-target weapon engagement for the stationary scenarios.  These models 
integrated 1) the scenario UAV flight elevations, 2) the identification ranges necessary to 
obtain firing authority for the 1.0 meter and 3.5 meter targets using both the EO and IR 
imagers, 3) the range of enemy unaided visual detection of the UAVs, and 4) the effective 
ranges for the enemy AK-47 and RPG-7 defensive weapons.   
For the enemy defense weapons, a fixed effective range was used regardless of the 
weapon firing angle.  The effective range for the RPG-7 was selected as 300 meters as 
previously described; the effective range for the AK-47 was 400 meters.  While a gunner 
may be able to hit a target at the longer ranges, the probability is lower due to the smaller 
UAV angular subtense presented resulting from range.  As range decreases, the 
probability of hitting the UAV increases with apparent target size.  No estimations of such 
changes in probability were included. 
No estimation of engagement ranges using MANPADS was performed due to the 
unknown signatures of the UAVs and the associated sensitivity of the missile systems.  If 
the signature of the UAV is sufficient, the MANPADS will be able to engage the aircraft at 
the maximum visual detection range.   
The resulting graph presents a simplified model of the target engagement envelope.  
In both the graphical depictions and all detection calculations, the UAV was assumed to be 
maintaining a fixed altitude while navigating an azimuth course directly at the target at a 
fixed speed.  Evasive maneuvers were not considered for this study. 
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1. Tier I Engagement Envelope 
The Tier I UAV was found to be well outside the threat range of the AK-47 rifle at 
the unaided visual detection range regardless flight altitude (Figure 44).  The Tier I EO 
sensor system proved capable of positive identification and weapons deployment of either 
the 1.0-meter or 3.5-meter target while remaining outside of both the AK-47 and RPG-7 
effective ranges.  However, identification of the 1.0-meter target using the IR sensor 
system did not occur until well within the effective range of both the AK-47 and the 
RPG-7.   
 
 
Figure 44 - Tier I Engagement Envelope 
 
An analysis was performed to determine the amount time the aircraft is subject to 
enemy defenses during a possible weapon engagement.  The entries in the tables indicate 
the times, in seconds, that the UAV was traveling certain portions of its profile and the 
associated enemy defense risk.  In all of these determinations, the UAV was considered to 
be headed directly at the target while maintaining its flight altitude.  The results are 
presented in Table 20. 
  
































Table 20 - Tier I Susceptibility - Engagement Times for Scenario Flight Conditions 
Event 
Seconds at 30 knots UAV Airspeed 
100 feet AGL 
(30.5 m) 
500 feet AGL 
(152.4 m) 
Time from maximum enemy visual detection of 
UAV until overhead target 113 113 
Time from maximum visual detection range until 
within AK-47 range 88 89 
Time from ID using 3.5m EO until within AK-47 
range 73
 74 
Time from ID using 1.0m EO until within AK-47 
range 3 3 
Time from ID using 3.5m IR until within AK-47 
range 16 16 
Time from AK-47 max range until ID using 1.0m 
IR1 14
1 171 
1 1.0 ID (IR) range not reached until after AK-47 effective range reached. 
 
2. Tier II Engagement Envelope 
The Tier II UAV was found to be well within the visual detection range prior to 
entering the AK-47 maximum effective range (Figure 45) regardless of flight altitude.  On 
any of the two flight profiles, either the onboard EO or IR sensor could identify both the 





Figure 45 - Tier II Engagement Envelope 
 
Similar to Tier I, an analysis was performed to determine the amount time the 
aircraft is subject to enemy defenses during a possible weapon engagement.  The results 
are presented in Table 21. 
 
Table 21 - Tier II Susceptibility - Engagement Timing for Scenario Flight Conditions 
Event 
Seconds at 65 knots UAV Airspeed 
500 feet AGL 
(152.4 m) 
2,000 feet AGL 
(609.6 m) 
Time from maximum enemy visual detection 
of UAV until overhead target 
123 122 
Time from maximum visual detection range 
until within AK-47 range 
112 122 
Time from ID using 3.5m EO until within 
AK-47 range 
93 103 
Time from ID using 1.0m EO until within 
AK-47 range 
18 23 
Time from ID using 3.5m IR until within 
AK-47 range 
189 199 





































3. Engagement Limitation Summaries 
Several observations may be made from the preceding discussion to aid in the 
selection of an optimum solution. 
• Sensor performance characteristics are geometric calculations assuming perfect 
optics, no background clutter, and no range attenuation effects.  Detection 
performance of actual sensors will likely be reduced. 
• The AK-47 was considered the primary enemy defensive weapon of concern.   
• If the signature of the UAVs was sufficient to launch a MANPADS, the 
MANPADS engagement range exceeded most of the identification detection 
ranges of any of the onboard UAV sensors, regardless of Tier, as launch could 
occur at the enemy visual UAV detection range.  The sole exception was the 
Tier II 3.5-meter target detection using the IR sensor. 
• All estimations of visual detection range were based on worst case (clear, 
day-time) conditions.  Visual detection ranges are expected to decrease 
significantly at night and lower visibility conditions.  In partial moon night 
conditions with no external lighting, visual UAV detection may prove 
impossible regardless of range or flight altitude. 
• The Tier II UAV IR sensor outperformed the EO sensor.  This was due to the 
pixel size of detector arrays being nearly identical, but EO optical FOV being 
more than twice as large as the IR FOV.   
• The Tier II UAV was able to identify both the 1.0-meter and 3.5-meter targets 
using either the EO or IR sensor outside of enemy defense ranges. 
• The Tier I UAV was within the effective range of an AK-47 for a period of time 
prior to achieving the adequate sensor resolution required for weapon 
deployment against the 1.0-meter target when utilizing the current IR sensor.  
The low resolution of the Tier I IR sensor and slower flight speed contributes to 
susceptibility durations prior to identification; however, its smaller size also 
decreases the probability of effective enemy defense. 
• The threat exposure necessary to accomplish positive identification using the 
IR sensors of the Tier I UAV would indicate use of this targeting sensor only in 
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reduced visibility conditions (night) to reduce UAV susceptibility to enemy 
defenses. 
• Calculations indicated the Tier I UAV audibly detectable while on the 100’ 
AGL flight path, and undetectable at 500’ AGL.  The Tier II UAV was 
calculated to be audibly undetectable while flying on the 2,000’ AGL flight 
path. 
• The optimum weapon engagement would consist of the UAV dispensing its 
weapons at ranges beyond the enemy’s detection and self-defense ranges.  
This situation would allow surprise engagement of the enemy, minimizing the 
time available to react and reposition, as well as minimizing the possibility of 
damage to the UAV resulting from enemy self-defenses by remaining outside 
of effective enemy defense range.  Table 22 presents the detection ranges 
developed during the analysis of possible UAV-enemy engagements.  
Unfortunately, the maximum range for proper identification necessary for a 
firing decision was estimated to be less than the visual detection range, with the 
single exception of the Tier II 3.5-meter target identification.  The UAVs will 
likely be visually detected by the enemy prior to weapon engagement.   
Table 22 - Calculated Detection Ranges  
UAV Type Maximum Range for Identification 
(meters) 
Range of UAV Detection by 
Enemy (meters) 
Vehicle Human Visual Audible 
Tier I 1,556 444 1,800 65 
Tier II 6,487 1,853 4,000 265 
 
D. Identification of Alternatives 
The development, evaluation, and selection of alternatives are a fundamental 
concept in the system engineering process.  Most engineering problems involve managing 
constrained resources to develop a set of alternatives that will be compared to a standard or 
each other.  Once a selection method is established, a decision between the alternatives 
can be made (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006). 
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 Blanchard and Fabrycky explain that limiting and strategic factors must be 
identified to define alternatives.  While limiting factors are those that “stand in the way of 
attaining objectives,” strategic factors are those “that can be altered to make progress 
possible.”  For this project, the primary limiting factors considered were the available 
payload weights and the sensor resolution of the typical sensor packages available on small 
UAVs.  Strategic factors included weapon type and weapon release range.  These were 
developed using research, analysis, and stakeholder feedback (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2006).   
To properly compare alternatives, they must be converted into “a common 
measure” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006).  The final comparison of alternatives was 
performed using a combination of analysis and modeling.  However, possible alternatives 
were identified and their feasibility verified prior to reaching that stage.  The limited 
alternatives identified during this process were then evaluated, using a variety of methods, 
before the optimum solutions were selected.   
1. Weapons Alternatives 
Several types of weapons were considered for use in the RUINS project.  These 
included 1) guns, 2) unguided ballistic weapons, 3) guided ballistic weapons, 4) unguided 
propelled weapons, and 5) guided propelled weapons.  The characteristics of each general 
type of weapon were examined to gauge their applicability to the project. 
The field of weaponeering was introduced earlier.  Certain basic concepts from 
elementary weaponeering could be used in the assessment of various weapon types for use 
with the UAV surrogates.  One of the major parameters of weaponeering, SSPD, has 
already been discussed.  Though direct determination of SSPD was not believed possible 
for the project due to lack of data, the measures of delivery accuracy used in its 
development were believed useful for solution comparisons.   
When attacking a target on the ground, an air vehicle will attempt to deliver the 
weapon to the ground aim point, referred to as the desired mean point of impact (DMPI).  
The actual impact points of the weapons will be dispersed around the mean point of impact 
(MPI).  The disbursements around the MPI will be due in part to ballistic dispersion, the 
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result of small manufacturing differences between individual weapons, and weather.  
Only unguided weapons display ballistic errors.  The difference in location of the DMPI 
and the MPI is due to aiming errors.  The two types of errors are assumed to be 
independent random variables, with the total miss distance being the sum of the ballistic 
and aiming errors.  The miss errors are generally measured in either the range or 




Figure 46 - Weaponeering Reference Terms (Driels 2004) 
 
Three other terms are used to further describe the impact errors.  Rather than using 
standard deviations, range error probable (REP) and deflection error probable (DEP) are 
typically used.  According to Morris Driels, “The REP is the distance from the DMPI to 
one of a pair of lines perpendicular to the range direction, equidistant from the DMPI such 
that 50% of the impact points lie between them.”  DEP is a similar construct in the 
deflection (cross range) direction.  Both are calculated only after careful analysis has 
removed any biases and extreme cases from the data.  Also commonly used is circular 














percent of the impact points contained within its boundary.  REP and DEP are generally 
more useful, as CEP may be derived from them; however, the inverse is not true (Driels 
2004). 
Though the preceding descriptions of REP, DEP, and CEP focused on ground 
measurements, in some cases such measurements may be made in either a plane normal to 
the line of sight of aircraft and target at time of weapon release, or the weapon velocity 
vector at the time of impact.  Conversion between the ground and normal plane 
measurements is performed with the application of geometric principles (Driels 2004). 
a) Unaccelerated Unguided Weapons 
Several types of accelerated weapon deliveries that affect the weapon 
trajectory are possible.  Aircraft maneuvers prior to release may cause the weapon to be 
accelerated and increase its engagement range.  These include pull-up, lateral toss, and 
loft maneuvers.  However, none of these maneuvers are being considered for the UAV 
platform.  The UAV flies in a fairly benign flight path, with gradual turns and few, if any, 
dives.  As a result, the following discussion will include only unaccelerated deliveries.  
For the purposes of this discussion, the UAV will be limited to horizontal flight at a fixed 
speed.  When dispensed, the weapon motion will be in a plane containing the velocity 
vector of the UAV at release (Driels 2004). 
The motion of the weapon is assumed to be independent in the horizontal 
and vertical directions once released from the UAV.  Further, the velocity of the weapon 
at the time of dispense is also known, and will include horizontal and vertical components 
from the UAV forward velocity and any weapon ejection velocity.  In many higher-speed 
situations, ejection charges are necessary to force the weapon from the boundary layer near 
the aircraft.  Without this positive ejection, large accuracy errors may result (Driels 2004).  
Such charges will not be considered on the Tier I and II UAVs due to their lower airspeeds. 
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Figure 47 - Downrange Displacement for Ballistic Dispense from Surrogate UAVs 
 
A simple point mass, zero-drag model may be used to determine the 
maximum standoff range for successful targeting engagement and the maximum weapon 
velocity at impact.  As this model neglects the effects of aerodynamic drag on any 
released weapon, the actual standoff ranges and impact velocities will be lower.  Figure 47 
and Figure 48 show the results of such calculations using the anticipated surrogate UAV 
cruise and maximum velocities.  In all cases, a level flight profile was assumed. 
 
Figure 48 - Impact Velocities of Ballistic Dispense from Surrogate UAVs 
 
Delivery accuracy for unguided ballistic weapons is influenced primarily 
by the dispensing aircraft.  As there is no guidance available in the weapon; the accuracy 





















































depends on the aircraft releasing the weapon at the proper time and location, derived using 
aircraft current position, flight speed, heading, and attitude.  Also impacting the accuracy 
are the effects of any winds.  Though the dispensing aircraft avionics may be able to 
accurately determine wind speed and perform adjustments to release timing with the aid of 
a wind model, there is no information on how the winds may vary between the weapon 
release location and point of impact.  Even small magnitudes of unpredicted wind can 
shift the final impact point, and the problem becomes more significant with increasing 
dispense altitude.  Any targeting model must adequately compensate for wind effects 
(Driels 2004). 
Several methods may be used by a fire control computer (FCC) for utilizing 
sensor data to assist the pilot in releasing the weapon in the proper location at the proper 
time.  Three typical methods will be discussed. Each requires knowledge of the aircraft 
flight state and understanding of the ballistics of the weapon to be deployed to plan an 
accurate release (Driels 2004). 
In the continuously computed release point (CCRP) method, the pilot 
selects the target before reaching the release point.  The FCC then determines the aircraft 
altitude above the target and ground range by use of onboard sensors, such as a laser 
rangefinder.  Using the designator depression angle and known altitude, the FCC cues the 
pilot to the proper release point where the weapon is released automatically (Driels 2004). 
The continuously computed impact point (CCIP) method indicates where 
the weapon would hit the ground if released at that moment.  The FCC is primarily used as 
a sophisticated display manager to constantly update the pilot’s display for current 
position.  The weapon is manually released by the pilot when FCC display cues are 
properly aligned with the target (Driels 2004). 
The bombing on coordinate (BOC) method is well known but has become 
much more effective with the introduction of the global positioning system (GPS) 
instrumentation in modern aircraft.  In this method, the GPS coordinates of a target are 
known and input into the weapon, either prior to release or during flight.  The aircraft is 
flown toward the target location.  The FCC computes the bomb fall range and the weapon 
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is released at this range from the target.  The weapon then guides itself to the preselected 
coordinates (Driels 2004). 
Sources of error in the delivery of these types of weapons are many.  In any 
of the methods, a slight error in dispense timing can cause the target to be missed.  Some 
of the error sources include slight aircraft positioning errors (yaw, pitch, roll), slant range 
measurement errors (range, relative depression angle), and altitude measurements (Driels 
2004).  Another source of error may be the time delay in the data link communication 
necessary for transmitting a dispense command to the UAV. Further analysis of resulting 
errors may be necessary to fully understand the limitations of the unguided ballistic 
methods. 
b) Unaccelerated Guided Weapons 
An advantage of guided weapons is that the accuracy of their delivery is due 
to the weapon guidance system and generally independent of the dispensing aircraft.  As 
these types of weapons have guidance effects that occur during descent, ballistic dispersion 
is not applicable.  A guided weapon will reach the target if it is released within a volume 
called the launch acceptable region (LAR), illustrated in Figure 49.  Demands on air crew 
for the precision of weapon release at the ballistic point are decreased (Driels 2004). 
Guidance is implemented by deflection of some surface in the airstream to 
control the velocity vector of the weapon.  This can range from a simple single fin to more 
complex guidance that proportionally displaces fins at the minimal angles to perform 
needed steering, reducing speed loss and maintaining maximum kinetic energy.  Several 
sensor types are used for guidance.  For use with a UAV system, all systems currently 
under consideration are passive.  These include imaging sensors, EO and/or IR modulated 
detector sensors, laser sensors, inertial sensors, and passive RF.  Active RF systems are 
not under consideration due to their higher weight resulting from needed transmitters. 
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Figure 49 - Launch Acceptable Region (Driels 2004) 
 
While guidance provides a benefit in accuracy, it is not without cost.  Due 
to the increased complexity of the added guidance system, guided munitions are more 
costly than their non-guided counterparts.  A portion of their weight is used by the 
guidance system including sensors, processing, and steering mechanisms, all of which 
decrease the weight available for use in the warhead.  Any necessary power needed for 
electronics and fin deflections must also be provided onboard the weapon.  Most guided 
ballistic weapons will also have a decreased range and impact velocity when compared to 
unguided weapons, resulting from the loss of velocity caused by steering fin aerodynamic 
drag.  An exception to this would be a guided weapon with glide capabilities such as the 
Small Diameter Bomb.   
For a guided weapon, some mechanism must be in place to calculate a path 
between the weapon’s current position and the target.  The general methods used separate 
the guidance types to either one that guides to a point in space, or one that guides to a 
target.   
To guide to a point in space, the target’s location must be known.  Any 
target movement, unless at a known fixed rate and direction, renders this method 






navigation system that can calculate current position and a processor that can convert the 
current weapon trajectory information and target location into steering corrections.  GPS- 
and inertial-guided weapons use this method.   
Moving and fixed targets may be engaged by a weapon that guides to target, 
but additional equipment onboard the weapon is necessary.  This may be accomplished by 
either remote control of the weapon guidance or tracker guidance.  Remote control 
requires commands to be sent to the weapon.  These may be transmitted by radio, laser, or 
wire.  These systems are very accurate but require man-in-the-loop feedback throughout 
their flight to ensure proper guidance.  In comparison, tracker guidance may be performed 
autonomously once the target has been acquired.  This type of guidance uses some form of 
sensor system to dynamically track the target, as the weapon completes its trajectory and 
generates the necessary steering commands to remain on course. 
c) Guns 
A wide variety of weapons are classified as guns for this investigation, with 
all including both the actual firing mechanism and the ammunition.  The delivery of a 
projectile from a gun is often modeled as a straight line for shorter ranges from the aircraft 
to the target.  The effective range of guns may range from under 100 yards for a shotgun to 
nearly a mile for larger caliber rounds.  The effective radius of rounds that might be used 
on a UAV also varies widely, from small .22 caliber rounds to explosive, 
fleshette-equipped 40mm mortar rounds. 
Aiming of a gun mounted on a UAV might be accomplished using a variety 
of methods.  A gimbaled mount would allow the gun aim point to separate from the UAV 
velocity vector, accommodating the slow maneuverability of the UAV platforms.  
However, this addition would be at the cost of much added weight.  Mounting the gun in a 
lookdown position and coupling with automatic UAV maneuvers for sighting is another 
option.  In either case, feedback to the operator on aiming location could be provided by 
the FCC.  
Limiting considerations of guns are stresses to the UAV, weight concerns, 
and targeting accuracies.  Stresses to the airframe, due to the absorption of impacts 
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resulting from each gun firing may stress the UAV airframes in ways that designers never 
considered.  The weight of the firing components of a gun, including the barrel, 
magazines, receivers, and any other necessary components, can be considerable.  The 
weight of any necessary gimbaled mounting needed for proper aiming must be considered, 
as well as the weight of any ammunition.  Of this total weight, only a small fraction is 
delivered to the target.   
 
Figure 50 - Gun Physics Issues 
 
Targeting accuracy of shots may be affected by the firing of a gun.  When 
the projectile leaves the barrel of the gun, it leaves with a certain amount of kinetic energy.  
For conservation of energy, an equal and opposite amount of energy will be absorbed by 
the UAV as recoil, potentially applying a torque and shifting the aim point of the gun.  The 
FCC must be able to make the required corrections to the gun aim and flight trim as a result 
of these.  This problem could be minimized or eliminated by positioning the gun such that 
the recoil acts near or at the center of mass of the UAV.  However, this could require 
significant modifications to the UAV.  Figure 50 illustrates the various physical forces 
operating on the UAV at the time of a gun firing. 
d) Accelerated Unguided Weapons 
Accelerated unguided weapons are unguided rockets.  The accuracy is 
subject to ballistic dispersion as these systems have no guidance.  Trajectories of these 











at high speed.  The FCC operates similarly to the CCIP bombing mode in prompting the 
pilot for firing.  While no weight is taken by guidance, a portion of the available weapon 
weight is used for rocket propellant, nozzles, and guidance surfaces. 
There are advantages to unguided rockets when compared to unguided 
unaccelerated weapons.  The addition of propulsion allows the standoff range from the 
aircraft to the target to be increased dramatically, providing for increased safety of the 
aircraft.  The addition of acceleration to the weapon flight also increases the kinetic 
energy of the weapon, allowing for better target penetration.  An improvement over guns, 
which may be considered similar weapons, is that the majority of the weight required by 
the weapon is deployed at the target and not maintained on the airframe.  Further, the 
stresses to the UAV airframe from the firing of a missile are minimal, as the missile is 
either ejected from its carrier prior to rocket ignition or accelerates off its launcher at 
ignition. 
A consideration when using a rocket propelled weapon is the blast effect 
that the firing aircraft experiences when the rocket motor fires.  This effect may well 
prevent the use of unguided rockets from a UAV, as these types of weapons rely on initial 
aiming provided by the launching hardware.   
A disadvantage of rockets, compared to unguided ballistic weapons, is the 
loss of weapon weight to rocket motor.  Additionally, the flatter trajectory of unguided 
rockets provides for miss distance increases when deployed at low angles of flight.  
However, these disadvantages would seem to be adequately compensated for by the 
increased standoff range and higher energy delivered by this type of weapon. 
e) Accelerated Guided Weapons 
These types of weapons have the advantages of the unguided accelerated 
weapons coupled with the benefit of guidance.  They provide significant standoff range as 
well as after-launch guidance capabilities.  These weapons are also the most expensive, 
difficult, and time consuming to develop, require a more sophisticated FCC and operator 
interface, additional maintenance, and special handling procedures.  The stresses 
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experienced by the UAV airframe from these types of weapons are the same as those of 
their unguided counterparts, both of which are less than that due to guns. 
Another type of accelerated guided weapon could be the UAV itself in a 
role where it would destroy itself upon reaching the target.  This option may be feasible 
for the Tier I UAV due to its limited payload and expendable nature.  The available 
payload space could be filled by a warhead of some type and the UAV flown under direct 
operator control into the target.  Though the impact energy of the UAV would not be 
great, due to its relatively low speed, it could be aimed quite accurately, due to the high 
maneuverability of the UAV and the pilot in the loop.  A rocket assist may be possible to 
increase the impact airspeed, but the weight required for such a motor would decrease the 
available weight for a warhead.  There may be legal prohibitions against this type of UAV 
weapon; however, the option will be retained for the purposes of the study. 
2. Weapons Choice Tradeoffs 
Building on the introductory analysis developed in the preceding section, a high 
level examination of the operational advantages and disadvantages of various weapon 
types was performed.  Results of the examination are presented in Table 23, Table 24, and 
Table 25. The discussion of weapon types was non-specific with no particular make and/or 
model identified in an effort to determine all possible solutions for the UAV 













Table 23 - Possible UAV Weapon Types - Unaccelerated 
Weapon Type Guidance Advantages Disadvantages 
Unaccelerated None Low cost 




Ineffective against moving 
targets 
Subject to weather effects 
Minimal standoff range 
Large targeting errors 
possible 
GPS Relatively low cost 
Ease of manufacture 
More accurate targeting 
Autonomous once 
deployed 
Ineffective against moving 
targets 
Minimal standoff range 









Relatively low cost 
Technology well known 
Accurate targeting 
May be used against 
moving targets 
Lock-on after launch 
possible 
Difficult to jam 
Minimal standoff range 







Table 24 - Possible UAV Weapon Types - Guns 
Weapon Type Guidance Advantages Disadvantages 
Guns None Technology well known 
Increased standoff range 
May be used against 
moving targets 
Lower cost 
Low collateral damage 
Reduced weapon effect 
Unknown long-term effects 
on airframe 
Sighting problems 
Low effect/weight ratio 
Reliability issues 








Table 25 - Possible UAV Weapon Types - Accelerated 
Weapon Type Guidance Advantages Disadvantages 
Accelerated None Relatively low cost 
Ease of manufacture 
Increased standoff range 
Autonomous once 
deployed 
Technology well known 
Marginally effective 
against moving targets 
Subject to weather effects 
Large targeting errors 
possible 
Decreased warhead payload 
GPS More accurate targeting 
Autonomous once 
deployed  
Increased standoff range 
Technology well known 
Ineffective against moving 
targets 








Technology well known 
Accurate targeting 
Increased standoff range 
May be used against 
moving targets 
Lock-on after launch 
possible 










Technology well known 
Accurate targeting 
Increased standoff range 









Lock on before launch only 
 
E. Candidate Weapon Identification and Preliminary Screening 
A search of open source literature was performed to identify possible weapons that 
might be applicable to the RUINS application.  Due to the limited payloads available on 
both Tiers of UAV, the identified selections proved limited.  Many of the weapons 
considered are in early stages of development or notional at this time.  For those cases, 
there was minimal specification or performance data available.  During identification of 
candidates, only the weight of the actual weapon was included.  Weights of additional 
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necessary components, such as mounting hardware or necessary electronic support, were 
considered separately. 
 
 Table 26 - Initially Identified Candidate Weapons 
Weapon Name (Country) Weapon Type Weapon 
Weight 
(pounds) 
Unguided Munition (U.S.) Dumb Bomb [notional] 10 
GPS Guided Munition (U.S.) GPS/SAL Guided Ballistic 6 
Selectively Targeted Skeet (U.S.) EO/IR Cluster Munition 10 
Viper Strike (U.S.) IR Guided Munition 44 
M66 (U.S.) Unguided Missile 30 
Explosive Nose Cone (U.S.) [notional Tier I only] 1.5 
Switchblade (U.S.) EO Guided Missile (UAV) 2.2 
SPIKE-NAVAIR (U.S.) EO Missile 5.3 
Precision Guided Mortar Munition (U.S.) GPS/INS Mortar  10 
Stinger (U.S.) IR Missile 23 
SPIKE-MR/LR (ISR) EO/IR Missile 23.1 
Javelin (U.S.) IR Missile 26 
LAHAT (ISR) SAL Missile 29 
Griffin (U.S.) SAL Missile 33 
Scorpion (U.S.) SAL Guided Glide Munition 34 
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System 
(U.S.) 
SAL Missile 35 
DAGR™ (U.S.) SAL Missile 35 
SPIKE-ER (ISR) EO/IR Missile 73 
 
For both Tiers of UAV, the weight of a weapons management system (WMS) and 
weapons mounting hardware was considered in weight calculations.  The sophistication 
of the WMS depends on the weapon system, but was expected to include certain minimal 
electronics processing capabilities necessary for informing the operator of weapon status, 
processing engagement and dispense requests, and interfacing between the weapon and 
UAV message bus.  The complexity and weight of any required mounting hardware was 
also weapon specific, and could range from a simple plastic tube dispenser to a 
complicated missile launch rail or bomb rack. 
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Guns were not selected as possible candidates on either Tier of UAVs.  The Tier I 
UAV does not have the payload to carry a gun, ammunition, and necessary mounting 
hardware.  Analysis of Tier II target attack scenario susceptibilities indicated that if the 
UAV was within successful target engagement range using a gun, the UAV was also 
susceptible to enemy defenses.  Accurate aiming of a gun from a Tier II UAV flying on 
described scenarios could also prove problematic, increasing the possibility of collateral 
damage.  Including a mounting gimbal to enhance weapon accuracy would greatly 
increase weapon system weight.  Finally, the effect delivered to the enemy using a gun 
was not felt to be sufficient for the required weight of the system. 
1. Tier I UAV Weapons 
The Tier I UAV presented a significant challenge to incorporate the addition of a 
weapon capability due to its small available payload of just 2.5 pounds.  If a mounting and 
WMS weight of a total of one pound was assumed, 1.5 pounds was available for weapon 
use.  The only option identified as acceptable, due to weight constraints, was an Explosive 
Nose Cone. 
This option is not a currently available weapon.  Instead, it is proposed that a 
warhead may be fitted inside the replaceable nose cone of the UAV.  The UAV would 
then proceed on a mission to identify and attack a target.  The device could have simple 
impact fusing in addition to a safe-arm system.  Necessary interfaces through the weapon 
controller would be minimal due to the simple functionality of the device.  The operator 
would have a single control arm. 
The Explosive Nose Cone was not considered a feasible option at this time.  The 
fitting of an explosive device to the UAV would require some type of safe-arm device to be 
included as part of the installation for safety in transport.  When preparing the vehicle for 
launch, the safe-arm device would be placed in the arm position,  This Tier of UAV is 
hand launched, resulting in the possibility of its impacting the ground close to the launch 
personnel and detonating the device.   
Instead of modifying existing Tier I UAV for use as guided missiles, it may prove 
more time and cost effective to seek a commercial off-the-shelf disposable UAV 
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capability.  Such a device is currently in development by AeroVironment and is described 
in more detail below.  As there are no feasible weapon options available for the Tier I, no 
further analysis will be performed on this vehicle. 
2. Tier II UAV Weapons 
The Tier II surrogate total available payload of 93 pounds allowed for a much 
broader selection of weapons.  The IAI POP-300D sensor package, considered part of the 
Tier II surrogate, consumed 35 pounds of the available payload, leaving 58 pounds 
maximum for weapon systems usage.  Estimates of weights for required mounting 
hardware and support electronics were as follows. 
• The weight of the WMS for the Tier II was estimated to be 10 pounds, which 
included the weight of all associated wiring and housings for the WMS.  Team 
Bravo member James Tuey has supported development of two such WMS intended 
for use on the surrogate-sized UAVs and felt that 10 pounds was a representative 
weight.  With the weight of the WMS considered, a total of 48 pounds remain 
available for weapon use. 
• The mounting for each non-missile weapon was estimated to be 10 pounds per 
round.  The estimate was based on the seven pound weight of the MA-4 bomb rack 
and an additional three pounds allowed for adaptor hardware (Fed Biz Ops 2009). 
• The mounting of any missile weapon was estimated to weigh the same as the 
weapon itself.  M299 Hellfire missile launchers intended to carry four missiles in 
current use on U.S. helicopters weigh 145 pounds empty (Lockheed-Martin 2011).  
However, these racks are intended to survive a more severe environment than that 
expected for the Tier II UAV.  The mounting was also considered to include any 
launch tube, if required, for the weapon. 
a) Unguided Ballistic Munitions 
This type of device is commonly referred to as a “dumb bomb.”  The 
munition has no propulsion mechanism and relies on gravity as the delivery force.  Lateral 
translation is due solely to dispensing vehicle velocity prior to dispense.  No guidance 
capability is provided and the weapon trajectory is purely ballistic.  The device used in 
this study was notional.  Ideal dispense parameters required to successfully engage the 
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target using the altitudes and airspeeds specified in the mission scenarios were developed 
and used in modeling of the scenarios.  The effects of aerodynamic drag were included in 
the calculations, assuming a pointed nose and cylindrical shape.  As this was a notional 
weapon design and not currently known to be in production, no illustration of this type of 
weapon was available.  At an estimated weight of ten pounds each and including the 
estimated ten pounds per weapon mounting weight, the Tier II UAV could carry two of 
these devices at takeoff within the available 48 pounds of payload weight. 
b) Guided Ballistic Munitions 
Two examples of guided ballistic weapons were identified that could be 
carried within the previously defined weight restrictions of the Tier II vehicle.  Both are 
developmental weapons.  Detailed information available in open sources concerning the 
weapons was not available.  Some information concerning sizing, weight, and anticipated 
weight was obtained and used to develop possible engagement boundaries.  
(1) GPS Guided Munition (G2M).  This weapon is being developed 
by ATK.  Its planned low weight of approximately six pounds will allow even smaller 
UAVs to carry multiple rounds.  As it is a non-propelled weapon, a majority of the weight 
is available for use as a warhead.  Approximately four pounds of the weapon’s weight is 
being allocated to warhead.  Use of both GPS and semi-active laser guidance allows for 
precision guidance and reduced collateral damage.  Figure 51 displays an illustration of 
the ATK G2M.  Approximate sizing of the device was developed by analysis of drawings 
illustrating the mounting of the devices on a MQ-5B Hunter UAV (Defense Update 2011).  
As these are non-missile weapons, the estimated additional mounting weight for each 
weapon was ten pounds, which includes the seven pound mounting rack and three pounds 
of hardware for adapting to the Tier II surrogate.  Using the anticipated weapon and 
mounting weights, each weapon round would require sixteen pounds of the 48 available 
payload pounds.  The Tier II UAV could carry up to three of these weapons at takeoff.   
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Figure 51 - GPS Guided Munition (G2M) from (Defense Update 2011) 
 
(2) Selectively Targeted Skeet (STS).  This weapon is being 
developed by Tektron Systems as a munition for use in a cluster munition dispenser.  
Intended for use as an anti-armor weapon, the STS is dispensed over the battle area.  An 
internal rocket motor causes the weapon to spin once deployed.  Using a dual-mode 
active/passive sensor system, the weapon utilizes a deployed Samara wing, similar to a 
maple seed, to steer to a target.  Once in position, its precision explosively formed 
penetrator (EFP) warhead is fired downward at the target.  The near vertical trajectory of 
the warhead reduces the possibility of collateral damage.  If a target is not found within a 
certain amount of time, the STS will self-destruct.  Figure 52 illustrates the STS munition 
in its deployed configuration (Textron Systems 2011). The STS munition weighs 
approximately ten pounds.  Combined with the estimated ten pounds per round 
mounting/dispenser weight, each weapon round would require twenty pounds of payload 
weight.  With a maximum of 48 payload pounds available, the Tier II UAV could carry 
two of the rounds at takeoff. 
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Figure 52 - Selectively Targeted Skeet (STS) (Textron Systems 2011) 
 
c) Unguided Propelled Munitions 
The M66 unguided propelled rocket rounds identified during the weapons 
search were found to be overweight for the Tier II platform and were not considered 
further.  Additionally, lack of guidance capability greatly increases the chance of 
collateral damage. 
d) Guided Propelled Munitions 
Though the initial search for possible weapons identified several options, 
once the weight of the WMS and mounting/launch hardware was included, several of the 
weapons were found to be overweight and were screened out of further analysis.  Two of 
the remaining weapons are developmental, while three are in current deployment.  In all 
cases, analysis of the weapon characteristics and performances were based on open source 
literature which may affect its accuracy.   
(1) Javelin Anti-Armor Missile.  The Javelin system is a 
fire-and-forget missile system that has been in full rate production since 1997.  The full 
system includes the missile, a launch tube, and the command-launch unit (CLU).  The 
missile itself weighs 26 pounds.  Target tracking is accomplished using passive infrared, 
depending on target lock-on before launch (LOBL) (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Figure 
53 shows a model of the Javelin missile round. 
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Figure 53 - Javelin Anti-Armor Missile (Grime 2007) 
 
In operation, the operator would detect the target using the CLU.  If 
the decision was made to fire, the weapon would be activated.  A choice of trajectory for 
top attack or direct attack is made prior to launch.  At firing, an eject motor propels the 
round away from the gunner.  Once at a safe distance, the main rocket motor fires to 
propel the missile to the target.  No further inputs to the missile from the gunner are 
required once the missile has been fired, allowing the gunner to either reload or reposition.  
The current warhead is a two-stage EFP; however, future versions will include a 
multipurpose warhead that will include both EFP and fragmentation effects.  Maximum 
range of the Block I Javelin missile is given as 2,500 meters (Net Resources International 
2011). 
The combination of the missile weight of 26 pounds and anticipated 
mounting/launcher weight of 26 pounds, the total weapon weight was approximately four 
pounds over the maximum available payload weight of the Tier II UAV of 48 pounds.  
However, the Javelin missile was retained as an option for further study due to the low 
weight overage.  Given the current weight approximations, the Tier II UAV surrogate 
might carry a maximum of one Javelin missile. 
(2) SPIKE-MR/LR Anti-Armor Missile.  These missile systems 
were originally developed by Rafael for the Israeli Ministry of Defense.  The SPIKE-MR 
is similar in capabilities to the U.S. Javelin anti-armor missile.  It operates in 
fire-and-forget manner similar to the Javelin, using either a passive IR or daytime (EO) 
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seeker.  The SPIKE-LR is an improvement to the MR version and allows for a fiber data 
link from the operator CLU to the missile to send commands during flight.  The missile 
operates in a LOBL mode only (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Figure 54 depicts a 
SPIKE-MR/LR missile round. 
 
Figure 54 - SPIKE-MR/LR Missile (Defense Industry Daily 2008) 
 
The SPIKE system also has a two-part propulsion system to first 
propel the weapon away from the launcher before igniting the main rocket motor.  It has a 
multipurpose warhead and a choice of trajectories for use in engaging different target 
types.  Its maximum range is given as 2,500 meters (EuroSpike GmbH Unknown).  
The combination of the SPIKE-MR missile weight, anticipated 
mounting/launcher, and WMS was found to be slightly under the maximum available 
payload weight of the Tier II UAV.  Given the current weight approximations of 23.1 
pounds for the weapon and 23.1 pounds for mounting/launching hardware, the Tier II 
surrogate UAV could carry a maximum of one SPIKE-ER missile at takeoff. 
(3) Stinger Anti-Air Missile System (FIM-92).  The current version 
of the Stinger system has been in production since 1992.  The missile was designed for 
surface-to-air use against a variety of rotary and fixed wing targets, and improvements 
have been made through the years to enhance its capabilities against cruise missiles as well 
as to allow its use as an air-to-air missile.  The design of the missile system includes the 
capability of operational software reprogramming in the field without disassembly.  The 
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missile itself weighs approximately 23 pounds and is equipped with an impact-fused 
fragmentation warhead (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Figure 55 shows the Stinger missile 
system including detachable eject motor. 
 
 
Figure 55 - Stinger Anti-Air Missile System (Raytheon n.d.) 
 
In typical operation, a gunner would power the weapon system, and 
aim at the target using optical mechanisms on the reusable launcher electronics.  The 
Stinger uses a dual band pseudo-imaging detection system to track the target in a variety of 
situations.  Once the target has been sighted, the WMS allows the missile to track the 
target.  Successful target lock is indicated by tone.  The missile is then fired.  A 
separable eject motor propels the missile from the tube to a safe distance in front of the 
launcher.  The two-stage motor is then fired, and the missile rapidly accelerates to over 
Mach 2.  The missile is guided using proportional navigation law to intercept the target’s 
flight path.  Shortly before impact, the aimpoint of the missile velocity vector is shifted 
away from the target's engine, causing the missile to impact the target body.  The 
maximum range of the Stinger missile is estimated to be 4.5 kilometers (IHS Global 
Limited 2010). 
The Stinger system has been demonstrated by the Army for 
air-to-air use from a helicopter.  At the expected combined missile weight of 23 pounds 
and mounting/launcher hardware weights of 23 pounds, the Tier II UAV can carry a single 
Stinger round and remain within the available payload weight of 48 pounds. 
(4) NAVAIR Spike Missile System.  The NAVAIR Spike missile 
system has been called the world’s smallest guided missile system.  Currently in 
development by a joint government-industry team, the missile was originally envisioned as 
a small man-portable precision fire-and-forget missile system for use against asymmetric 
targets.  Early successes have expanded its possible role to use on UAV platforms.  The 
missile itself is 2.25 inches in diameter, 25 inches long, and weighs approximately 5.3 
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pounds, with a one pound EFP warhead for reducing collateral damage.  It can be 
launched from either a reusable shoulder launcher or remotely from a vehicle launcher 
(Felix 2006).  Figure 56 illustrates a cutaway of the NAVAIR Spike missile. 
 
 
Figure 56 - NAVAIR Spike Missile (Felix 2006) 
 
The operation of the missile is anticipated to be similar to other 
LOBL systems.  The gunner will perform the task of verifying target acquisition as in 
other systems.  Once the gunner has verified the target, the missile would be launched.  
The small rocket motor would accelerate the missile to its maximum speed of an estimated 
800 feet per second.  Target detection and guidance is provided using a COTS focal plane 
array operating in the visual band, though both IR and SAL options are being investigated.  
Designed for low cost, the system uses a non-gimbaled detector system, limiting the 
engagement capability of the system to slower moving targets.  A contact-only fuse will 
detonate the warhead on target impact.  The NAVAIR Spike missile has demonstrated 
engagement ranges of over 1.5 miles (Felix 2006).   
The NAVAIR Spike has been demonstrated against a variety of 
fixed, moving targets.  Given the low weight of the Spike missile system of 5.3 pounds 
each and anticipated lower weights of mounting/launcher hardware of 5.3 pounds per 
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round, the Tier II UAV could carry up to four rounds and remain within the 48 available 
payload pounds. 
(5) Switchblade Agile Munitions System.  The Switchblade is a 
developmental project of AeroVironment.  The battery-powered vehicle is designed to be 
flown by an operator using feedback from an on-board EO sensor.  An IR 
sensor-equipped version is being developed and is anticipated to become available soon.  
It is being designed as a disposable system (Defense Update 2004-2009). Figure 57 
illustrates anticipated Switchblade appearance. 
 
 
Figure 57 - Switchblade Mini-UAV (AeroVironment, Inc. 2011) 
 
Called by AeroVironment “Man-portable ISR with Teeth,” the 
Switchblade is planned to provide both ISR capabilities as well as precision munition in 
one lightweight and portable package.  The vehicle may be launched by hand, from a 
launch tube, or from air vehicles such as UAVs.  Miniaturized avionics and sensors 
provide information to the operator using a portable control station.  If desired, a small 
lethal payload may be carried by the vehicle and terminal guidance provided by an onboard 
video tracker system, allowing for precision strike with low collateral damage (Grabowsky 
2007).  The range of the system is unknown at this time, but is anticipated to be between 
twenty and forty kilometers (Strategy Page 2010).  Each Switchblade is expected to weigh 
2.2 pounds.  Allowing for necessary mounting hardware, the Tier II UAV could carry up 
to ten of these weapons. 
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3. Feasibility Screening and Remaining Weapon Candidates 
Identified weapon possibilities were screened to limit to those feasible for the 
RUINS implementation.  To reduce the possibility of collateral damage, unguided 
propelled munitions were screened out.  Guns were removed from further consideration 
for two primary reasons.  First, the effective range of the weapon would force the UAV 
into enemy defense range during engagements, and second, the amount of effect a gun can 
deliver to the enemy was felt small in comparison to its weight.  Weight was a primary 
screening criteria.  Due to the limitations on weapons options and operator safety 
concerns, the Tier I UAV has been screened from further investigation.  More options 
were available for the Tier II due to the increased available weapon payload of 48 pounds.  
These include a simple bomb, guided ballistic weapons, and several guided missiles. One 
additional weapon was screened from the Tier II candidate list for reasons other than 
weight.  The Precision Guided Mortar Munition (PGMM) is a mortar round.  Its expected 
flight trajectory is based on that of a mortar: it is fired from a mortar and propelled to high 
elevations, where it begins scanning for a target.  If one is found, it then guides and attacks 
(Burke 2004).  This trajectory was not felt feasible for the UAV use, though future 
versions of the PGMM are intended to be fired from a 120mm gun.  Though several 
weapon options for the Tier II were initially identified, screening decreased the number of 
candidates for continued investigation to eight.   
Though the initial identification of possible weapons identified several available 
and developmental weapons by specific name, the weapons used in the study are all 
surrogates developed from open source documents and engineering approximations.  The 
results of any modeling performed using the surrogates should not be considered indicative 
in any way of the performance of the actual systems.  To prevent the unintentional 
correlation with an existing system, the surrogate systems were code named for the 
remainder of the project.  Table 27 provides an approximate crosswalk between the 
surrogate and the actual weapons. The Tier II candidates considered for further 
investigation are listed in Table 28. 
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Table 27 - Surrogate Weapon Crosswalk 
Surrogate Weapon Name Identifier Weapon Emulated 
Bomb B or Bomb Dumb Bomb 
Guided Bomb 1 GB-1 GSM 
Guided Bomb 2 GB-2 STS 
Missile 1 M-1 Javelin 
Missile 2 M-2 Spike-MR 
Missile 3 M-3 Stinger 
Missile 4 M-4 Spike-NAVAIR 
Missile 5 M-5 Switchblade 
 













Bomb Unguided Ballistic 
48 
 
10 10 2 
GB-1 Guided Ballistic 6 10 3 
GB-2 Guided Ballistic 10 10 2 
M-1 Guided Propelled 26 26 1 
M-2 Guided Propelled 23.1 23.1 1 
M-3 Guided Propelled 23 23 1 
M-4 Guided Propelled 5.3 5.3 4 
M-5 Guided Propelled 2.2 2.2 10 
 
F. Logistics Analysis 
1. Acquisition Logistics 
The RUINS concept was based on taking general specifications for already fielded 
UAS and combining them with fielded or in-development weapons systems.  The result is 
applied directly to existing systems.  Procedures for weapons handling, takeoff and 
landing, and maintenance will have to be developed.   
2. Operational UAV Logistics 
The UAS is composed of many parts including the air vehicle (UAV) and the 
ground or portable control station.  While much simpler than a manned vehicle system 
and although the consequence of its loss is much less, preventing failure of the UAS is 
important in supporting both the RUINS and existing ISR missions.  “The current UAV 
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accident rate (the rate at which the aircraft are lost or damaged) is 100 times that of manned 
aircraft” (Bone and Bolkcom 2003).  Maintenance is important to the UAV.   
There are two forms of maintenance that can be performed: preventive 
maintenance and corrective maintenance.  According to the definitions developed by 
Global Security, “Preventive maintenance consists of preflight and post flight inspections, 
and routine servicing including pre-launch and post-launch inspections, acceptance 
inspection and initial buildup, corrosion control and preservation.  Corrective 
maintenance involves minor structural repair as well as fault isolation and access, removal, 
and repair or replacement of failed components to the lowest level replaceable assembly” 
(Global Security 1999).  Both are critical to keeping the system operational and in the 
field.  Since its tasking includes identifying IEDs that have been planted, identifying 
persons planting the IED, as well as normal ISR operations, UAS availability is crucial.  
Any part of the system that is not functioning properly could cause a complete UAS 
malfunction, and potentially mean loss of life to either Coalition Forces or civilians.  It is 
crucial to perform preoperational tests to verify the system is ready to operate using built in 
tests as well as manual inspections (Global Security 1999).  This allows the users to verify 
there are no equipment function obstacles that will prohibit the UAV from successfully 
performing its mission.  Though preventive maintenance and pre-operational tests are 
widely used, not all problems can be prevented from occurring.  When problems do occur, 
fault detection and isolation help pinpoint its source and functional tests verify its 
resolution (U.S. Army 1995).   Since maintenance factors were involved in 2–17 percent 
of the reported accidents depending on the type of UAV, it is important that maintenance is 
completed correctly and by trained personnel (Alan Hobbs 2006).   
A study of U.S. Army UAV accidents determined that 32 percent of accidents 
involved human error, whereas 45 percent involved materiel failure either alone or in 
combination with other factors (Alan Hobbs 2006).  This indicates proper training is 
necessary to maintain system reliability.  “Several operators reported that UAVs were 
delivered with operating manuals, but without a maintenance manual or maintenance 
checklist.  As a result, the operators developed their own maintenance procedures and 
documentation.  Other UAV operators reported that their UAVs were delivered without 
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technical information such as wiring diagrams, making it difficult to troubleshoot 
problems or repair electrical systems” (Alan Hobbs 2006).  Improper training and not 
having the right tools to accomplish the maintenance could mean an increase in mean time 
to repair (MTTR) and a lower mean time between failures (MTBF), which results in less 
time for the UAV to be operational.  The RUINS concept intends that the addition of a 
weapons system will not overly impact the maintenance mission. However, the inclusion 
of any additional equipment and capabilities will increase the maintenance requirements.  
Weapons system support will be in addition to the current Tier I and Tier II maintenance 
and support concepts.  Spares and repair equipment for the mounting hardware will be 
added to the basic UAS unit.  It is believed that the existing weapons supply chain will be 
able to support addition of the UAV weapon without severe impact.  Yet specially trained 
weapons personnel and associated equipment will be required on the maintenance team.  
The number of additional personnel and equipment requirements are weapon-specific, and 
will be better determined once a final weapon solution is selected.   
3. Post Operation Actions 
Post operations (post-ops) are just as important as the operations itself.  Post-ops 
allow the forces to analyze what has happened, what went wrong and what can be 
improved for the next mission.  Post-ops may vary depending on the outcome of the 
mission.  The RUINS concept would assist in the missions for the three scenarios 
discussed below.  These include: 1) If the IED was located and neutralized 2) If the IED 
was/was not located, detonated and inflicted harm or caused damage, and 3) if a person was 
captured planting the IED or trying to detonate the IED. 
The main activities in C-IED are: attack the network, defeat the device, and train 
the force.  These parts include, but are not limited to, lethal and non-lethal actions against 
the network, detection, mitigation and neutralization of IEDs, and training the force to stay 
ahead of the adaptive enemy (Oates 2010).  All post-operations are imperative to getting 
ahead in the fight against IEDs, commonly referred to as getting “left of the boom.”  There 
is something to take away or learn from each scenario/operation to allow the forces to 
protect themselves and stay ahead of the enemy. 
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G. Summary 
The existing UAVs and their supporting systems and activities were examined to 
better identify operational limitations and opportunities.  Further investigation into 
possible performance of the planned scenarios was performed to better understand issues 
of enemy defenses and possibilities of damage to the UAV.  A wide variety of candidate 
weapons that might be applicable to the RUINS project were identified, along with their 
strengths and weaknesses.  A list of candidate weapons was obtained by performing 
open-source research, and was further screened for applicability to the RUINS effort.  An 
analysis of risks involved with the RUINS project, and their mitigations, were presented. 
The result of the analysis contained in the chapter was a specific list of candidate 
weapons that might satisfy the sponsor needs.  The small available payload and operator 
safety concerns led to the screening out of the Tier I platform from further weaponization 
investigation.  Due to Tier II UAV’s larger available payload, several possible weapons 
were identified for continuing analysis. The candidates weapons identified include a 
simple unguided ballistic bomb, two types of guided ballistic bombs, four different types of 
rocket propelled guided weapons, and one propeller-driven guided weapon.  The guidance 
methods include GPS, semi-active laser, infrared, and electro-optic.  The diversity of 
identified candidates offers a broad spectrum of implementation options.  These 






IV. Analysis of Alternatives 
The candidate weapons identified during the Design and Analysis phase offered 
different delivery, guidance, and warhead options.  Many considerations were made 
during the analysis, and several possible weapons were screened out as a result of this 
investigation.  To further assess the strengths and weaknesses of each of the identified 
candidates in an operational scenario, additional modeling methods were used. 
Four major types of modeling were performed during the Performance Analysis.  
The surrogate weapons were modeled and utilized in an operational environment 
simulation designed to closely emulate the representative scenarios developed during the 
Problem Definition phase.  Technical performance measures were gathered during the 
modeling and used for assessing relative performance.  Additional modeling was 
performed separately to assess the destructive abilities of candidate warhead technologies 
and the aerodynamic effects of adding weapons to the UAV. A financial analysis was also 
performed to assess the life cycle costs of the various possible solutions.  Finally, the 
results of the modeling and financial studies were integrated to assist in the identification 
of the optimum solution for the RUINS.  The details of the modeling and simulation and 
analysis efforts are presented below.  
A. Performance Modeling and Simulation 
Modeling and simulation tools provided the mechanism to evaluate candidate UAS 
solutions to accomplish RUINS objectives.  The Systems Engineering Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA), cost and performance trades were performed by the application of 
statistical methods to modeling and simulation results.  
1. Modeling and Simulation Tools 
Several modeling and simulation tools were evaluated during the early phases of 
the RUINS project.  Availability, capability and suitability were key factors in 
determining the appropriate modeling and simulation tool set for the RUINS project.  





Figure 58 - RUINS Modeling and Simulation Environment 
 
The Joint Integration Mission Model (JIMM) and Next Generation Threat System 
(NGTS) are constructive threat and mission models developed and maintained by the U.S.  
Government Department of Defense (DoD).  JIMM is currently used jointly by the U.S. 
Navy and Air Force for live, virtual and constructive testing and training.  NGTS is a 
computer generated forces (CGF) threat simulation used for U.S. Navy and Air Force Fleet 
synthetic, live, virtual, and constructive training and exercises.  NGTS uses a parametric 
database to supply inputs to the model.  Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the areas of 
Electronic Warfare (EW) and weapon systems are required to populate data for the 
parametric database.  The software simulated NGTS sensor, platform, weapon, 
communication and environment models use the inputs from the database during execution 
to simulate a battlespace environment.  JIMM simulates a battlespace environment by 
combining scripts and parameter data to achieve a desired effect.  The Battle Monitor 
provides a graphical user interface to visualize and manipulate simulation during 
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execution.  Interoperability in a distributed simulation environment is accomplished using 
standards and protocols.  The U.S. Air Force uses Simulation International Standards 
Organization (SISO), Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) Standards.  The Naval 
Aviation Simulation Master Plan (NASMP) High Level Architecture (HLA) is used by the 
US Navy.  Simulation data is transported over the network and a GOTS data logger was 
used to record simulation data.  MS Excel and Oracle Crystal Ball were used to 
manipulate and analyze logged simulation data.   
During the evaluation of M&S tools it was determined that JIMM was the preferred 
tool for the RUINS M&S effort.  JIMM supported effects-based-modeling, which 
simplified the M&S process.  Digging for unclassified information on candidate weapon 
systems for emulated real world simulation systems was an onerous task.  Due to 
availability issues, NGTS was used to perform the final RUINS M&S.  The NGTS 
parametric database drove the need to have “good” but not “real” data on candidate 
weapons for the models to work correctly, and in some cases, the data to support the 
necessary weapon system attributes were contrived using engineering judgment.  The 
diverse engineering background of the team became an invaluable asset as several 
members were weapon, sensor and pseudo aerodynamic SMEs.    
NGTS simulation trials were deterministic and only needed to be conducted once 
as they were repeatable given the same set of input conditions.  NGTS supported both 
autonomous and manual fire modes and both were used during RUINS M&S.  During the 
simulation trials, if the weapon was unable to produce a kill in auto-engagement mode, the 
trial was rerun and manual fire was used to produce a kill.  The model supports a manual 
sensor mode that provides the ability to manually transition and hold sensors at a given 
mode and to identify a sensor Target of Interest (TOI).  During the Fixed target simulation 
trials at the 500 foot altitude, this feature was used to allow the longer range missiles to get 
a kill without a valid visual identification of the target.   
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2. Design of Experiments (DOE) 
Design of Experiments was applied to orchestrate RUINS scenarios to capture key 
system attributes during M&S.  Two target sets, fixed and moving, are defined in two 
operational environments – urban and rural.  Two variations of altitude and one speed 
were used in the scenarios.  The eight surrogate weapons identified as possible payloads 
for the Tier II UAS were modeled for use in the scenarios.  The total number of 
combinations simulated for a full factorial design as a function of speed, altitude, target and 
weapons, are defined by 1 x 2 x 2 x 8 = 32. 
3. Performance Modeling and Simulation Description 
A functional flow of RUINS modeling and simulation is represented in the IDEF0 
drawing of Figure 59. 
 
Figure 59 - Modeling and Simulation IDEF0 
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Parametric data for Tier II platforms, sensors, weapons, communications and threat 
signatures were inputs to model for simulation.  Government owned DoD models were 
used as the mechanism to employ weapon systems in a synthetic operational environment.  
Rules of engagement and critical operational parameters provided the control for the 
simulation execution.  Simulation output data was input to the M&S analysis and stored 
for reference and accountability.  Statistical analysis tools were used to facilitate an 
evaluation of MOP parameter coefficients.  The output of the analysis was used as an 
input to the RUINS Analysis of Alternatives. 
a) Model Inputs and Assumptions 
Model inputs for the simulation experiments were derived from the systems 
engineering analysis.  RUINS Data was mapped to the NGTS model using a parametric 
database.  The following paragraphs summarize the inputs to the NGTS database. 
Model data associated with platforms such as the UAV, life-form, ground 
control station (GCS) and vehicles were represented by database parameters.  The 
aerodynamic model inputs are described in Table 30.  The fixed target, a human with an 
IED and neutral human bystanders were represented as life-forms with a very small IR 
cross sectional area.  The moving target and neutral vehicles assumed the characteristics 
of a standard Toyota light-duty pickup truck with a small IR cross sectional area.  The 
GCS assumed the characteristics of a communications radio station.  
The electro-optical sensors used in the simulation are defined by the model 
as sensors.  Relevant parameters and values associated with the RUINS Tier II 
electro-optical sensors are provided in Table 31.  The system engineering analysis 
provided specifications for Tier II optical systems in the spectral bands of 3–5 and 0.4 um 
to 0.8um range.  The optical sensors modeled for the experiments used the specifications 
provided in the 3–5 range.  The scan elevation and azimuth were derived from the RUINS 
optical FOV and resolution specifications using the relationship (1/ (HIFOV = FOV / 
Horizontal Resolution and VIFOV = FOV / Vertical Resolution).  The scan period is 
derived from the equation 360 / (Azimuth Scan Rate).  The NGTS database scope limit 
parameter was mapped to the RUINS optical specifications for target size and the detection 
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range.  The following analogies can be made in mapping M&S sensor modes to RUINS 
optical performance: 
 
Table 29 - M&S Analogies 





The weapon payloads used in the simulation were defined by the model as 
Weapons.  Weapons parameters and values associated with the RUINS Tier I and II 
weapons are provided in Table 32.  The weapons guidance types are Line of Sight (LOS), 
IR, and GPS/SAL. IR guidance directed the weapon to the target by pursuing the target IR 
signature, GPS/SAL directed the weapon to the target by calculation of positional data 
relative to the intended target, and LOS guided the weapon to a target along a continuously 
updated LOS transmitted to the weapon by the launch platform.  Command Guidance for 
the EO only occurs during the first 10 percent of the weapon time of flight.  Flight Profiles 
were defined by the weapon model as Three Point, Pure Pursuit or Ballistic.  Three Point 
profiles guide the weapon on the line of sight between the shooter and target.  Pure Pursuit 
guides the weapon to the target along a direct line of sight from the weapon to the target.  
Ballistic flight profiles follow ballistic paths determined by the starting position of the 
weapon and the initial application of energy.  Ballistic rockets follow a semi-ballistic path 
determined by the starting position of the weapon and the period during which momentum 
is applied.  All weapons modeled used a Probability of Kill (PK) of 0.7.
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Tier II 0.3 1.5 0.5 40.0 0.35 1.6 16,000 370 41.41 22.4 
 
Table 31 - Modeling Sensor Input Data for Tier II Systems 
Attribute 
Optical Emitter 
Tier I Fixed Target Tier I Moving Target Tier II Fixed Target Tier II Moving Target 
Search Track Fire Search Track Fire Search Track Fire Search Track Fire 
Free Space Det. Range 
(NM) 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Max Azimuth (deg) 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Min Azimuth (deg) -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 -180 
Max Elevation 
(degrees) 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Scan Type  SHR SHR SHR SHR SHR SHR SHR SHR Circular SHR SHR Circular 
Scan Width Elevation 
(s) 48 48 48 48 48 48 68 68 0 68 68 0 
Scan Width Azimuth 
(deg) 64 64 64 64 64 64 91 91 360 91 91 360 
Power (kWatts) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Scope Limit (NM) 0.6 0.17 0.1 2.44 0.61 0.35 6.99 1.75 1 24.48 6.12 3.5 
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Bomb GB-1 GB-2 M-1 M-2 M-3 M-4 M-5 
Propulsion Bomb Gravity Gravity Rocket Rocket Rocket Rocket Prop 
EO/IR Guidance Unguided GPS/SAL IR Unguided EO/IR EO/IR EO-LOS Unguided 
Flight Profile Ballistic Pursuit Pursuit Ballistic Pursuit Pursuit 3- Point Ballistic 
Mass (slugs) 0.3108 0.186 0.3108 0.808 0.717 0.714 0.164 0.0683 
CCA (sq ft) 1 0.1875 0.208 1.479 1.2 1.1 0.39 0.011 
Cd n/a 0.002 0.0028 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.02 
Sustain Time  (s) 1 5 2 2 5 5 3 5 
Sustain Mdot  (slugs/s) 0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0513 0.0513 0.02 0.0072 
Sustain ISP  (s) 0 150 250 250 100 130 180 150 
Az Gimbal Limit (deg) N/A 180 180 30 30 30 0 0 
El Gimbal Limit (deg) N/A 90 90 30 30 30 0 0 
Seeker FOV (deg) N/A 5 5 2 20 20 30 30 
Max Angle of Attack (deg) 0 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Min Slant Range (ft) 0 200 200 500 200 500 200 200 
Max Slant Range (ft) 2,000 3,000 6,000 1,000 10,000 15,000 2,500 7,500 
Max Engage TOF (s) 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
LOBL No No No No Yes Yes No No 
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Platforms, sensors and weapons were combined to create a Weapon System 
or UAS. Sensors defined in Table 29 are applied to Tier II platforms to create a 
representative fixed and moving target UAS.  Weapons defined in Table 30 are mounted 
to the center of gravity of the UAV to create a lethal weapon system.    
The environment for the scenario included urban and rural settings. The 
Tactical Area was defined as NE(N40,W113) SW(N31,W120), which is located in the 
South West U.S. Region. Cultural features, such as buildings, were occulted during the 
simulation.  Wind Tables derived from China Lake historical weather data and Standard 
Day atmosphere were input to the weather model.  One, two and three story buildings 
were modeled as cultural features and had dimensions described in Table 33.  
 
Table 33 - Simulated Building Dimensions 
Building Length (ft) Width (ft) Height (ft) 
1 Story 50 260 10 
2 Story 150 175 20 
3 Story 350 150 30 
 
Weapon systems, environment, cultural features, routes and waypoints 
were combined to construct a scenario.  The fixed target scenario for the Tier II systems is 




Figure 60 - Battle Monitor Graphic of Fixed Target Scenario 
 
During execution of the fixed target scenario, the UAS is launched from the 
GCS west of the target and flies a route slightly north of the target.  The UAS flies a short 
distance south, turns northward and eastward to engage the target, and then flies a route 
back to the GCS.  Friendly and neutral personnel are at a distance of 10, 20 and 30 feet 




Figure 61 - Battle Monitor Graphic of Moving Target Scenario 
 
During execution of the moving target scenario, the UAS is launched at a 
distance of 2.5 nautical miles (NM) south of the target at a heading of 50˚ T.  The target is 
a light duty pickup truck heading 135˚ T at a speed of 40 knots (kts).  There is a 
combination of neutral and friendly vehicles and personnel along the route and in the 
vicinity.  The UAS sensor begins in search mode the UAS and flies along a surveillance 
route until it comes within the track scope limit of the target.  The sensor transitions to 
track mode and performs a fly-to-target tactic.  As the UAS converges on the target, the 
sensor transitions to fire mode and enables the weapon master arm.  
b) Assumptions 
The M&S assumed the models used provided sufficient fidelity at an 
unclassified level to accurately represent a candidate RUINS solution set.  The NGTS 
offline database limited the parameters available for input into the model and assumed a 
correct correlation was made from candidate RUINS attribute specifications to NGTS 
database parameters.  
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In addition to the general assumption that the model was correct and 
accurate, the following assumptions about the scenarios were made: 
• The human target was positively identified as a foe prior to mission execution,  
• There was a clear Line of Sight from the Ground Control Station (GCS) to the 
UAS.  
• UAV tactics assumed optical sensor detection ranges met specification. 
• The GCS has a positive identification of the target when the sensor model 
transitions from track to fire.  
• Weapons, platform and sensor data were represented at an unclassified security 
level. 
c) Constraints 
The following list of constraints bounded the modeling scenarios: 
• Aerodynamic glide as a UAV counter to audio detection by adversaries was not 
modeled. 
• Time of Day (TOD) was modeled as a fixed percentage reduction in visibility 
• Communication links were not blocked by terrain or other objects. 
• The communication datalink was either present or not.  
4. Performance Modeling and Simulation Results 
The numerical results of the M&S effort are summarized in Appendix D of this 
document.  The data in Table D-1 and D-2 provide a summary of weapon engagements 
from the logged data. The headings in the tables can be deciphered as follows: 
• Shooter – weapon system that launched the weapon 
• Time of Flight – total weapon time of flight in seconds 





Table 34 - Detonation Result Values 
Field Value Detonation Result 
1 Entity Impact 
2 Entity Proximate Detonation 
3 Ground Impact 
4 Ground Proximate Detonation 
5 Detonation 
6 None or No Detonation (Dud) 
 
• Shooter to Target Range – slant range from the shooter to the target when the 
weapon is fired 
• Target Miss Distance – distance of the weapon from the target when it 
detonates 
• Quantity Hit – 1 indicated the target is impacted by the weapon during 
detonation and 0 indicates it is not impacted 
• Score – 1 if the weapon detonation resulted in enough damage to kill the target 
and a 0 if the target is not killed as a result of the detonation 
 
One goal of the simulation exercise was to determine the maximum range that the 
target could be engaged with a denotation result of 1 – “Entity Impact” or 2 – “Entity 
Proximate Detonation.”  To accomplish this, the UAV performed an auto-engagement 
against the target and if it did not produce a result of 1 or 2, the weapon fire input 
parameters were adjusted and the simulation trial was rerun. During these trials, it was 
observed that a maximum range to target could be found where the values for miss 
distance, time of flight and range to target had less than a one percent deviation.  In the 
case where an optimum range to target with a detonation result of 1 or 2 could not be found 
with the auto-engagement, the targets were engaged manually. Weapons B1, M-1 and M-5 
were engaged manually using the Battle Monitor weapon fire button.  During these 
simulation trials, weapons were fired and the value of miss distance, range to target, and 
time of flight were recorded when the weapon fire produced a detonation value of 2.  It 
was observed during manual engagements, that the value of miss distance and range to 
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target deviated greater than one percent.  The statistical average of thirty simulation trials 
was used to produce a single value for the miss distance and range to target and the results 
have been summarized in Appendix D.  As a measure of performance, the greater the 
distance from the shooter to target the better, and the smaller the value of miss distance of 
the weapon detonation to the target the better.  A value of 1 for the quantity hit is better 
than 0 and a value of 1 for the score is better than 0.     
The team tested the results for normality.  Since the results did not fit a normal 
distribution, non-parametric statistics are used to evaluate the interactions of the factors: 
weapon, altitude and target type to miss distance and fire range. The results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis Test were used to determine the significance of the data means. The test 
statistic H is compared to X2(a,n-1) and if H is greater than the critical chi-square value, the 
hypothesis that there is no difference in medians is rejected. The null hypothesis H0: the 
population medians are all equal or H1, the medians are not all equal, are used to evaluate 
the data below.  
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for miss distance vs. weapons are shown in 
Figure 62. From the results, weapon M-3 differed least from the mean rank for all 
observations, Bomb had the highest rank, GB-1 the lowest. In this case the null hypothesis, 
H0, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, H1, was accepted, which implies the choice 
of weapon is a statistically significant factor on the results observed for miss distance. 
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Kruskal-Wallis Test on Miss Distance 
 Weapon  N Median  Ave Rank Z 
 Bomb 4 651.640 30.3 3.13 
 GB1 4   0.400     7.5 -2.05 
 GB2 4    0.390  8.5   -1.82 
 M1       4   117.985     25.5    2.05 
 M2        4   8.670     11.8   -1.08 
 M3        4    18.225     17.5   0.23 
 M4        4   0.455     7.8    -1.99 
 M5        4 90.965   23.3    1.54 
 Overall   32               16.5 
 
 H = 25.49  DF = 7  P = 0.001 
 
Figure 62 - Kruskal-Wallis Test: Miss Distance versus Weapon   
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for miss distance vs. altitude are shown in 
Figure 63.  In this case the null hypothesis failed to be rejected, therefore the null 
hypothesis was accepted which implies altitude is not a statistically significant factor on 



























Kruskal-Wallis Test on Miss Distance 
 UAS Altitude 
 (ft)        N    Median   Ave Rank    Z 
 500       16   32.840  15.8    -0.41 
 2,000       16    3.090    17.2   0.41 
 Overall    32                16.5 
 
 H = 0.17  DF = 1  P = 0.678 
 
Figure 63 - Kruskal-Wallis Test: Miss Distance versus UAS Altitude (ft) 
 
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for miss distance vs. target type are shown in 
Figure 64.  In this case the null hypothesis failed to be rejected, therefore the null 
hypothesis was accepted, which implies target type is not a statistically significant factor 



























Kruskal-Wallis Test on Miss Distance 
 Target Type N  Median  Ave Rank  Z 
 Fixed  16  1.335  15.1   -0.87 
 Moving     16 28.270   17.9 0.87 
 Overall       32               16.5 
 
 H = 0.24  DF = 1  P = 0.624 
 H = 0.24  DF = 1  P = 0.624  (adjusted for ties) 
 
 
Figure 64 - Kruskal-Wallis Test: Miss Distance versus Target Type 
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for range vs. weapons are shown in Figure 
65. From the results, weapon M-2 differed least from the mean rank for all observations 
and weapon M-4 had the highest rank and Bomb the lowest. In this case the null 
hypothesis, H0, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, H1, was accepted, which 
implies the choice of weapon is a statistically significant factor on the results observed for 

























Kruskal-Wallis Test on Range (ft) 
 Weapon   N Median Ave Rank Z 
 Bomb         4     1,762        5.1   -2.59 
 GB1        4     2,339       8.6   -1.79 
 GB2        4     2,765       12.3   -0.97 
 M1         4     3,038       13.3   -0.74 
 M2         4     3,220       14.8    -0.40 
 M3         4    5,043       22.4    1.34 
 M4         4     11,727       30.5    3.19 
 M5         4     6,623        25.1 1.97 
 Overall   32               16.5 
 
 H = 24.00  DF = 7  P = 0.001 
 H = 24.05  DF = 7  P = 0.001  (adjusted for ties) 
 




The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for fire range vs. altitude are shown in Figure 


















Boxplot of Range (ft)
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accepted which implies altitude is not a statistically significant factor on the results 




Kruskal-Wallis Test on Range (ft) 
 UAS Altitude 
 (ft)  N Median Ave Rank Z 
 500      16   2,461 14.3 -1.36 
 2,000 16  3,858  18.8 1.36 
 Overall    32           16.5 
 
 H = 1.84  DF = 1  P = 0.175 
 H = 1.84  DF = 1  P = 0.174  (adjusted for ties) 
 
Figure 66 - Kruskal-Wallis Test: Range (ft) versus UAS Altitude (ft) 
 
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for fire range vs. target type are shown in 
Figure 67.  In this case the null hypothesis failed to be rejected, therefore the null 
hypothesis was accepted which implies target type is not a statistically significant factor on 























Kruskal-Wallis Test on Range (ft) 
 Target Type N Median Ave Rank Z 
 Fixed         16     3,129       15.1   -0.85 
 Moving     16     3,676       17.9    0.85 
 Overall       32               16.5 
 
 H = 0.72  DF = 1  P = 0.396 
 H = 0.72  DF = 1  P = 0.396  (adjusted for ties) 
 
 
Figure 67 - Kruskal-Wallis Test: Range (ft) versus Target Type 
 
5. Modeling and Simulation Conclusions 
The model results appear to indicate that the target type and altitude are not 
significantly significant factors that would influence the decision to pick one weapon over 
another. However, as expected, the weapon type is a statistically significant factor. From 
the data collected, the RUINS team believes, based on this analysis alone, that the GB-1 or 
M-4 weapons should be the primary weapons systems considered.  It is recognized that 
this conclusion is dependent on the assumptions and algorithms in the M&S. However, the 
M&S results might reasonably be used to reduce the number of variables for an actual 
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B. Modeling of Warhead Effects 
1. Introduction 
If the weapon being modeled is anything other than a simple projectile, some 
means of judging the effects on the target resulting from the explosion of a warhead must 
be included in any lethality analysis and weapon effectiveness tradeoffs.  Warheads are 
described for the purposes of this study as some amount of explosive material encased in a 
housing designed for fragmentation upon detonation of the explosive. The explosion of the 
warhead results in two different types of damage to the target.  A measure of warhead 
effectiveness is the probability of kill (PK).  This measure is the result of the combination 
of the assessment of the target vulnerabilities, damage functions, and effects of the 
warhead on the target.  The PK of a target is a statistical measure of the likelihood that a 
target will be removed from combat.  The overall PK, due to the detonation of a warhead, 
is a combination of the probability of kill due to the blast (PK|BLAST) and the probability of 
kill due to the warhead fragmentation (PK|FRAG).  For the purposes of this report, only the 
effects of PK|FRAG will be included in estimations of PK. 
When an explosive material is detonated, a chemical reaction nearly 
instantaneously converts the explosive from either solid or liquid form to gas in a violent 
reaction.  Large amounts of energy are released during the conversion.  The results of the 
explosion are a region of highly compressed gas and various solid residues that are remains 
of the explosive and its housing.  The compressed gas, called the blast, expands rapidly to 
occupy a volume many times greater than the original explosive volume.  
Blast can damage a target by one of two methods: diffraction and drag loading. 
Diffraction loading is the application of pressure as the shock wave passes over an object. 
It is associated with diffraction as the shock wave bends around the target while passing it. 
Loading pressure is applied to several of a target’s surfaces almost instantaneously.  A 
building would be subjected to the pressure on the front and roof at the same time. To 
illustrate how destructive this could be, a 10 ft cubicle building exposed to 15 pounds per 
square inch (psi) over pressure would experience diffraction loading on the front, roof, and 
two sides simultaneously totaling 864,000 pounds of force (lbF) (Federation of American 
Scientists 1998).  
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Drag loading is a result of dynamic pressure. Drag loading is the aerodynamic force 
that acts on a surface perpendicular to the shock wave front. Dynamic loading applied to a 
10 foot cubicle building with a dynamic pressure of 5 psi would experience a drag load 
totaling 72,000 lbF. Drag loading is typically applied for longer than diffraction loading 
and drag loads tend to reverse direction, resulting in forces that can destroy buildings 
(Federation of American Scientists 1998). Figure 68 shows diffraction and drag loading.  
  
 
Figure 68 - Loading Pressures from (Federation of American Scientists 1998) 
 
The expanding gas will also cause the warhead housing to fragment and disperse at 
high speeds, overtaking the blast shock. The velocity of the fragments does not decrease as 
rapidly as that of the shock, extending the effect of the warhead.  The fragments impact 
the targets and cause penetration damage, maximizing the warhead effect against the 
enemy (Driels 2004). 
The damage to a target from fragmentation can be found from the kinetic energy. 
For personnel, the minimum amount of kinetic energy to lethal is 100 Joules (J). This is 
roughly equivalent to a .22 caliber long bullet (40 grains) traveling at 1000 feet per second 
(fps). An increased level of damage is 1000 J, which correlates to a .357 caliber jacketed 
soft point bullet (158 grains) traveling at 1400 fps. This can be lethal to personnel 
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depending on where they are hit. 4000J is sufficient to penetrate body armor and correlates 
to a 7.62 caliber full metal jacket or a .30-06 caliber armor piercing bullet (166 grains) at a 
velocity of 2750 fps (Federation of American Scientists 1998).  Table 35 shows the 
kinetic energy required for a number of targets and the corresponding PK.  
 
Table 35 - Damage and Corresponding PK (Federation of American Scientists 1998) 
 Fragment Energy in kJ 
Target Light Damage 
(PK = 0.1) 
Moderate Damage 
(PK = 0.5) 
Heavy Damage 
(PK = 0.9) 
Personnel 0.1 1 4 
Aircraft 4 10 20 
Armored Vehicle 10 500 1,000 
 
Fragments do not lose their energy as quickly as the blast.  A fragment from a hand 
grenade can be lethal up to 100 m, while the effects of the blast may be minimal at that 
range. However, the probability of being hit by a fragment at 100 m is very low. There are 
a finite number of fragments distributed in all directions. Assuming spherical fragment 
dispersion, the average number striking a target will be directly related to 1/R2, where R is 
the range from the exploding warhead.  The number of fragment hits can be found using 
Equation 21; however, the equation is not valid for R < √(1/4π), when the calculated 
number of fragment hits begins to exceed the total fragments of the warhead.   
 
 
Equation 21 - Number of Fragment Hits from (Federation of American Scientists 1998) 
 
Where 
 NHITS is the expected number of fragments hitting the target; 
 No is the initial number of fragments from the warhead;  
 A is the frontal area of the target presented to the warhead;  
 R is the range of the target to the warhead. 
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Complete assessment of the warhead effects requires detailed knowledge of the 
engagement geometries, target vulnerabilities, and weapon characteristics.  The fragment 
trajectories resulting from one angle of attack may not be the same as those from a slightly 
different angle.   
Warhead fragmentation was modeled during development, but the only way to 
determine lethality was to perform an arena test.  The left drawing in Figure 69 is an 
example of fragmentation contours for a weapon not detonating normal to the target.  The 
contour lines dividing different thresholds of PK are difficult to predict and not symmetrical 
about the center of detonation.  A different impact angle might yield a different set of 
profiles.  This yields a variety of damage functions from single engagement geometry, as 
shown in the right drawing, making accurate predictions of weapon performance for 
different conditions difficult.  In contrast, a blast-only damage function would remain 
more symmetrical about the detonation point (Schaffer 1966). 
 
`  
Figure 69 - Example Damage Functions (Schaffer 1966) 
 
The PK will be the product of the probability that a target will be hit by a fragment 
and the probability of incapacitation if hit as shown in Equation 22.  Multiple fragment 
hits will be handled with Equation 23.  The miss distance was determined from published 
data for warhead weights. 
θ = 0






























Equation 22 - Overall PK for a Target (Schaffer 1966) 
Where 
 = probability of being hit; 
 = probability of incapacitation if hit  
 
 
Equation 23 - PK for Multiple Hits (Schaffer 1966) 
 
Where 
 = PK if hit; 
NHITS = the number of fragment hits 
 
To determine the target vulnerable area, several assumptions were made. For the 
human target, ergonomic data was used for a European in the 95 percentile. The 
measurements were taken for the chest, neck and head and an area was calculated. Figure 
70 shows the ergonomic data. For the human, the vulnerable area was found to be 0.264m2. 
For the truck target, a 1990 Toyota truck was used. The analysis was for a mobility kill of 
the truck; this was assumed to be a flat tire or overheated truck. The stock tire was 
determined to be a P225/50R/15S. This relates to a tire diameter of 0.381 m with a side 
wall length of 0.112 m. A replacement radiator was found with dimensions of 0.457 by 
0.717 meters.  These accumulated to a vulnerable area of 0.559m2. 
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Figure 70 - Ergonomics Data from (Royal Mechanical 2010) 
 
2. Candidate Weapon Warheads Characteristics and Results 
The weapons that remained after down select were evaluated to determine warhead 
weight. Assuming a charge-to-metal ratio of one, the total mass of fragments was 
determined.  Individual fragment size was calculated based on a 2000 m/s fragment speed 
and the kinetic energy necessary to produce a 0.7 PK|HIT for a single fragment hit of a 
human. A single exception to this was the GB-2 warhead. This warhead produces a single 
explosively formed projectile and twelve fragments, resulting in much higher kinetic 
energy per fragment.  The resulting number of fragments for the candidate weapons is 
shown in Table 36.  
 
Table 36 - Warhead Parameters 
Weapon Warhead weight (kg) Total Fragment  Weight (kg) Number of fragments 
Kinetic Energy  
(Joules) 
Bomb 4.54 2.27 1,452.56 2,611.31 
GB-1 1.81 0.91 581.03 2,611.31 
GB-2 2.27 1.13 13.00 145,887.97 
M-1 8.39 4.20 2,687.24 2,611.31 
M-2 7.98 3.99 2,556.51 2,611.31 
M-3 3.00 1.50 960.14 2,611.31 
M-4 0.91 0.45 290.51 2,611.31 
M-5 0.29 0.14 90.79 2,611.31 
 
Once the total number of fragments was known for the warheads, Equation 21 was 
used to determine the number of fragment hits as a function of radial distance.  Equation 
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23 was then used to determine the PK for multiple fragment hits, and Equation 22 was used 
for single fragment hits.  The resulting PK was calculated to 30 m for a human target and is 
shown in Figure 71.  Figure 72 shows the resulting PK for the truck target.  The analysis 
assumes that all of the fragments are the same size and that all of the fragments are 
uniformly dispersed.  
 
 
Figure 71 - PK of a Human as a Function of Distance from Detonation 
 
 
Figure 72 - PK of a Truck as a Function of Distance from Detonation 
 
The weapons miss distance data was taken for the Tier II UAS at its maximum and 
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target scenario, two primary targets were assumed to be within 0.5 m of the targeted 
point.  A secondary target was positioned 2.67 m from the targeted point. The results of the 
analysis can be seen in Table 37 and Table 38.  As mentioned previously, the equation for 
number of hits is not valid at small miss distances and can indicate more hits than the total 
number of fragments. In these cases, the total number of fragments possible was used. 
 
















PK  Look 
Out (human) 
T2-FT-B-MAX 687.47 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 
T2-FT-GB1-MAX 0.24 211.92 1.000 1.44 0.823 
T2-FT-GB2-MAX 0.30 3.03 0.974 0.03 0.021 
T2-FT-M1-MAX 0.44 291.61 1.000 5.84 0.999 
T2-FT-M2-MAX 0.42 304.47 1.000 5.63 0.999 
T2-FT-M3-MAX 0.00 960.14 1.000 2.83 0.967 
T2-FT-M4-MAX 16.73 0.02 0.015 0.02 0.011 
T2-FT-M5-MAX 1,999.02 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 
T2-FT-B-MIN 802.50 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 
T2-FT-GB1-MIN 0.37 89.16 1.000 1.32 0.796 
T2-FT-GB2-MIN 0.38 1.89 0.897 0.03 0.021 
T2-FT-M1-MIN 454.89 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 
T2-FT-M2-MIN 0.41 319.50 1.000 5.66 0.999 
T2-FT-M3-MIN 335.09 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 
T2-FT-M4-MIN 23.37 0.01 0.008 0.01 0.006 





Table 38 - PK for Truck Target 
Scenario Name Target Miss Distance (m) Fragment Hits PK(truck) 
T2-MT-B-MAX 846.74 0.00 0.000 
T2-MT-GB1-MAX 0.44 133.50 1.000 
T2-MT-GB2-2-MAX 0.71 1.15 0.548 
T2-MT-M1-MAX 0.39 785.92 1.000 
T2-MT-M2-MAX 1.15 85.99 1.000 
T2-MT-M3-MAX 0.00 960.14 1.000 
T2-MT-M4-MAX 18.11 0.04 0.020 
T2-MT-M5-MAX 2,017.77 0.00 0.000 
T2-MT-B-MIN 302.58 0.00 0.000 
T2-MT-GB1-MIN 0.43 139.79 1.000 
T2-MT-GB2-MIN 0.4 3.61 0.918 
T2-MT-M1-MIN 67.74 0.03 0.013 
T2-MT-M2-MIN 0.43 615.05 1.000 
T2-MT-M3-MIN 0.83 62.00 1.000 
T2-MT-M4-MIN 39.73 0.01 0.004 
T2-MT-M5-MIN 857.02 0.00 0.000 
 
3. Warhead Lethality Radius 
A typical performance measure used in the evaluation of various warhead options 
is the lethal radius.  This term has been defined as the radius from the warhead at which 
the probability of the target being damaged enough to remove it from action (PK) is 0.5.  
Only fragmentation effects were considered in this analysis.  For use in the analysis, 
Equation 21, Equation 22, and Equation 23 were reorganized to directly provide this 
measure for each of the candidate weapons.  This reorganization results in Equation 24. 
 
 
Equation 24 - Lethality Radius Calculation 
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For purposes of this investigation, different values of PK|HIT were used for the 
human and vehicle target due to differences in the target scenarios, as well as different area 
values.  For this reason, two values of lethality radius were calculated for each candidate 
weapon.  PK of 0.5 was used in both cases. 
 
Table 39 - Lethality Radius for Candidate Weapons 
Weapon Fragments per Weapon 
Radius for Human 
Target (meters) 
(PK|HIT = 0.7, A = 
0.264m2) 
Radius for Vehicle 
Target (meters) 
(PK|HIT = 0.5, A = 
0.559m2) 
Bomb 1,452.6 7.28 8.04 
GB-1 581.0 4.60 5.08 
GB-2 13.0 0.69 0.76 
M1 2,687.2 9.90 10.93 
M2 2,556.5 9.66 10.66 
M3 960.1 5.92 6.54 
M4 290.5 3.26 3.59 
M5 90.8 1.82 2.01 
 
4. Warhead Collateral Damage 
For complete knowledge of the effects the candidate weapon may have if used in 
battle, some notion of the potential collateral damage effects are needed.  To assess these 
effects, the population density of an example city was used.  Baghdad is one of the world’s 
more densely populated cites, with a population estimated at 5.5 million people located in 
an area of 596 square kilometers (City Mayors 2007).   
An area of 100m2 was used for performing the analysis.  Within this area, targets 
in the quantities determined by the above described population density were positioned 
according to a random uniform distribution.  The vulnerable area of each target was 
assumed to be that representing a human.  The damage functions described earlier were 
used to determine differing levels of damage on the population within the area.  As the 
damage function used has a spherical distribution, a radius of 50m was used to limit the 
range of the analysis.  A warhead was considered detonated at the (0, 0) location.  
Approximate numbers of those suffering various levels of damage were then assessed 
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based on their distance from the point of detonation.  Each detonation was considered an 
independent event.  Ten thousand detonations were simulated using each warhead type, 
with a random positioning of targets occurring prior to each detonation.  Figure 73 
illustrates the random distribution of targets and the increase in area coverage as the 
quantities of independent detonations were increased.  The marker size of each data point 
used in the far right illustration has been reduced to allow better visualization of the target 
area coverage.  The circles in Figure 73 illustrate the study area boundary.  Targets 
outside of these circles were not considered in the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 73 - Collateral Damage Random Target Positioning 
 
For each target, three possible levels of damage were considered.  From the 
preceding discussions, PK ≥ 0.7 indicates a hit in the target vulnerable area by at least one 
warhead fragment.  This level of damage was considered severe, and is indicated by the 
red markers in Figure 73.  A moderate level of damage was defined to be 0.3 ≤ PK < 0.7 
and is indicated by yellow markers.  A light level of damage was defined as PK < 0.3 and is 
indicated by green markers. 
Total quantities of targets suffering each of the three damage categories were 
determined after 10,000 independent detonations of each warhead candidate.  The data 
was then analyzed to determine percentage of the sample at each level of damage.  
Percentages were used as they are applicable with differing population densities.  Using 
166 
the percentages presented in Table 40 and an approximate population density, estimated 
collateral damages may be calculated using Equation 25. 
 
Table 40 - Estimated Collateral Damage Percentages by Candidate Weapon 
Weapon PK >= 0.7 0.3 <= PK < 0.7 PK < 0.3 
Bomb 1.24% 2.89% 95.87% 
GB-1 0.49% 1.17% 98.34% 
GB-2 0.01% 0.03% 99.97% 
M-1 2.24% 5.37% 92.78% 
M-2 2.14% 5.08% 92.78% 
M-3 0.80% 1.91% 97.29% 
M-4 0.24% 0.57% 99.20% 
M-5 0.08% 0.18% 99.74% 
 
 
Equation 25 - Collateral Damage Estimation Equation 
Where 
 = Estimated Collateral Damage (persons), 
 = Population Density (persons/meter2), 
  = Area of a circle with radius of 50 meters (meters2), and 
  = Estimated Collateral Damage Percentage from Table 40 (dimensionless) 
 
For additional insight into the possible effects of collateral damage, the expected 
radius associated with each PK level was calculated using a variation of Equation 24.  
These may allow rapid assessment of collateral damage potential and target damage 







Table 41 - Target Distance from Point of Detonation for PK Levels 
Weapon Radius where 
PK = 0.7 (meters) 
Radius where 
PK = 0.3 (meters) 
Bomb 5.5 10.1 
GB-1 3.5 6.4 
GB-2 0.5 1.0 
M-1 7.5 13.8 
M-2 7.3 13.5 
M-3 4.5 8.3 
M-4 2.5 4.5 
M-5 1.4 2.5 
 
C. Aerodynamic Performance Analysis 
Part of the weaponization feasibility study was to ensure that the addition of a 
weapon would not significantly impact the aerodynamic performance of the UAV.  For 
the purposes of this study a significant impact was considered to be greater than 5 percent 
reduction in the existing capability of the UAV.  A full set of aerodynamic properties for 
the Shadow 600 were available with the NGTS modeling tools that were used for the 
weapon effectiveness modeling and simulation efforts.  While the parameters associated 
with the Shadow 600 were not the same as those that would be associated with the 
surrogate UAV, the relative impact of adding a weapon was assumed to be similar. 
1. Methods and Initial Data 
Basic aerodynamic lift and drag calculations were performed to determine the 
impact on velocity, endurance, and distance traveled.  The basic equations for lift and drag 
come from the forces that act upon the UAV.  Figure 74 is a free body diagram depicting 
the forces acting on a UAV.  In this case, it was assumed that there were no winds and that 




Figure 74 - UAV Aerodynamic Forces 
 
The Shadow 600 data used in the analysis was obtained from the NGTS model data 
and Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets.  Data used in this analysis included 
maximum, cruise, and loiter velocities, coefficient of drag as a function of coefficient of 
lift, angle of attack as a function of coefficient of lift, wing area, empty weight, fuel 
capacity, and fuel flow rates.  Table 42, Figure 75, and Figure 76 summarize the data that 









Table 42 - Shadow 600 Parameters for Analysis (IHS Global Limited 2010) 
Shadow 600 Property Value Units 
Empty Weight 327.00 lbf 
Fuel Capacity 22.50 gal 
Fuel Weight 4.86 lbs/gal 
Sensor Weight 35.00 lbf 
Baseline Weight 471.35 lbf 
Wing Area, S 40.41 ft2 
Max Velocity 104.00 kts 
Cruise Velocity 75.00 kts 
Loiter Velocity 65.00 kts 
Max Fuel Flow 27.65 gal/hr 
Cruise Fuel Flow 20.74 gal/hr 
Loiter Fuel Flow 17.97 Gal/hr 
 
 




Figure 76 - Shadow 600 Drag Polar Data 
 
2. Calculations 
With the Shadow 600 aerodynamic data, it was possible to find the coefficient of 
lift that resulted in level flight for known velocities through the following equations.  
Standard atmosphere was assumed to determine the air density as a function of altitude. 
 
 
Equation 26 - Required Lift for Level Flight from (Anderson 2011) 
 
 
Equation 27 - Required Thrust for Constant Velocity from (Anderson 2011) 
 
 
Equation 28 - Total Drag as a Function of Induced Drag from (Anderson 2011) 
 
 





Equation 30 - Lift for Level Flight with Known Velocity with Substitutions 
 
Where:             
 
 
Once the baseline performance was established, it was possible to determine the 
degraded performance by assuming values for additional weight and drag from the 
weapon, the weapon hardware, and the weapon management system.  The analysis 
considered total weapon system weights from 15 to 60 pounds.  It also assumed that the 
drag coefficient could increase anywhere from 0 percent to 10 percent.  In order to 
determine the impact on lift and drag from the addition of a weapon, it was necessary to use 
a different set of equations.  In the baseline analysis, the velocity was known, but if the 
same throttle settings are used, the resulting velocity will be reduced with additional 




Equation 31 - Lift for Level Flight with Known Thrust from (Anderson 2011) 
 
 
Equation 32 - New Required Thrust for Constant Velocity from (Anderson 2011) 
 
 
Equation 33 - Required Lift for Level Flight with Known Thrust with Substitutions 
 
3. Results 
MATLAB was used to evaluate the lift and drag equations over a range of altitudes, 
velocities, weapon weights, assumed drag increases, and time.  The results indicated that 
the addition of weapons could have a significant impact on the performance of the Shadow 
600.  This is clearly shown in the following series of figures in which maximum velocity 
is depicted as a function of the percent increase in drag and the additional weapon weight.  
The shading represents the percent difference from the baseline case of 0 percent increase 
in drag and 0 pounds added.  Green represents a 0–to 4 percent reduction, yellow 
represents a 4–5 percent reduction, and red represents any reduction greater than 5 percent.  
The values along the x-axis simulate the effect of increasing the drag only and offsetting 
the weight of the weapon by having less fuel aboard the UAV.  The values along the 
y-axis simulate the effect of carrying the weapon internally and only increasing the weight.  
These options are not actually being considered, and were not investigated any further, but 
they are interesting byproducts of the analysis.  The remaining region of the charts is the 
primary area of interest, and as they clearly show, the performance falls off rather quickly. 
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Figure 77 - Reduction in Maximum Velocity at 500 feet 
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Figure 78 - Reduction in Maximum Velocity at 2,000 feet 
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Figure 79 - Reduction in Maximum Velocity at 14,500 feet 
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In the 500 and 2,000 feet cases, level flight is still possible throughout the analyzed 
region, but the maximum velocity cannot be maintained within the 5 percent margin as the 
drag increases.  However, the impact worsens with altitude, and level flight is not possible 
at the Tier II maximum defined altitude of 14,500 feet as weight and drag increase.  This is 
indicated by the “NaN” values shown on the 14,500 feet plot.  “NaN” was used as the 
output when MATLAB was unable to find a solution to the required lift equation.  All the 
plots show that the effect of drag is much more significant than the effect of the additional 
weight.  Any weapon system that would be considered should emphasize being 
“low-drag.”   
The next area that was analyzed was the velocity over time.  This was important to 
know because the additional weight and drag of a weapon made it nearly impossible to fly 
at anything but 100 percent throttle and maximum velocity with a full load of fuel.  By 
looking at velocity over time, it was possible to see at what point level flight became 
possible as fuel burned off.  Loiter velocity was of the most interest because the scenarios 
that were defined assumed that the UAV would be in a search pattern at loiter velocity.  
The following figure shows the maximum and loiter velocities for 15, 30, 45, and 60 pound 
weapon systems at 2,000 feet.  Based on the team’s assumption that the weapon 
management system (WMS) weighs 10 pounds and the mounting hardware is equal in 
weight to the actual weapon, the 15 pound weapon system is an approximate representation 
of the Switchblade.  On the other end, the 60 pound weapon system is an approximate 
representation of the Stinger or SPIKE-MR/LR.  The dots indicate the point at which 
enough fuel has been burned to transition from maximum to loiter velocity.  At 100 
percent throttle, the Shadow 600 model data assumed a 27.65 pound per hour fuel 
consumption rate, which allowed for almost 4 hours of endurance.  At loiter throttle, a 
17.97 pound per hour consumption rate was assumed, which allowed for slightly more than 
6 hours of endurance.  This conflicts with the 12–14 hours of endurance claimed by Jane’s 
(IHS Global Limited 2010) for the Shadow 600 endurance, but 6 hours is representative of 
the other members of the Shadow family.  The top row of graphs shows the flight time at 
maximum velocity, and the bottom row shows the remaining flight time once a transition to 
loiter has been made. 
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Figure 80 - Shadow 600 Maximum and Loiter Velocity over Time 
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Due to a lack of real Shadow 600 data, it was assumed that the maximum and loiter 
velocities were achieved with a full load of fuel.  Furthermore, it was assumed that the 
maximum and loiter velocities corresponded to a constant throttle percentage and thrust.  
Therefore, as the weight of fuel is reduced over time, the angle of attack declines to 
maintain level flight and the velocity increases.  These graphs again show that drag is a 
more significant factor than weight. 
4. MOE / MOP Impact Assessment 
Following the initial analysis, the results were applied to the screened Tier II 
candidate weapons from Table 28 to assess the MOE 1.1.2 Minimize Endurance & 
Performance Impacts on Aerial Vehicle.  The three MOPs that supported this MOE were 
MOP 1.2.2.1 Impact to Mission Time on Station, MOP 1.2.2.2 Impact to Maximum UAV 
Range, and MOP 1.2.2.3 Impact to Maximum Speed.  The additional weight and drag of 
these weapon systems had a negative impact on all three MOPs.  The impacts of the 
addition of single and where applicable multiple weapons were considered at the selected 
altitude of 2000 feet.  Interpolation was used to calculate performance for each of the 
candidate weapon systems.  Red was used to indicate a significant impact of greater than 5 
percent reduction in performance.  Yellow was used to show impacts between 4 percent 
and 5 percent reduction in performance.  Green was used to show impacts less than 4 
percent. 
In order to determine the performance impacts for a specific candidate weapon 
system, it was required to determine the exact amount of additional weight that would be 
added to the UAV from the weapon, the mounting and launcher hardware, and the WMS.   
Table 43 shows the total weights for single and maximum configurations of the Tier II 






























10 10 2 30 50 
GB-1 6 10 3 26 58 
GB-2 10 10 2 30 50 
M-1 26 26 1 62 62 
M-2 23.1 23.1 1 56.2 56.2 
M-3 23 23 1 56 56 
M-4 5.3 5.3 4 20.6 52.4 
M-5 2.2 2.2 10 14.4 54 
 
The second consideration is the amount of additional drag that will be created.  
Wind tunnel data would be required to determine the actual drag impact of a particular 
weapon and mounting hardware installation on the Shadow 600, but this was not possible.  
To come up with a reasonable estimate for the drag coefficient increase, it was assumed 
that the ratio of the baseline Shadow 600 cross-sectional area to the “with weapon” 
cross-sectional area would be equal to the baseline and “with weapon” drag coefficient 
ratio.  Therefore, a 5 percent increase in the cross-sectional area would result in a 5 
percent increase in drag.  Available data was used to determine the cross-sectional area 
along the main body axis for each candidate weapon, but assumptions were required to 
account for launcher and mounting hardware, weapon fins and other protrusions, and 
potential off-axis mounting angles.  For all weapons, a factor of 2 was used to account for 
the additional area beyond the on-axis weapon cross-section.  Furthermore, it was 
assumed that there was no masking when multiple weapons were loaded and that the full 
cross-sectional area of each weapon was added to the total to create a worst-case scenario.  




Table 44 - Total Cross-Sectional Area for Screened Tier II Candidate Weapons 
Weapon Maximum Rounds 
Dimensions 





















Bomb 2 5 19.6 39.3 58.9 117.8 
GB-1 3 2.75 5.9 11.9 17.8 53.5 
GB-2 2 5 19.6 39.3 58.9 117.8 
M-1 1 5 19.6 39.3 58.9 58.9 
M-2 1 4.2 13.9 27.7 41.6 41.6 
M-3 1 2.75 5.9 11.9 17.8 17.8 
M-4 4 2.25 4.0 8.0 11.9 47.7 
M-5 10 2.25 2.25 10.1 10.1 15.2 151.9 
 
Cross-sectional area data was not readily available for the Shadow 600, so it had to 
be estimated.  A scaled drawing of the UAV, showing three orthographic views, was used 
in combination with the known dimensions of wing span, total length, and total height to 
obtain approximate dimensions for simple shapes that are present in the nose-on view. 
Figure 81 shows these views, with the known dimensions in blue, and the scaled 
measurements in red.  Table 45 provides details on the chosen shapes and calculations that 




Figure 81 - Shadow 600 Scale Drawing (IHS Global Limited 2010) 
 




Cross-Section Shape Dimensions (in) Area (in
2) 
Fuselage Trapezoid B1 B2 H 295.0 18.0 11.5 20.0 
Wing Rectangle W H 1075.2 268.8 4.0 
Tail 2 x Rectangle W H 156.0 3.0 26.0 
Sensor Semi-Circle R 66.4 6.5 
Nose Wheel Rectangle W H 17.5 2.5 7.0 
Rear Wheel 2 x Rectangle W H 54.0 3.0 9.0 
Antenna Rectangle W H 39.0 6.0 6.5 



















Finally, the percent increase in cross-sectional area was calculated for each weapon 
system load.  The results are assumed to be equal to the percent increase in the drag 
coefficient, and they are presented in Table 46. 
 
Table 46 - Shadow 600 Cross-Sectional Area Increase with Weapons 
Weapon Single Weapon  Increase 
Maximum Round  
Increase 
Bomb 3.46% 6.92% 
GB-1 1.05% 3.14% 
GB-2 3.46% 6.92% 
M-1 3.46% 3.46% 
M-2 2.44% 2.44% 
M-3 1.05% 1.05% 
M-4 0.70% 2.80% 
M-5 0.89% 8.92% 
 
a) Time on Station 
To assess the time on station impact, it was assumed that the total endurance 
time was equal to the time on station.  This assumption was made because the scenario 
definitions only placed the ground control station 5 km away from the target area.  This 
distance could be covered in less than 3 minutes at 65 knots and meant that the UAV was 
essentially on station from launch.  Endurance time was maximized by being at loiter 
velocity, so the impact assessment assumed that the UAV would burn fuel at maximum 
velocity and then transition to loiter once sufficient fuel weight was lost.  Under the 
assumptions of the analysis, the baseline system was capable of a maximum time on station  
of 365.3 minutes by flying at loiter velocity the entire time, and at maximum velocity the 
baseline system could fly for 237.3 minutes at 2000 feet.  Table 47 shows the time on 
station and the percent reduction from the baseline 365.3 minutes for each of the weight 
and drag combinations created by the candidate weapon systems.   
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Table 47 - Maximum Time on Station for 2,000 feet 
Weapon Quantity Weight (lbs) 
Additional 
Drag 




Bomb 1 30 3.46% 311.6 14.67% 
Bomb 2 50 6.92% 271.1 25.75% 
GB-1 1 26 1.05% 328.9 9.92% 
GB-1 3 58 3.14% 280.6 23.15% 
GB-2 1 30 3.46% 311.6 14.67% 
GB-2 2 50 6.92% 271.1 25.75% 
M-1 1 62 3.46% 274.3 24.88% 
M-2 1 56.2 2.44% 286.2 21.60% 
M-3 1 56 1.05% 293.9 19.51% 
M-4 1 20.6 0.70% 337.1 7.68% 
M-4 4 52.4 2.80% 288.9 20.88% 
M-5 1 14.4 0.89% 343.3 5.98% 
M-5 10 54 8.92% 256.9 29.63% 
 
As the table shows, there is configuration that achieves an impact of less 
than 5 percent reduction in time on station.  The primary reason for the significant 
reduction in endurance time is that it is necessary to fly at a higher throttle setting in order 
to reduce UAV weight to a point at which level flight becomes possible at the loiter throttle 
setting.  The analysis only considered flying at maximum velocity before transitioning to 
loiter because maximum velocity was the only velocity possible, initially, for the heavier 
weapon systems. 
b) Maximum Range 
While endurance time is of great importance to surveillance UAVs, so is the 
amount of distance that can be covered over that endurance time.  The distance covered by 
the Shadow 600 was calculated based on the velocity over time data.  The MATLAB 
model calculated the data at 1 minute intervals over 360 minutes.  The following tables 
show the calculated cumulative distance that could be covered by the Shadow 600 in 6 
hours or until the fuel ran out for the selected weapon system configurations.  The first 
table assumes that maximum velocity is maintained over the entire flight.  At maximum 
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velocity the baseline Shadow could cover 417.9 nautical miles.  The second table assumes 
that the transition to loiter velocity is made once sufficient fuel has burned off.  At loiter 
velocity, the baseline Shadow could cover 463.9 nautical miles in 360 minutes. 
 
Table 48 – Total Distance at Maximum Velocity at 2,000 feet 







Bomb 1 30 3.46% 404.9 3.12% 
Bomb 2 50 6.92% 392.6 6.06% 
GB-1 1 26 1.05% 411.8 1.46% 
GB-1 3 58 3.14% 401.3 3.97% 
GB-2 1 30 3.46% 404.9 3.12% 
GB-2 2 50 6.92% 392.6 6.06% 
M-1 1 62 3.46% 399.8 4.34% 
M-2 1 56.2 2.44% 403.5 3.44% 
M-3 1 56 1.05% 407.4 2.52% 
M-4 1 20.6 0.70% 413.5 1.07% 
M-4 4 52.4 2.80% 403.2 3.53% 
M-5 1 14.4 0.89% 413.8 0.99% 





Table 49 - Total Distance for Transition to Loiter Velocity at 2,000 feet 








Bomb 1 30 3.46% 434.8 6.27% 
Bomb 2 50 6.92% 407.3 12.19% 
GB-1 1 26 1.05% 443.5 4.40% 
GB-1 3 58 3.14% 414.5 10.65% 
GB-2 1 30 3.46% 434.8 6.27% 
GB-2 2 50 6.92% 407.3 12.19% 
M-1 1 62 3.46% 409.9 11.63% 
M-2 1 56.2 2.44% 417.6 9.97% 
M-3 1 56 1.05% 421.0 9.24% 
M-4 1 20.6 0.70% 447.5 3.53% 
M-4 4 52.4 2.80% 419.8 9.50% 
M-5 1 14.4 0.89% 451.7 2.64% 
M-5 10 54 8.92% 394.1 15.05% 
 
For the most part, the impact to maximum range at maximum velocity is 
within the 5 percent margin, but the opposite is true when a transition to loiter velocity is 
made. 
c) Maximum Velocity 
Finally the impact on the full fuel maximum velocity was assessed.  The 
baseline Shadow 600 was capable of 104 knots.  For the purposes of this analysis, it was 
assumed that this was the full fuel maximum velocity at all altitudes.  The results for the 




Table 50 - Maximum Velocity at 2,000 feet 









Bomb 1 30 3.46% 100.3 3.58% 
Bomb 2 50 6.92% 96.7 7.02% 
GB-1 1 26 1.05% 102.2 1.74% 
GB-1 3 58 3.14% 99.1 4.73% 
GB-2 1 30 3.46% 100.3 3.58% 
GB-2 2 50 6.92% 96.7 7.02% 
M-1 1 62 3.46% 98.6 5.18% 
M-2 1 56.2 2.44% 99.7 4.13% 
M-3 1 56 1.05% 100.8 3.10% 
M-4 1 20.6 0.70% 102.7 1.27% 
M-4 4 52.4 2.80% 99.6 4.20% 
M-5 1 14.4 0.89% 102.8 1.15% 
M-5 10 54 8.92% 95.0 8.69% 
 
Most of the candidate weapon configurations are within the 5 percent 
margin for maximum velocity.  The systems that fail to meet the margin all have drag 
increase of at least 3.46 percent.  While drag seems to be the most significant factor, the 
weight also has a noticeable effect.  The single Bomb and single GB-2 also experience a 
3.46 percent increase in drag, but their lower weight allows them to stay within the 
threshold, where the heavier M-1 exceeds the 5 percent limit due to its 62 pound weight. 
5. Aerodynamic Performance Conclusions 
Overall, the addition of a weapon system to a UAV appears to have a significant 
impact on the on-station time and the range at loiter velocity.  The impact is less severe on 
the maximum velocity and the range at maximum velocity.  Lower drag weapon systems 
perform better than higher drag ones, but there is still a noticeable impact from the weight. 
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D. OMOE Decision Matrix 
 The OMOE decision matrix is a graphical tool used to combine the value 
scores and global weights for each KPP category and alternative weapon to generate total 
OMOEs.  The formula to perform the total OMOE calculation is provided in Equation 34. 
 
Equation 34 - Total OMOE 
 
In this function, KPP Weight(j) represents the global weight of a given KPP, and 
Alternative KPP Score(j) is the value score for the KPP for a given alternative.  Table 51  
is a summary of the individual scoring of each KPP for each weapon alternative, the global 
weights associated with each measure that were calculated from QFD, and the total OMOE 
will be calculated using Equation 34. 
According to the OMOE scores of each candidate weapon system integrated on the 
RUINS Tier II UAV, the overall winner based on score alone is M5 with an OMOE score 
of 0.621, whereas the second highest score is 0.563 and belongs to weapon candidate M4.  
The team performed a sensitivity analysis to determine whether the assumptions that were 
made regarding the weighting of the KPPs are valid.  Furthermore, cost analysis and 
integration studies were performed as OMOE alone should not be the only decision driver. 
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Weapon Weight 0.020 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Maximum 
Weapon Rounds 
at Takeoff 0.126 0.200 0.400 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.600 1.000 
Maximum 
Weaponized UAV 
Range 0.070 0.714 0.787 0.714 0.774 0.806 0.838 0.803 0.664 
UAV On-station 
Time 0.070 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.151 0.098 0.000 





Weapon Range 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.383 0.383 0.593 0.380 0.380 
Maximum 
Effective Weapon 
Range 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.018 0.107 0.064 0.478 0.421 
Weapon Speed 0.075 0.178 0.289 0.361 0.451 0.347 1.000 0.407 1.000 
Weapon 




Warhead 50% Pk 
Human 0.096 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.260 1.000 
Warhead 50% Pk 
Truck  0.096 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.590 1.000 
  OMOE Score 1.000 0.109 0.271 0.442 0.162 0.351 0.308 0.563 0.621 
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E. Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was done for each RUINS KPP.  How the categories are 
weighted can determine whether one weapon is chosen over another.  The purpose of 
performing a sensitivity analysis is to determine whether changing the category weights 
would alter the results dramatically and change the weapon of choice.   The sensitivity 
analysis is performed by making the weight of a single KPP a one and making the other 
KPPs zero, thereby generating a new score for each weapon.    
Weapon Weight was the first KPP analyzed.  The original global weight of this 
measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and shown in 
Figure 82.  The point of indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.0681, which is 
approximately 0.048 different than the global weight of 0.020 for this KPP.    
 
 
Figure 82 - Weapon Weight Sensitivity 
 
Maximum Rounds at Takeoff was the second KPP analyzed.  The original global 
weight of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and 
shown in Figure 83.  The point of indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.20, 























Figure 83 - Maximum Rounds at Takeoff Sensitivity 
 
Maximum Weaponized UAV Range was the third KPP analyzed.  The original 
global weight of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was 
determined and shown in Figure 84.  The point of indifference for this KPP was 
determined to be 0.346, which is approximately 0.276 different than the global weight of 
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Figure 84 – Maximum Weaponized UAV Range Sensitivity 
 
UAV On-station Time was the fourth KPP analyzed.  The original global weight 
of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and shown in 
Figure 85.  The point of indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.396, which is 
approximately 0.325 different than the global weight of 0.070 for this KPP.   
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Stand-Off Range was the fifth KPP analyzed.  The original global weight of this 
measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and shown in 
Figure 86.  The point of indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.134, which is 
approximately 0.079 different than the global weight of 0.054 for this KPP.   
 
 
Figure 86 – Stand-Off Range 
 
Minimum Weapon Range was the sixth KPP analyzed.  The original global weight 
of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and shown in 
Figure 87.  The point of indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.281, which is 






















Figure 87 - Minimum Weapon Range Sensitivity 
 
Minimum Weapon Range was the sixth KPP analyzed.  The original global weight 
of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and shown in 
Figure 88.  The point of indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.576, which is 
























Figure 88 – Maximum Effective Weapon Range Sensitivity 
 
Weapon Speed was the eighth KPP analyzed.  The original global weight of this 
measure, and the corresponding score for each weapon, was determined and shown in 
Figure 89.  The first point of indifference for this KPP is 0.025, which is approximately 
-0.418 different than the global weight of 0.075 for this KPP.  The second point of 
indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.133, which is approximately 0.058 









0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.200














Figure 89 – Weapon Speed Sensitivity 
 
Weapon Accuracy was the ninth KPP analyzed.  The original global weight of this 
measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was determined and shown in 
Figure 90.  The first point of indifference for this KPP is 0.083, which is approximately 
-0.039 different than the global weight of 0.123 for this KPP.  The second point of 
indifference for this KPP was determined to be 0.154, which is approximately 0.031 





















Figure 90 – Weapon Accuracy Sensitivity 
 
Warhead 50 Percent PK Range Human was the tenth KPP analyzed.  The original 
global weight of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was 
determined and shown in Figure 91.  The point of indifference for this KPP was 
determined to be 0.223, which is approximately 0.127 different than the global weight of 























Figure 91 - Warhead 50% PK Range Human Sensitivity 
 
Warhead 50% PK Range Truck was the eleventh KPP analyzed.  The original 
global weight of this measure and the corresponding score for each weapon was 
determined and shown in Figure 92.  The point of indifference for this KPP was 
determined to be 0.302, which is approximately 0.206 different than the global weight of 
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Figure 92 – Warhead 50% PK Range Truck Sensitivity 
 
A KPP is considered not sensitive if the point of indifference is greater than the 
global weight plus 10 percent of itself.  In this analysis all of the KPPs were found to be 
not sensitive.  The results of the sensitivity analyses performed on each KPP have 
determined that the RUINS KPPs are not sensitive and are shown in Table 52.  This 
indicates that the assumptions that were made regarding the weighting of the KPPs are 
reasonable.  Adjustments to the RUINS KPP weights will not change the study.  
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Table 52 – KPP Sensitivity Summary 
Impact Category KPP Point of Indifference 
KPP Weight 






Weapon Weight 0.0681 0.022 No 
Maximum Rounds 




0.346 0.077 No 
UAV On Station 
Time 0.396 0.077 No 












0.576 0.149 No 
Weapon Speed 0.025 0.133 
0.068 
0.083 No 





Warhead 50% PK 
Range Human 0.223 0.105 No 
Warhead 50% PK 
Range Truck 0.302 0.105 No 
 
F. Cost Analysis 
As one of the three main pillars of program management, cost is one of the most 
important considerations in the development of any new weapon system.  Not only must a 
new weapon system meet performance and schedule requirements, but it must do both of 
these within the constraints of a budget.  In order to ensure the successful fielding of a new 
weapon system such as RUINS, a Cost Analysis was conducted to take an early look at 
some of the costs associated with the proposed alternative design solutions. 
1. Cost Model Description 
The cost model for RUINS consisted of a combination of the Analogy and 
Parametric Methods, relying mostly on historical data from similar systems as the source 
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of cost data.  Historical information provided a source for unit costs and a basis for 
estimating the number of units required and hardware upgrades.  Although the overall 
system cost will ultimately depend largely on the number of weapons needed to combat the 
threat, the historical data provides a basis for estimating quantity requirements.  In the 
development of the RUINS cost model, every task was treated as a cost-risk analysis and 
uncertainty was recognized as an inherent part of every estimate.    
2. Cost Analysis Approach and Methodology 
Since RUINS builds heavily on pre-existing platforms and technology, the scope of 
the cost estimation only included those parts of the overall system that were developed 
specifically for RUINS.  UAV platform and sensor costs were considered out of scope for 
the cost analysis.  The primary focus of the cost analysis centered around the cost of the 
RUINS weapon and the integration estimates.  
In essence, RUINS is an upgrade to an existing UAV platform that comes with 
unavoidable performance costs to the UAV.  UAV performance effects were modeled as a 
part of the RUINS performance analysis, but UAV Life Cycle Costs were considered 
equal, since all feasible RUINS alternatives used the same surrogate UAV platform.  UAS 
Life Cycle costs were researched as a part of the overall cost analysis research effort, 
however, many small UAS, like those utilized by RUINS, are still owned by private 
companies whose cost information is considered proprietary. 
As the scope of the RUINS engineering analysis focused largely on the feasibility 
of arming a small UAV, the surrogate UAV and sensor were assumed to be mature 
technologies with established support infrastructures.  By leveraging the existing 
technologies for the UAV and sensor, many of the associated support costs could be 
assumed by the existing infrastructure provided within the DoD. 
Based on the RUINS Problem Definition phase and System Engineering Analysis, 
certain cost-drivers emerged as areas that would most likely become deciding factors in the 
analysis of alternatives.  The following areas were quickly identified as candidate 
cost-drivers for RUINS: 
• Weapon Weight 
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• Maximum Rounds 
• Engagement Range 
• Guidance Type 
• Warhead Weight 
In addition to the above cost-drivers, the development cost of RUINS will depend 
highly on the successful integration of a weapon system on a Tier I or Tier II UAV.  
Because lethal weapons have yet to be fielded on these smaller tiers of UAVs, there is a 
great degree of uncertainty when it comes to the cost of system integration.  Although the 
surrogate UAV, the sensor, and the weapon are all existing and mature technologies, they 
were not designed to be used together on one system.  Overall, system integration cost 
poses the greatest risk as a cost driver for RUINS. 
In the process of developing an accurate cost estimate for RUINS, it was necessary 
to address the proposed operational and support concepts.  RUINS is designed to be a 
tactically launched UAV, operated and maintained at the unit level.  At the Unit level, 
RUINS units will require several air vehicles, enough ground stations to control the air 
vehicles, and enough personnel to operate and maintain all components of the system.  To 
support the system, the RUINS units will require appropriate storage containers, portable 
operations spaces and enough spare parts to ensure mission accomplishment.  At some 
point during the life cycle of RUINS, a hardware refresh will be needed to keep the system 
ahead of evolving threats and to allow RUINS to continue to be an effective weapon 
system until the end of the system life cycle 
Quantity requirements for RUINS depend highly on the operational tempo 
anticipated for the life of the system as foreseen during development.  Overall force 
requirements are determined by strategic objectives and detailed threat assessments and 
were not considered within the scope of this project.  The cost estimation effort was based 
largely on a historical analogy of similar system purchase quantities.   
3. Cost Data  
RUINS cost research focused primarily on the cost of the munitions for the 
surrogate UAV and the cost of integrating a new weapon on an existing airframe.  
202 
Weapon unit cost information was found in a variety of sources including IHS Jane’s 
Databases and online articles. Inflation indices were drawn from the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis (NCCA) and current government Discount Rates were obtained from the 2010 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94, Appendix C. 
a) Bomb Data 
The RUINS Bomb was modeled as a theoretical 10-lb gravity bomb: 
therefore, there was no historical cost data that directly correlated to its cost.  Instead, the 
theoretical cost of the Bomb was derived from the cost of the Mk-82 and Mk-84 Gravity 
Bombs, munitions used by various U.S. platforms.  According to the Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS), the Mk-82, 500-lb bomb, cost approximately $287 (Federation 
of American Scientists 2000), while the Mk-84, 2,000-lb bomb, cost approximately $3,100 
as of FY2000 (Federation of American Scientists 2000). 
b) GB-1 Data 
The RUINS GB-1 was modeled on ATK’s G2M.  Although the RUINS 
GB-1 was included as a candidate weapon for RUINS, the G2M is very early in the 
development stage and no cost data could be found on which to base a cost estimate.  The 
G2M is a GPS Guided Munition so can be compared to a dumb bomb with a Joint Direct 
Attack Munition (JDAM) kit added to it, JDAM being a kit that allows dumb bombs to be 
GPS/INS guided.  To determine the total unit cost of a G2M, the estimated cost of a six 
pound bomb was calculated and added to the unit cost of a JDAM kit.  IHS online 
databases provided procurement costs on which the JDAM kits cost estimate was based.  
According to IHS online databases, contracts were awarded to Boeing in 2006 for 12,889 
JDAM kits, 2008 for 4,372 JDAM kits and 2009 for 2925 JDAM kits estimated at 296, 107 
and 72 million dollars respectively (IHS Global Limited 2010).  
c) GB-2 Data 
The RUINS GB-2 was modeled after Textron Defense Systems’ Selectively 
Targeted Skeet weapon.  IHS Jane’s online databases provided procurement costs on 
which to base a cost estimate for the GB-2.  According to IHS Jane’s online databases, a 
contract for 332 Sensor Fuzed Weapons (the weapon package that includes STS 
submunitions) was awarded in January 2006 for approximately $108.1 million (IHS 
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Global Limited 2010).  In addition, India is in negotiations to purchase 533 CBU-105s (4 
STS per CBU-105) at an estimated $375 million (IHS Global Limited 2010). 
d) M-1 Data 
Since the RUINS M-1 missile was modeled after Lockheed Martin’s 
Javelin Missile, cost data for the M-1 missile was estimated based on historical costs of the 
Javelin Missile.  IHS Jane’s online databases provided the historical cost data for the 
Javelin Missile, including U.S. Army procurements between FY 2003 and FY 2010.  U.S. 
Army Javelin Missile lot quantities and cost data are shown in Table 53.  In FY2006, the 
U.S. Army purchased a block upgrade of the Javelin Missile from Block 0 to Block 1.  The 
Army retrofitted 450 missiles in FY 2006 and 349 missiles in FY 2007 for $13.8 million 
and $10.4 million respectively (IHS Global Limited 2010). 
 
Table 53 - U.S. Army Javelin Missile Procurements (IHS Global Limited 2010) 
 Fiscal Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Volume 
(units) 1,478 991 1,038 300 250 1,320 1,320 1,265 
Value 
(USD) 101,280 75,649 79,941 23,691 33,125 146,798 166,816 163,627 
 
e) M-2 Data 
The RUINS M-2 missile was modeled based on Rafael Armament 
Development Authority’s Spike MR/LR anti-tank weapon system.  Cost estimates for the 
M-2 missile were derived from research data found in IHS Jane’s online databases.  
According to Jane’s online databases, the Netherlands Ministry of Defense purchased 
2,400 Spike MR/LR missiles at a reported $225 million (IHS Global Limited 2010). 
f) M-3 Data 
General Dynamics Corporation’s FIM-92 Stinger missile served as the 
basis for modeling the RUINS M-3 missile.  Historical Stinger procurement information 
found in IHS Jane’s online databases provided the necessary cost data needed to make a 
cost estimate of the RUINS M-3 missile.  In 1987, the U.S. Army Missile Command 
contracted Raytheon Missile Systems Division for 400 FIM-92 missiles at an estimated 
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$24.6 million (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Additionally, the Army exercised an option for 
an additional 1,500 missiles in 1989 for $54.4 million (IHS Global Limited 2010). 
g) M-4 Data 
The RUINS M-4 missile was modeled based on the NAVAIR Spike 
missile, currently in development by NAWCWD, China Lake.  Although there are no 
procurement cost numbers available, the expected cost of the NAVAIR Spike missile was 
reported as $4,000 per unit as of 2003 (Selinger 2003) and $5,000 per unit as of 2008 
(Mathews 2008).  The expected costs per unit for the NAVAIR Spike missile served as the 
basis for the cost estimate for the RUINS M-4 missile. 
h) M-5 Data 
The AeroVironment Switchblade served as the basis for the RUINS M-5 
missile.  Although the system has no procurement costs as it is still in development, online 
sources report that the new weapon will cost at least $30,000 per unit (Strategy World 
2010). 
4. Cost Assumptions 
As the RUINS alternatives are theoretical munitions based on several different real 
world weapons, certain assumptions were made in order to derive meaningful RUINS costs 
from the reference weapons.  Specific assumptions were made in order to estimate  
average unit costs, Net Present Values (NPVs), and benefit scores.  Specific RUINS 
weapon integration costs were based on assumptions drawn from integration cost research. 
a) Average Unit Cost Assumptions 
Since the 10-lb gravity bomb is a theoretical weapon, there are no cost 
references for an actual 10-lb munition.  In order to derive a theoretical average unit cost 
for the Bomb, a unit cost-to-weight ratio was established based on the Mk-82, 500-lb 
bomb, and the Mk-84, 2,000-lb bomb.  The Mk-82 and Mk-84 were used to develop the 
ratio as they are much heavier gravity bombs that are analogous to the RUINS Bomb.  
Based on the cost-to-weight ratio for the Mk-82 and Mk-84, the average unit cost of the 
RUINS Bomb was derived.  
Because ATK’s G2M is so early in development, there are no specific cost 
references available on which to base the GB-1 estimate.  In an effort to make a 
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reasonable cost estimate of the GB-1, an upgrade cost-to-unit cost was established based 
on the JDAM upgrade for a six pound bomb based on the cost-to-weight ratio derived from 
the Mk-82 and Mk-84 bombs.  The JDAM upgrade for standard gravity bombs was 
established as an analogous upgrade for the RUINS Bomb to be upgraded to a GB-1.  
Based on the upgrade ratio, it was possible to estimate the average unit cost for the GB-1. 
The Javelin cost research revealed that there were two different Blocks of 
hardware and correlating differences in unit costs (IHS Global Limited 2010).  In order to 
avoid unit cost differences caused by the different Block upgrades, only the Block 1 unit 
costs were used in the calculation of the overall average unit cost for the M-1. 
Research for the RUINS M-2 cost estimate is based on a reference for Spike 
MR/LR system cost that includes the cost of launching posts in addition to the submunition 
(IHS Global Limited 2010).  In order to account for the added cost of the launching 
hardware, the Spike MR/LR purchase quantities were reduced by 100 units. 
M-3 cost research is based on FIM-92 Stinger unit costs that are a few 
decades old (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Although it is possible to account for the inflated 
value, it is not likely that current Stinger inventory is the exact same hardware that was 
bought in the referenced procurement.  Although the reference unit cost data is old, the 
M-3 cost estimate does not take into account any upgrades to the system since the cost 
reference from the late 1980’s. 
b) Net Present Value Assumptions 
As a means to calculating NPVs for each of the RUINS munitions, it was 
necessary to make some specific assumptions about the RUINS program including number 
of years of procurement, quantities procured, integration costs and hardware upgrades.  
For all RUINS NPV calculations, the average cost per unit and upgrade costs were 
converted into then-year dollars, as necessary, using inflation indices provided by the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (Naval Center for Cost Analysis 2010) based on the 
expected procurement year.  For NPV comparisons, all then-year dollars were converted 
into FY 2011 dollars using discount rates provided in the OMB Circular A-94, Appendix C 
(Office of Management and Budget 2010). 
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As a basis for NPV calculations, it was necessary to estimate the expected 
life cycle duration of RUINS procurements.  Based on the sum of the research for all of 
the RUINS weapons, the RUINS program was assumed to have a life cycle similar to some 
of those weapons: 10 years.  The RUINS system was assumed to start its procurement 
cycle in FY 2014 as a way of accounting for the time needed for system development.  
Thus the RUINS costs were calculated from FY 2014 through FY 2023. 
RUINS integration costs were assumed to be incurred during the first year 
of the RUINS life cycle since most integration efforts would be complete prior to the 
deployment of the system or subsequent procurements. 
During the life cycle of RUINS, a hardware upgrade was planned for the 
fifth year of the program, roughly the halfway point.  The hardware upgrade was based on 
research information from the Javelin system, whose Block 1 upgrade also occurred at 
about the mid-way point of procurement (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Based on a ratio of 
the Javelin Block 1 upgrade cost to overall procurement cost, an upgrade cost for each of 
the RUINS weapons was calculated. 
Annual procurement quantities for the RUINS weapons were based on the 
historical procurement quantities for the Javelin Missile system.  Similar to the pattern of 
procurements for the Javelin Missile system, the pattern of procurement quantities repeats 
following the hardware upgrade (IHS Global Limited 2010).  Although the maximum 
number of stored rounds was not equal for each of the RUINS munitions, the annual 
procurement quantities for each of the RUINS weapons were assumed to be equal. 
5. Integration Cost Assumptions 
Since RUINS depends heavily on the integration of systems already fielded or in 
development, the cost of system integration becomes a major issue for cost analysis.  Cost 
data for system integration of existing systems proved extremely difficult to locate.  
Through research, it was found that many currently fielded systems kept no record of the 
cost of system integration, but there were some accepted methods for estimating costs 
associated with UAS.   
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With the increasing number of aircraft in inventory, every added requirement can 
bring a significant cost increase.  “From 2002 through 2008, the number of unmanned 
aircraft in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) inventory increased from 167 to more than 
6,000 in an effort to meet growing warfighter demand for these capabilities in Iraq and 
Afghanistan” (GAO 2009).  Cost can determine what changes can be made to an aircraft 
because every change has a cost associated it with it.  One example of this is the Global 
Hawk, which is an unmanned aerial vehicle used by United States Air Force and Navy.  
“On April 13, 2005, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force formally notified Congress that 
the procurement unit cost of the Global Hawk had increased 18 percent over the baseline 
estimate” (GAO 2005).  The reasons for the cost increase were requirements growth, 
increased sensor cost, deferred aircraft purchases, increased cost of airframe, increased 
support requirements and initial spares and increased government costs for acceptance 
tests, design changes and mission support” (GAO 2005).  Changes can have a cost 
snowball effect.  A new sensor must be tested, which has a cost has associated with it.  
One added sensor can correlate to added weight, therefore the airframe now has to 
compensate.  Sensors, like all equipment have to be replaceable in case of a failure.  As a 
result, spares have to be available.  All of the additional costs multiplied by the number of 
fielded systems can endanger the viability of an acquisition program.  This has to be taken 
into account when considering all options to aid the coalition forces with the counter 
improvised explosive device effort.  
Empty weight cost is a commonly used metric in the aviation industry 
because it tends to remain constant across a variety of aircraft types. That 
number today is roughly $1500 per pound.  The empty weight and cost data for 
DoD UA is depicted in Figure 4-1. It shows current DoD UA platforms cost 
approximately $1,500 per pound of empty weight and $8,000 per pound of 




Figure 93 - UAV Weight vs. Cost from (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2005) 
 
Taking the estimates from above and looking at possible EO/IR sensors in Figure 
93, the cost of adding a sensor can range dramatically.  This can be seen when comparing 
the cost of adding a 35-lb vs. 186-lb sensor. The estimated cost per aircraft was $280,000 
for the 35-lb sensor and $1,488,000 for the 186-lb sensor.  This difference was substantial, 
especially when the cost was multiplied by the number of aircraft that would house the 
sensor.  This is why it was necessary to evaluate all alternatives, when adding capabilities, 
in order to obtain the best "bang for the buck." 
6. Cost Model Development 
In developing the RUINS cost model, estimates were generated for candidate 
weapon integration costs, average unit costs, and NPV. 
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a) Integration Costs 
Integration costs for each of the candidate weapons were based on the 
assumption that integration of the candidate weapon would be directly proportional to the 
overall weight of the candidate weapon system being added to the UAV.  The weapon 
integration cost ratio was $8,000 per pound of payload (Office of the Secretary of Defense 
2005).  Since the reference for the integration cost ratio was from 2005, the integration 
cost for each candidate weapon was calculated in FY 2005 dollars and translated to FY 
2011 dollars using the NCCA Raw Inflation Index.  Estimated integration costs for each 
of the RUINS candidate weapons are shown in Table 54 and a comparison of each 
candidate weapons’ estimated integration cost is shown in Figure 94. 
 
Table 54 - Candidate Weapon Integration Costs 
Weapon Total Payload (lbs) 
Estimated Integration Cost 
(FY05$k) 
Estimated Integration Cost 
(FY11$k) 
Bomb 75.0 600.00 673.58 
GB-1 67.0 536.00 601.73 
GB-2 75.0 600.00 673.58 
M-1 87.0 696.00 781.35 
M-2 81.2 649.60 729.26 
M-3 81.0 648.00 727.47 
M-4 77.4 619.20 695.13 




Figure 94 - Estimated Integration Cost Comparison by Weapon 
 
In order to calculate procurement costs, an overall Average Unit Cost was 
derived from research data for each of the RUINS candidate weapons.  Each of the cost 
references were translated into an average unit cost by dividing the procurement cost by the 
number of units procured.  Each of the average unit costs were assigned a fiscal year based 
on the citation.  All respective then-year dollars were converted into FY 2011 dollars as a 
basis for comparison.  For candidate weapons with more than one cost reference, the FY 
2011 average unit costs for each reference were averaged into an overall average unit cost 
for that weapon.  Overall average unit costs are contained in Table 55. 
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(1) Annual Cost Data.  For all RUINS annual cost calculations, the 
average cost per unit and upgrade costs were converted into then-year dollars as necessary 
using inflation indices provided by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (Naval Center for 
Cost Analysis 2010) based on the expected procurement year. Based on the sum of the 
research for all of the RUINS weapons, the RUINS program was assumed to have a life 
cycle similar to some of those weapons: 10 years.  The integration costs will occur in the 
beginning as the integration efforts would be complete prior to the deployment of the 
system subsequent procurements.  At the half way point, 5 years, a hardware upgrade will 
occur.  The upgrade timeframe was based on research information from the Javelin 
system, whose Block 1 upgrade occurred at about the mid-way point of procurement (IHS 
Global Limited 2010).  The RUINS system was assumed to start its procurement cycle in 
FY 2014 as a way of accounting for the time needed for system development.  Thus the 
RUINS costs were calculated from FY 2014 through FY 2023.  The annual cost results for 
each of the RUINS munitions can be seen below in Figure 95 through Figure 102. 
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Figure 96 - GB-1 Annual Costs 
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Figure 98 - M-1 Annual Costs 
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Figure 100 - M-3 Annual Costs 
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Figure 102 - M-5 Annual Costs 
 
(2) NPV Comparison by Weapon. The annual costs were first 
calculated for each of the RUINS munitions.   Then for each of the RUINS munitions, the 
average of the annual costs over a 10-year span, 2014–2023, was calculated to determine 
the Net Present Value (NPV).   The NPV Cost comparison by weapon can be seen in 
Figure 103.  The results show that the RUINS GB-2, which was modeled after Textron 
Defense Systems’ Selectively Targeted Skeet weapon, had the highest NPV at almost $1.2 
billion.  The RUINS Bomb, which was modeled based on a theoretical 10-lb gravity 
bomb, had the lowest NPV at $800 thousand.  This depicts how much it would cost today 
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Figure 103 - NPV Cost Comparison by Weapon 
 
7. Cost Benefit Analysis 
The modeling and simulation results for each KPP in correlation with each weapon 
were then entered into its respective KPP scoring equation as seen in Chapter 2, section E.  
For example, the weapon accuracy M&S results for the M-4 was entered into the scored 
weapon accuracy scoring equation, which was Scored Miss Distance = (Miss Distance – 
KPP Goal) / (KPP Threshold – KPP Goal).  This number was then multiplied by the KPP 
weighted value, as seen in Figure 17, which for weapon accuracy was 0.123.  This is 
completed for all the KPPs and results grouped into categories "UAV Performance & 
Susceptibility," "Weapon Delivery," and "Weapon Warhead Effectiveness."  The 
individual KPP scores were totaled for each category and given a total score for that 
category.  For instance the KPP score for "Weapon Effectiveness" for the M-4 weapon 
was created by adding together the "Weapon 50% PK Value Range Human (Radius)" and 
"Weapon 50% PK Value Range Truck (Radius)," giving the M-4 a total weapon 
effectiveness score of 0.11.  The last step was adding all categories together for a given 
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Table 56 - OMOE Weights 







Bomb 0.095 0.013 0 0.108 
GB-1 0.126 0.145 0 0.271 
GB-2 0.095 0.156 0.192 0.443 
M-1 0.074 0.088 0 0.162 
M-2 0.135 0.215 0 0.350 
M-3 0.143 0.164 0 0.307 
M-4 0.213 0.269 0.820 0.564 
M-5 0.247 0.183 0.192 0.622 
 
These OMOE scores were then entered into a cost as an independent variable 
(CAIV) calculation.   
CAIV is a strategy for acquiring and supporting defense systems that 
entails setting aggressive, realistic cost objectives (and thresholds) for both new 
acquisitions and fielded systems, and managing to those objectives. The cost 
objectives must balance mission needs with projected out-year resources, taking 
into account anticipated process improvements in both DoD and defense 
industries (Beach n.d.).   
A CAIV takes the weapon OMOEs and graphs it against NPV weapon cost.  The CAIV 
data results are in Table 57. 
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Table 57 - CAIV Data 
Alternative NPV ($M FY11) OMOE 
Bomb $0.8 0.108 
GB-1 $213.9 0.271 
GB-2 $1,148.8 0.443 
M-1 $1,093.3 0.162 
M-2 $953.5 0.350 
M-3 $598.7 0.307 
M-4 $42.6 0.567 






Figure 104 - CAIV 
 
8. Cost Recommendations 
Based on the CAIV results, the M-4, M-5 and bomb are the non-dominated 
solutions on the Pareto boundary. M-5 is one optimal solution having highest OMOE at 
0.622 and a NPV of $257.9 million.  However, the M-4 is also an optimal solution having 
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million dollars.  The bomb, while a possible solution, is interesting because it had the 
lowest NPV at $800,000 but it had the lowest OMOE at 0.161 which is too low to be a 
practical solution.  Although upgrades can be done to the bomb to raise the OMOE to an 
acceptable score while still keeping the total NPV below all the weapon options, it does not 
seem feasible at this time.  Even though the basic bomb can be upgraded, there may not be 
enough time to visit these options.  The weaponized UAV is needed currently by the 
coalition forces.  In conclusion, reviewing the collected data, M-4 is the weapon of choice, 
if the UAV is to be armed. The tradeoff made for M-4 over M-5 was less effectiveness for 
greater cost savings. 
G. Synthesis of Optimum Solution 
Four different modeling and analysis procedures were used to ascertain the 
strengths and weaknesses of the candidate Tier II weapon solutions.  Each procedure 
focused on a separate portion of the proposed weapons, utilizing open source information 
developed during the Problem Identification phase and the Design and Analysis phase.  
"Performance Modeling and Simulation" used notional weapon models created using the 
most accurate, available open source specifications.  This data was used in the Joint 
Integration Mission Model environment to determine approximate weapon engagement 
performance in two different scenarios.  "Modeling Warhead Effects," including possible 
collateral damage, was accomplished using engineering assumptions, algebraic methods, 
and statistical analysis.  "Aerodynamic Performance Analysis" assessed decreases to the 
Tier II UAV aerodynamic performance as a result of the addition of weapons, using the 
Shadow 600 as a representative model.  The evaluation developed notional percentage 
degradations that were applied to the performance of the surrogate Tier II UAV.  Finally, 
"Cost Analysis" provided financial estimations of the cost effectiveness of each solution, 
and included a CAIV analysis. 
While each of the different modeling and analysis sections provided recommended 
solutions, the optimum solution must not be selected without consideration of all possible 
inputs.  Therefore, an examination of each analysis and interaction allowed the selection 
of the optimum solution using the entire modeling and analysis effort.  The OMOE was 
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developed in three sections: weapon engagement performance, warhead performance, and 
UAV impacts.  The OMOE sections were used in discussion of the results for each 
section. 
Performance Modeling and Simulation had several KPPs associated with it: 
"Minimum Weapon Range," "Maximum Effective Weapon Range," "Weapon Speed," and 
"Weapon Accuracy."  Table 58 shows the candidate weapons' performance in each of 
these categories, ranked by best performance. 
The M-4 system easily offers the best standoff range capability.  Its ability to 
successfully engage a target at a range of over 3 km is impressive and is nearly twice that of 
its nearest contender, the M-5.  While the M-4 miss distance performance was exceeded 
slightly by both the GB-1 and GB-2, the standoff range of the M-4 is over four times that of 
the GB-2.  
 





Weapon Miss Distance 
(feet) 
1 M-4 (11,727) GB-2 (0.4) 
2 M-5 (6,623) GB-1 (0.4) 
3 M-3 (5,043) M-4 (0.5) 
4 M-2 (3,220) M-2 (8.7) 
5 M-1 (3,038) M-3 (18.2) 
6 GB-2 (2,765) M-5 (91.0) 
7 GB-1 (2,339) M-1 (118.0) 
8 Bomb (1,762) Bomb (651.6) 
 
Warhead performance had two KPPs associated with it.  These were applied in the 
OMOE formula in an effort to reward effective target performance while minimizing 
collateral damage.  Collateral damage was not directly selected as a KPP; however, 
analysis was provided to allow full understanding of the possible warhead impacts in 
various operational scenarios.  The ranked KPP results of the warhead analysis follow. 
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Table 59 - Warhead Lethality Radius Rankings 
Rank Lethality Radius of Warhead against Human Target (meters) 
Lethality Radius of Warhead against 
Vehicle Target (meters) 
1 GB-2 (0.69) GB-2 (0.76) 
2 M-5 (1.82) M-5 (2.01) 
3 M-4 (3.26) M-4 (3.59) 
4 GB-1 (4.60) GB-1 (5.08) 
5 M-3 (5.92) M-3 (6.54) 
6 Bomb (7.28) Bomb (8.04) 
7 M-2 (9.66) M-2 (10.66) 
8 M-1 (9.90) M-1 (10.93) 
 
The GB-2 warhead lethality radius performance was exceptional due to the low 
number of fragments expected in the explosively formed projectile construction.  
However, the lethality radius is insufficient to successfully address the secondary target of 
the fixed target scenario even with perfect targeting.  The same applies for the M-5 
weapon.  The lethality radius becomes adequate beginning with the M-4 and GB-1 
weapons, requiring precise targeting, which both weapons have demonstrated.   
UAV Performance had several KPPs contributing to it, including Maximum 
Weapons at Takeoff, Maximum Weaponized UAV Range, Maximum Weaponized UAV 
On-Station Duration, and Stand-Off Range.  Aerodynamic Analysis provides the 
information used to calculate the results for two of these KPPs, as well as an additional 
derived factor.  Though there were some differences in degradation effects for the various 
options, none are significantly better than others during a full weapon loadout.  However, 
the M-4, GB-1, GB-2, Bomb, and M-5 weapons offer multiple rounds resulting in 
degradations similar to the effects due to other weapon single rounds.  This offers the 
possibility of operating with less than a full weapon load, reducing the UAV degradation 
impact if required, as well as possibly increasing actual on-station duration as the UAV 




Table 60 - Degradation Effects of Weaponization on Tier II UAV Aero Performance 
(Maximum Weapon Loadout) 










M-3 1 -9.2 -19.5 -3.1 
M-4 4 -9.5 -20.9 -4.2 
M-2 1 -10.0 -21.6 -4.1 
GB-1 3 -10.7 -23.2 -4.7 
M-1 1 -11.6 -24.9 -5.2 
GB-2 2 -12.2 -25.8 -7.0 
Bomb 2 -12.2 -25.8 -7.0 
M-5 10 -15.1 -29.6 -8.7 
 
The OMOE scores and resulting CAIV recommendations provided interesting data.  
The CAIV recommendations include the M-4 as the preferred solution, with M-5 and GB-1 
preferred second choices.  The OMOE scores resulting for the analysis and other 
measured parameters are presented in Table 61.   
 
Table 61 - Candidate OMOE Rankings 
Rank Candidate OMOE 
1 M-5 0.622 
2 M-4 0.564 
3 GB-2 0.443 
4 M-2 0.350 
5 M-3 0.307 
6 GB-1 0.271 
7 M-1 0.162 
8 Bomb 0.108 
 
However, such recommendations cannot be used without full evaluation of all 
available data.  The top-rated weapon from the CAIV analysis, the M-5, though 
possessing the desirable attributes of large standoff range and multiple weapon capability, 
displayed an average 91-meter miss distance.  Though the miss distances achieved during 
modeling may be inaccurate, the M-5 includes an underpowered warhead unable to 
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accomplish the fixed target scenario even with perfect targeting.  It is the judgment of the 
Team that the M-5 should not be considered a possible solution for the presented problem 
at this time.  
Given the analysis performed, the Team recommends the M-4 weapon for use with 
the Tier II UAV for the accomplishment of the proposed scenarios.  Its unsurpassed 
standoff range, high accuracy, and adequate warhead will allow successful rapid 
engagement of targets while limiting enemy damage to the UAV and collateral damage.  
A secondary selection, the GB-2, also offers excellent accuracy and comparable warhead 
performance but with significantly less standoff range.  Both weapons may be used day or 
night, offering wide operational flexibility.  Both also offer the capability of more than 
one round being on-board the UAV at takeoff, promising longer duration missions and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of the investigation was to determine the feasibility of arming Tier I 
and Tier II UAVs in aiding the C-IED mission. System engineering processes were used 
throughout the project in analysis of requirements and stakeholder needs, functional 
analysis, and the generation of an objectives hierarchy.  SE tools were used to help map 
the needs to hardware, resulting in a notional architecture. Research was performed using 
open sources for identification of possible solutions and gathering the information 
necessary for the analysis of alternatives and development of models.  Modeling of 
candidate solutions and their financial and operational implications led to identification of 
the optimum solution for each Tier of UAV.   
A. Conclusions 
Tier I UAVs are not feasible for weaponization in their current configuration. The 
analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that due to the very small available payload capacity, the 
only feasible weapon would be an explosive nose cone. However, this implementation 
could prove potentially dangerous for personnel. If the nosecone is armed with some 
explosive device, safety would dictate having a mechanical safe-arm device to allow safe 
transport. While in safe mode, even if the primer were to go off, the full warhead would not 
detonate. However, in preparation for launch, the safe-arm would be set to “armed.” As 
this Tier of UAV is hand-launched, there is the distinct possibility it could hit the ground 
close to the launching personnel and trigger detonation. 
Based on cost analysis and weapons effectiveness modeling, the RUINS Team 
found the optimum solution for the Tier II UAV is either the M-4 or the GB-1 weapons.  
Either selection offers the possibility of multiple weapons being onboard the aircraft at 
takeoff, allowing for the attack of more than one target and longer on-station persistence.  
Both offer engagement ranges outside of the anticipated enemy defense range, though 
within visual detection range.  With low cost and high performance, the M-4 is suitable 
for the needs of the C-IED mission.  A second recommended alternative is the GB-1.  
The cost effectiveness may outweigh the poor performance shown in the modeling and 
simulation depending on the needs of the user. 
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B. Logistics Conclusions 
As previously stated, the logistics and support will be largely similar to existing 
UAS and weapon support.  The UAS unit currently includes several UAVs, ground 
control stations, launcher, recovery device, personnel, transport vehicles, repair 
equipment, and enough spares and supplies to operate for a specified amount of time.  
This would be expanded to include the M-4 weapon and its associated storage, repair, and 
transportation equipment. 
Due to the cost, complexity, and small size of the weapon, only depot-level 
maintenance should be required.  In the field, a built-in self-test would be performed.  If 
the weapon failed the test, it would be removed and shipped back for repairs.  Assuming 
adequate stores, maintaining weapons in the field is unnecessary.  Depending on the 
operations tempo, and the number of weapons fired per mission, a significant number of 
weapons could be required.  For example if all four missiles were fired every mission, and 
two missions were carried out in a 24 hour period, then 56 M-4 missiles would be needed to 
sustain a week’s worth of operations.   
1. Operational Support 
Operations would be supported through the normal methods for UAS units with the 
addition of some specialized personnel.  Personnel would need to be trained to properly 
handle, load, and unload weapons from the UAV.  The pilot would need to be trained on 
the capabilities, tactics, and operation of the weapon.  EOD personnel would have to be 
collocated or be nearby to handle hang fires or jettisoned weapons. 
After integrating the new equipment and armament, the users must be trained.  It is 
essential that the users are well equipped with the knowledge to operate the equipment as 
people’s lives hang in the balance.  New displays, controls, and procedures associated 
with the M-4 will require the operator to complete additional training.  Employing the 
weapon correctly will come from a combination of operational, computer-based, and 
classroom training.  Training is just as important as the operational availability of the 
weapon.  If the weapon is functional and the user cannot operate it, the mission is a failure.  
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2. Disposal and Demilitarization 
Disposal would again be similar to current operations.  The current components of 
the UAS would be no different than the systems currently fielded.  Weapons would be 
kept separate and disposed of as they typically are in accordance with regulations. 
C. Solution Risks 
Final selection of M-4 as the optimal solution allowed closer examination of the 
risks involved with continuing to pursue its integration with the Tier II UAV.  These risks 
have the potential to severely impact the successful development of the RUINS.  
Identification of the anticipated risks, their likelihood of occurrence, and possible 
consequences will allow active monitoring and management as the project proceeds to its 
future phases. 
A primary risk is the selected alternative.  The risk is due to the lineage of much of 
the data used in performing analysis and tradeoffs.  Identification of M-4 as the optimum 
alternative relied heavily on modeling and simulation during the selection of alternatives.  
While efforts were made to obtain accurate and representative data, many of the systems 
investigated during the project were notional and prototypes, including the M-4.  In the 
absence of documented open-source data, engineering estimates or approximations were 
used.  These estimates may have caused an unintended biasing in the selection process.  
The consequences resulting from this risk are severe if not monitored closely.  Large 
amounts of effort and funding could be expended pursuing a solution that is not truly 
feasible.  To mitigate the risk, the Team recommends further modeling and analysis when 
more data becomes available, or modeling in a classified environment, before proceeding 
further with any acquisition plans. 
A second risk is associated with the integration of the selected weapon system with 
the UAS.  It was assumed early in the project that the UAV airframe would be able to 
endure the additional stresses caused by the mounting, transport, and operation of the 
weapon system.  It was also assumed that the UAV would be able to power the weapon 
system and any necessary support equipment without modification.  Finally, the onboard 
and ground control processing resources were assumed to be capable of hosting and 
performing any additional software instructions necessary for the successful control of the 
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weapon system.  These assumptions form a significant risk judged to have a medium 
likelihood of occurrence but with severe consequences.  If such an event occurs, severe 
implementation delays and financial impacts could result.  To mitigate this risk, the Team 
recommends immediate stress and aero analysis, and better determination of power and 
processing requirements to better gauge required resources against those currently 
available. 
A final identified risk is with the specific identified option.  The M-4 system 
includes rocket propulsion.  There is some concern that the rocket motor may crack during 
repeated takeoffs and landings.  Damage to the motor could cause failure of the motor, 
increased maintenance requirements, and unreliable operation.  The likelihood of 
occurrence was judged to be low as other rocket motors have experienced similar loads 
without failure, with a relatively severe consequence if it occurred, as the selection process 
would have to be repeated.  To mitigate, the Team recommends better definition of the 
anticipated load environment and continuing efforts throughout the procurement process to 
insure the motor will perform as intended. 
To assist in the tracking of the risks, a graphical depiction of the identified risks, 
their associated likelihood of occurrence, and relative consequence of occurrence was 
constructed.  This graph is presented as Figure 105. 
 






















3. Rocket Motor Damage
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D. Recommendations 
The following list captures the recommendations suggested by the RUINS team. 
• The modeling should be run again using more accurate information and more 
encompassing scenarios. The analysis performed during the project was based 
entirely on open source information.  Open source information can be quite 
accurate; it can also be entirely incorrect.  While there is a significant amount 
of information relevant to the topic, much of it was not approved for public 
release.  In many cases, engineering estimates were made or time-consuming 
searches for approximate or equivalent information were conducted. The 
accuracy of input data certainly affects the accuracy of the modeling outputs.   
• Investigate improving the WMS and Ground Control Station hardware and 
software suite for the Tier II UAV. The WMS concept need not be applied to 
just weapons, but other items that could support ISR or C-IED missions.  This 
would allow the payload controller to have C2 over anything from a weapon to 
another sensor package. 
• Instead of arming a Tier I UAV, consider AeroVironment's Switchblade. This 
device is designed to be disposable.  To address the safety concerns during 
launch mentioned earlier, it comes packed in a launch tube and is ejected into 
flight by a propulsive charge.  The operator is able to maintain a safe distance 
during this operation. 
• Research a more appropriate use of the available payload in the Tier I UAV.  
The Team suggests that instead of arming, the Warfighter would be better 
served by improving and enhancing the onboard imaging capabilities, allowing 
it to better perform its existing ISR mission or just extending the endurance. 
• Research and investigation into identifying the optimum detector-tracking 
system is recommended.  The lack of detailed system information and the 
modeling package selected for the project did not offer the specialization 
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Appendix A Functional Hierarchy 
Perform External RUINS Control  
 
Figure A-1 - Communicate with UAV Functional Hierarchy 
 
Figure A-2 - Analyze RUINS Data Functional Hierarchy 
 















































Figure A-4 - Control UAV Weapons Functional Hierarchy 
Prepare and Launch RUINS 
 
Figure A-5 - Communicate with Controller Preflight Functional Hierarchy 
 





































Figure A-7 - Ready RUINS for Launch Functional Hierarchy 
 
Figure A-8 - Launch RUINS Functional Hierarchy 
Fly RUINS Mission 
 
Figure A-9 - Communicate with Controller in Flight Functional Hierarchy 
Ready RUINS for 
Launch
2.3








































Figure A-10 - Provide On-Board Vehicle Control Functional Hierarchy 
 
Figure A-11 - Conduct Sensor Operations Functional Hierarchy 
 
















































Figure A-13 - Monitor System Status Functional Hierarchy 
Recover UAS 
 
Figure A-14 - Communicate with Controller Post-flight Functional Hierarchy 
 























Figure A-16 - Remove Returned Weapon(s) Functional Hierarchy 
 
 
































Appendix B Functional Flow Block Diagrams 
Perform External RUINS Control 
 
Figure B-1 - Communicate with UAV FFBD 
 
Figure B-2 - Analyze RUINS Data FFBD 
 












































Figure B-4 - Control UAV Sensors 
 
Figure B-5 - Control UAV Sensors 
 
Prepare and Launch RUINS 
 

































Figure B-7 - Prepare RUINS for Flight FFBD 
 
 
Figure B-8 - Ready RUINS for Launch FFBD 
 
 






























Fly RUINS Mission 
 
Figure B-10 - Communicate with Controller in Flight FFBD 
 
 
















Figure B-12 - Conduct Sensor Operations FFBD 
 
 














































































Figure B-16 - Land RUINS FFBD 
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Appendix D MODELING AND SUMULATION DATA 
 
Table D-1 – RUINS Modeling & Simulation Results Summary - Bombs 
Weapon Altitude (ft) Target Type Time of Flight (s) Miss Distance Range (ft) Detonation Result Score 
Bomb 2000 Fixed 23 687.47 2248.12 2 0 
Bomb 500 Fixed 11 615.81 1275.94 2 0 
Bomb 2000 Moving 23 734.04 2740.32 2 0 
Bomb 500 Moving 10 665.48 1210.03 2 0 
GB1 2000 Fixed 16 0.24 2248.12 1 1 
GB1 500 Fixed 13 0.37 1215.20 1 1 
GB1 2000 Moving 22 0.44 3159.52 1 1 
GB1 500 Moving 12 0.43 2430.40 1 1 
GB2 2000 Fixed 17 0.30 3281.04 1 1 
GB2 500 Fixed 11 0.38 2248.12 1 1 
GB2 2000 Moving 26 0.71 4253.20 1 1 




Table D-2 – RUINS Modeling & Simulation Results Summary - Missiles 
Weapon Altitude (ft) Target Type Time of Flight (s) Miss Distance Range (ft) Detonation Result Score 
M1 2000 Fixed 16 81.51 2977.29 2 0 
M1 500 Fixed 12 78.32 2308.92 2 0 
M1 2000 Moving 16 394.46 3584.90 2 0 
M1 500 Moving 13 154.46 3098.82 2 0 
M2 2000 Fixed 28 0.42 5893.83 1 1 
M2 500 Fixed 12 0.15 1397.51 1 1 
M2 2000 Moving 22 16.92 3949.47 2 1 
M2 500 Moving 15 39.62 2491.21 2 0 
M3 2000 Fixed 23 1.98 4496.32 2 1 
M3 500 Fixed 24 32.25 5590.02 2 1 
M3 2000 Moving 18 4.20 3767.19 2 1 
M3 500 Moving 26 43.20 7291.33 2 0 
M4 2000 Fixed 51 0.69 10511.68 1 1 
M4 500 Fixed 68 0.66 10511.68 1 1 
M4 2000 Moving 56 0.25 12942.11 1 1 
M4 500 Moving 85 0.16 15190.28 1 1 
M5 2000 Fixed 10 117.05 7230.57 2 0 
M5 500 Fixed 7 33.43 4739.37 2 0 
M5 2000 Moving 11 192.96 7291.33 2 0 
M5 500 Moving 8 64.88 6015.35 2 0 
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